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Sustainable industrial development: 
alleviating poverty by fostering productivity growth 
Industrialisation is a key element in the promotion of sustainable development by 
creating productive employment and generating value added income and hence 
making a significant contribution to the eradication of poverty. As part of the United 
Nations (UN) system, the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) 
has responsibility for promoting industrialisation throughout the developing world in 
cooperation with its Ί69 Member States. In this interview, UNIDO's Director General 
Carlos Magariños answers the Courier's questions on how to forge a stronger 
consensus on the role of industrialisation within the general development paradigm. 
Maurizio Carbone 
In the past two years the international community has 
made concrete progress towards achieving the 
Millennium Development Goals. Doha, Monterrey and 
Johannesburg show that the developed world is 
committed to eradicating world poverty. What was 
UNIDO's role in these major conferences? Is there a 
common, coherent strategy within the UN system on 
how to promote industrial development? 
In a nutshell, the outcome of the three major conferences 
can be summarised as follows: Doha recognises that interna-
tional trade cooperation has to heed better the needs of the 
developing countries; Monterrey celebrates a consensus on 
how development is to be financed; and Johannesburg 
strengthens the international resolve to achieve development 
in ways that are sustainable. From UNIDO's perspective it 
was of paramount importance to see the role of the productive 
sector properly highlighted in these processes. While there is 
general agreement now that trade has to supplement aid in 
promoting the greater well-being of all people, trade liberali-
sation can onlv benefit the developing countries if they have 
sufficient productive capacities to generate tradable goods and 
il their products satisfy international norms and standards. In 
this sense, the UN system could do more. In particular, 
increased efforts are needed to promote technology coopera-
tion, innovation and competitiveness. For instance, UNIDO 
is participating actively in the task force on technolog}
7 estab-
lished under the Millennium Project directed by Jeffrey Sachs. 
Furthermore, I intend to initiate consultations with the 
Executive Heads of several other UN agencies to identify 
avenues for increased cooperation within the UN system in 
this area. It is also important to note that the UN Secretan-
General has been mandated by the General Assembly to 
include the topic of industrialisation in his yearly report on the 
implementation of the New Partnership for Africa's 
Development. UNIDO will cooperate ver)' closely with the 
Secretan- General in this area. 
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Thinking about industrialisation and 
industrial policy has undergone many 
shifts in the post-war period. What lessons 
have we learned since the 1960s? 
With respect to industrialisation, the part 
played by 'industry in development' — if it was 
ever seriously questioned — is full)' recognised 
again. In particular, the key role of manufactur-
ing industry for growth - based mainly on tech-
nology-driven increase of productivity and some 
essential "co-factors', like human skills or appro-
priate institutions - is undisputed. As regards 
It is the role of governments to formulate a 
national vision, to achieve consensus and 
unite the key stakeholders of society 
behind such a vision, as well as. eventually, 
to create the conditions for unleashing the 
dynamism of the private sector in achieving 
that vision 
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policy, the new lessons take into account, in particular, the 
question marks about the role of industrial policy in the success 
stories of Japan and the East Asian Tigers. The core of the new 
thinking is that functioning markets and private agents acting 
in these markets matter most, also for the development of 
industry and its contribution to growth. However, they must 
not be left to themselves completely, if the goal is to promote 
and accelerate industrialisation and growth effectively. In areas 
where markets fail predictably, public policy has to step in. 
Prominent among such areas, where public intenention is 
expected to enhance welfare, are those to do with the creation 
as well as the diffusion of knowledge and information. It is the 
public-goods chatacteristics of all kinds of knowledge that are 
at the roots of market failure and thus provide a rationale for 
policies to correct it. Another broad field for policy-making is 
that of building institutions required for and conducive to sus­
taining and accelerating the development of industry. 
Economic theorising and recently empirical results too point to 
the pivotal role of institutions for sustained growth (also of and 
through industry) and to the fact that policies are at the core of 
establishing fruitful institutional settings, which can vary wide­
ly between countries. 
With the exception of some East Asian countries and to 
a lesser extent China, almost all developing countries 
have experienced a process of industrial regression or 
de-industrialisation. Can the industrial sector still play a 
role in the fight against poverty and marginalisation? 
By addressing the economic and social causes of poverty, 
industry can play a major role in helping to overcome it. The 
indirect contribution of industry through its promotion of eco­
nomic growth, which is a necessary condition for a sustainable 
reduction of poverty, is undisputed. The direct contribution of 
industn' to poverry reduction, though more narrowly defined 
and thus limited, is nevertheless significant, and includes the 
creation of jobs for clearly disadvantaged groups like unskilled 
workers. For most developing countries, the greatest benefits 
can be derived through a pattern of industrial specialisation in 
accordance with the principle of comparative advantage. In 
addition, an industrialisation strateg)' meeting the needs of 
rural development can also be expected to have positive effects 
with respect to poverty reduction in the affected areas. 
By contrast, the topic of marginalisation reflects broader 
issues or how developing countries can take full advantage of 
the potential benefits of the rapidly advancing process of glob­
alisation. In this context it may be noted that industry can act 
as a key agent for securing developmental benefits from rapid 
international integration, with respect to trade, investment and 
technolog)' transfer. In the case of ttade, for example, manu­
facturing industry is a sector producing tradable goods only. If 
this production meets the standards of international competi­
tiveness, it forges a most important link to world markets. 
Similar global integration effects occur in industry with respect 
to investment and the transmission of knowledge. A prudent 
industrialisation strateg)' may thus be seen as an indispensable 
element in fighting economic marginalisation. 
What can we expect in the near future for Africa? 
Expectations for Africa in the not too distant future are built 
around this renewed view of what industrialisation can do for 
development at large and of the attendant 'economically cor­
rect' policies. Given what we know today about the multi-
faceted develop­
ment problems 
of African coun­
tries, it seems 
reasonable to 
expect that in 
the near future, 
the decline of 
industry - as 
reflected, for 
instance in 
decreasing per 
capita manufac­
turing output of 
African Least 
Developed 
Countries - will 
be arrested, stas,-
nation lifted and 
turned into 
increase before long. Based on this scenario, industry can be 
expected to make its much-needed contribution (through 
growth) to .a substantial reduction of poverty by 2015, as stat­
ed in the first of the Millennium Development Goals. 
Are there different paths to industrialisation? Or do you 
think that greater export-orientation is the only "game 
in town"? 
Although export-oriented industrialisation may not be the 
only path, it seems to be the most promising one by far for 
most developing countries. There are a number of reasons 
for this. The first one goes back to Adam Smith's dictum 
about the division of labour being limited by the extent of 
the market. Only very few developing countries have domes­
tic markets large enough to induce a pattern of specialisation 
leading to an efficient allocation of resources. In addition to 
allowing for an optimal pattern of specialisation, world mar­
kets provide the chance for the smaller economies to exploit 
scale effects in their production. Furthermore, exposure to 
international competition as a rule leads to increases in tech­
nical efficiency with the ensuing gains for growth. Further 
increases in productivity come from knowledge acquisition 
associated with export activities, or simply from "learning by 
exporting ". 
The experience of leading industrialised economies 
shows that innovation and technological change are 
key elements of the industrialisation process. Do you 
think that applying and adapting imported technologies 
is the only option for developing countries? 
The adoption of imported technology is clearly not the 
only feasible path to industrial development, although it 
may often be the most appropriate one. Empirical studies of 
economic growth - including some carried out by UNIDO 
- have shown that technological progress is the achievement 
of a relatively small number of industrialised countries, and 
that the remaining industrialised and virtually all developing 
economies can realise large productivity gains from the 
adoption of this technology. A prerequisite for the successful 
use of foreign technolog)', and the learning processes associ­
ated with it, is some own effort in research and development, 
which, however, does not have to result in a large volume of 
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world-class innovations. One of the reasons why it is pru-
dent for "technological followers" to concentrate on the 
adoption, adaptation and utilisation of industrial-technolog-
ical knowledge transmitted from abroad is that this type of 
knowledge displays clear traits of an international public 
good. It offers a foundation on which developing countries 
can base their technological advances without foregoing the 
possibility of their own, albeit limited, innovative activity. 
What can the international community do to close 
this technological divide? 
In addition to promoting the international integration of 
the industrial sectors of developing countries, more direct 
support to building 
industrial capacities in 
the less industrialised 
countries can be offered 
through technical coop-
eration between these 
countries and the inter-
national community. In 
the field of industry, 
such cooperation can 
take many forms, cover-
ing areas ranging from 
investment and technol-
ogy promotion to busi-
ness support services 
and further to energy-
efficiency and cleaner 
production methods. In 
this context, the provi-
sion of direct support 
for the building of insti-
tutions tailored to cer-
tain aspects of industrial 
development and to the 
specific conditions pre-
vailing in a given devel-
oping country is partic-
ularly important. This 
may be complemented 
by the provision of appropriate policy advice for the simple-
reason that good institutions result - in a cumulative 
fashion - from good policies. 
The basis for any industrial strategy is a national 
vision of industrial development. Governments play a 
key role in allowing heavy foreign involvement in 
industrialisation, through foreign direct investment 
(FDI) by multinational corporations. What are the risks 
of a too "dependent" industrial policy? 
First of all, it is important to underline the premise of 
your question: yes, it is indeed the role of governments to 
formulate a national vision, to achieve consensus and unite 
the key stakeholders of society behind such a vision, as well 
as, eventually, to create the conditions for unleashing the 
dynamism of the private sector in achieving that vision. 
This is fundamentally different from previous times when 
governments prepared so-called industrial master plans 
pretty much in a top-down manner. The role of FDI needs 
to be considered in this context. In the past, there was often 
a black-and-white perspective on FDI. It was either consid-
ered a devil in disguise or counted on as the panacea for 
development. In reality, the challenge is to utilise FDI as a 
mechanism to benefit the entire economy. This, by the way, 
also implies working with those transnational corporations 
that look beyond a crude short-term profit maximisation 
strategy. What comes into play here is corporate social 
responsibility — an issue that is also high on the agenda of 
the EU. Also, let us not forget that, for successful industri-
alisation to take place, heavy reliance on FDI is not the only 
option. For instance, the Republic of Korea - during its 
take-off phase in the 1970s and 1980s — relied mostly on 
other forms of technology acquisition such as licensing 
agreements. At the same time, it is true that most develop-
ing countries have assigned a prominent role to attracting 
FDI flows and the technological and managerial know-how 
that comes with it. While the benefits can be tremendous, 
there are some risks which need to be carefullv monitored. 
These include a possibly negative impact on the balance of 
payments when the levels of imported technology, raw 
materials and components are high and the outflow of prof-
its and dividends puts a burden on the current account. 
Other risk factors relate to a possible "race to the bottom" 
in terms of competing with generous investment incentives, 
and to the danger of creating a dual economy with a mod-
ern enclave-type foreign sector co-existing with traditional 
domestic firms. Clearly, therefore, the key policy challenge 
is one of linking the nvo areas. This starts with attracting 
FDI into the most appropriate sectors, and requires build-
ing up the physical and institutional infrastructure that 
would allow and foster business linkages between foreign-
invested and domestic firms. We at UNIDO are support-
ing developing countries in creating such linkages. 
The small-scale industry sector is often seen as an 
alternative to big firms. Small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs) play a leading role in creating 
employment in low-income countries, especially in 
Africa and Asia. But there is also evidence that, while 
only a very small percentage of SMEs graduate, the 
majority of them remain small or disappear. 
I would not consider small enterprises as an alternative to 
large ones, be they domestic or foreign-owned. Rather, they 
are a complement to big businesses. It is essential to build 
up an industrial sector that effectively combines large, 
medium and small enterprises. Many researchers see the 
key weakness of poor developing countries exactly in hav-
ing a myriad of informal micro enterprises on the one hand 
and just a few large enterprises on the other. These 
economies are lacking the so-called "missing middle" of 
dynamic small and medium companies that are so impor-
In the past, there was often a black-and-white 
perspective on FDI. It was either considered a 
devil in disguise or counted on as the panacea 
for development. In reality, the challenge is to 
utilise FDI as a mechanism to benefit the entire 
economy 
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tant for a resilient and flexible economic structure. Also, 
just relying on small enterprises with low-productivity 
would not be a viable strategy under an international trade 
regime in which the most competitive firms worldwide will 
prevail. In the long run, the artificial protection of ineffi-
cient enterprises is likely to be socially expensive and would 
only increase adjustment pressure in the future. The task at 
hand is to make micro and small enterprises more produc-
tive, to increase their efficient use of resources and to move 
them towards more consistent output patterns and higher 
quality' products. A lot can be done in this direction: from 
supporting technology and management upgrading to fos-
tering cooperation such as in sectoral clusters and, most 
importantly, facilitating their participation in regional and 
international trade through helping them to comply with 
increasingly demanding technical and environmental stan-
dards. The goal must not be to relegate poor developing 
countries to low productivity activities but to promote a 
gradual process of productivity enhancement and innova-
tion. Micro and small enterprises are a starting point in this 
direction, a breeding ground for domestic entrepreneurship 
and not an end in themselves. 
You discussed some of the constraints that small firms 
face. You did not mention access to credit... 
In my view, the key issue here is not access to credit. No 
doubt, finance is important - be it micro-credit, conven-
tional loans or equity capital. But equally, if not more impor-
tant, are business development services that help new entre-
preneurs to identify potential markets, to improve product 
quality, to select and acquire new technologies, to apply 
clean production approaches efficiently, to exchange experi-
ence and to cooperate, such as in industrial clusters. In other 
words, injecting finance alone, without ensuring the techno-
logical and managerial upgrading required, will not do the 
trick. 
You referred to industrial clusters. Can the "industrial 
district model" guarantee Africa the necessary 
flexibility for international competitiveness? 
Whereas 15 years ago, SME cluster development seemed 
to be a prerogative of OECD economies, the last decade 
witnessed successful cluster experiences in Latin America 
(for instance Chile, Brazil and Mexico) and in South Asia 
(most notably in the Indian sub-continent). In Africa, SME 
clustering has been under-researched. The limited evidence 
available suggests a large number of under-performing clus-
ters with hundreds and even thousands of micro-scaled 
enterprises, often in the metalworking and repair sector. 
The degree of specialisation and collaboration of these 
enterprises is low. Moreover these clusters face very severe 
infrastructure problems both in terms of utilities (e.g. 
roads, electricity, information technology) and institutions 
(e.g. contract enforcing, law and order). These features 
limit the capacity of enterprises to reach global markets and 
improve quality and technology. However, these clusters 
offer an environment conducive for the development of 
entrepreneurship and skills. Provided infrastructure is 
developed, it is likely that "collective efficiency" might 
emerge. 
Finally, the relationship between industrial 
performance and pollution. The last UNIDO report 
shows that it is not necessarily the most advanced 
countries that pollute most. It is generally believed 
that industrial development compromises the 
environment: is that a misperception then? 
Yes indeed. Progressing industrialisation does — rather 
would - compromise the environment, if nothing were done 
about it. The danger comes from the sheer volume of pollu-
tion and resource depletion associated with increasing world 
industrial output, and here the advanced countries still figure 
prominently. However, it is also clear that the more advanced 
a country is, the less it tends to pollute in relative - for some 
pollutants even in absolute - terms. All this underlines the 
importance of strong efforts to make industrial production 
cleaner, in view of the inexorable rise of world levels of indus-
trial production in the context of overall development. The 
major instruments for achieving such goals are technological. 
Hence it must be seen as a primary objective to transfer envi-
ronmentally sound technology to the developing countries in 
large measure and at the fastest pace possible. Leveraging the 
complementarities of developmental and environmental 
efforts has the potential to maximize the contribution of 
industrial expansion to fairer and more environmentally 
responsible sustainable development. ■ 
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EU-Cuban relations 
Taking further steps 
towards Cotonou membership 
The year 2003 marks a decisive step in strengthening the relations 
between the European Union and Cuba. On 8 January Mr Perez Roque, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cuba, sent a formal request for accession to 
the Cotonou Agreement. In February, a European Commission Delegation 
opened in Havana. 
Maurizio Carbone 
Over the past 18 months much progress has been 
achieved in relations between the European Union and 
Cuba. Two meetings at high political level took place 
(in Havana in December 2001 and in Copenhagen in 
November 2002) and a further meeting is planned for the 
end of 2003. However, although Cuba is now a full mem-
ber of CARIFORUM and has recently signed a partial free 
trade agreement with CARICOM, it is the only country in 
Latin America and the Caribbean that has not yet signed a 
cooperation agreement with the European Union. 
Nevertheless, the EU is Cuba's most important partner in 
terms of trade and foreign direct investment (FDI), as well 
as a major tourist provider. In 2001, EU exports to Cuba, 
which have doubled over the past ten years, stood at €1.43 
billion, while imports from Cuba reached €581 million. As 
for FDI, the EU's share exceeds 50 per cent of total foreign 
investment in Cuba. 
Strengthening political dialogue 
The basis of the EU policy towards Cuba is the Common 
Position (CP) adopted in 1996. In the first paragraph, the 
CP states that "the objective of the European Union in its 
relations with Cuba is to encourage a process of peaceful 
transition to pluralist democracy and respect for human 
rights and freedoms". On the basis of this position, the 
European Commission has been able to provide, since 1993, 
close to €145 million in assistance programmes to Cuba 
(see table). The CP has been confirmed every six months. 
However, following the 12th evaluation of the CP, on 
10 December 2002 in the conclusions of the General 
Affairs and External Relations Council, the Council intro-
duced two important modifications while reconfirming the 
CP principles. Firstly, there will no longer be limitations on 
development cooperation measures provided they meet the 
main objectives of the CP. Secondly, the periodic reviews of 
the CP are extended from six to 1 2 months. 
The opening of the new Delegation in February 2003 
represents a further step in this process of rapprochement 
between the EU and Cuba. "Cuba and the EU are tied 
together in an important strategic partnetship. A partner-
ship based on our historical ties but also on the fact that the 
EU today is Cuba's main trading partner, major source of 
foreign investment, first provider of tourists and its princi-
pal partner in development cooperation. I am convinced 
that from now on we will travel together some way towards 
the goal of fostering a democratic and prosperous Cuba," 
stated Poul Nielson, EU Commissioner for Development 
and Humanitarian Aid. 
Application for membership 
Another event will allow Cuba and the EU to turn a page 
in their relations. Following an announcement made on 8 
December 2002 by President Castro Ruiz in Havana before 
a meeting of all CARICOM Heads of Government, Cuba 
formally applied for accession to the ACP-EC Partnership 
Agreement (the Cotonou agreement) on 8 January 2003. 
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"The expression of this desire takes into account the his-
torical bonds forged by the Republic of Cuba with the ACP 
States and the EU Member States, the similarities of its eco-
nomic-productive structure with that of the rest of the ACP 
States and the active participation that the Republic of 
Cuba has been undertaking since its accession to the ACP 
Group in December 2000", stated Mr Felipe Perez Roque. 
This application for accession follows the granting of 
informal observer status for the Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA) negotiation process. As formal status 
could only be granted to candidate countries of or signato-
ries to the Cotonou agreement, Cuba was admitted as an 
informal observer during the "all-ACP" phase of the EPA 
negotiations. The first "all-ACP" phase is intended to be 
used for clarification and explanation on a certain number 
of salient issues that concern the ACP as a group. The 
regional phase, due to be launched in September 2003, will 
involve negotiating key issues such as market access, region-
al market building, and economic integration. 
Cuba's request for Cotonou membership will be assessed 
on the basis of Article 94 of the Cotonou agreement. This 
article states that any "independent State whose structural 
characteristics and economic and social situation are com-
parable to those in the ACP States" is eligible for member-
ship. It should be remembered that Cuba joined the ACP 
Group on 14 December 2000, thus placing the EU in a 
position of having a partnership agreement with the ACP 
Group from which Cuba is the only country not benefit-
ing. 
However, if Cuba is accepted by the ACP-EU Council of 
Ministers as a new member (which is subject to the con-
clusion of the ratification process in the Member States), it 
could not receive funds under the 9th EDF provision, as 
allocation has already been made. Article 94 establishes that 
any accession "may not infringe on the benefits enjoyed by 
the ACP States signatory to this Agreement under the pro-
visions on development co-operation financing." This does 
not prevent the EU, as was the case for South Africa, from 
adding a specific budget line to finance cooperation proj-
ects under the Agreement. Financial and commercial bene-
fits under Cotonou, some Member States point out, is sub-
ject to fully respecting the stipulations of Article 9 (which 
refers to democracy, human rights, and rule of law). The 
two phases, however, must be kept distinct. Whether it 
meets the democracy and human rights criterion is to be 
decided once Cuba becomes a full member of the 
Agreement and not at the moment of the application. ■ 
EU-Cuba development cooperation 
Poor relations with the US are a major handicap for Cuba's participation in many multilateral insti-
tutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB). Cuba, therefore, enjoys little multilateral development assistance. Its main 
donors are the UN agencies, such as the World Food Programme (WFP), the UN development 
Programme (UNDP), and UNICEF. 
As for the European Union, Cuba receives aid bilaterally from the Member States and from the 
European Community (EC). The bulk of assistance provided by the Member States goes into economic 
support measures targeting in particular the furthering of trade and investment opportunities for 
European companies, vocational training, small-scale agricultural support and local infrastructure. 
Since 1993, the EC has financed close to €145 million in assistance measures: most of this money 
(about €90 million) is in the field of humanitarian affairs through ECHO, the EC Humanitarian Office. 
The food security programme has also been a major provider of funds, with a total of some €20 mil-
lion. Since 1998, the budget lines 'co-financ-
ing of NGOs' and 'economic co-operation 
with Latin America countries' have become 
increasingly used for projects in Cuba, with 
funding reaching €18.8 million and €14.8 
million respectively in the period 1998-2001. 
The Commission decided in 2000 to phase 
out humanitarian aid on a programmable 
basis, since Cuba was no longer in a state of 
generalised emergency, and instead to 
mobilise financing for projects that promote 
economic reform and the development of 
civil society. 
EC cooperation with Cuba 1997-2001 
(commitments in M€) 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Humanitarian aid 
Disaster prevention 
Food security 
NGO co-financing 
Economic co-operation 
with LA countries 
EIDHR 
10.3 
0.2 
0.6 
1.1 
0 
9.S 
02 
2.4 
2 
0 
11.4 
0.7 
2.8 
2.1 
0 
2 
I 
8.2 
5.8 
0 
8.5 
0.9 
0 
5.4 
4.9 
0.5 
12.2 14.4  17 20.2 
Source: European Commission 
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Female genital mutilation: 
women step up the campaign at 
international level 
At the initiative of three associations (Associazione Italiana Donne 
per lo Sviluppo [AIDOS], No Peace Without Justice [NPWJ] and 
Tanzania Media Women's Association [TAMWA]), and supported 
by a number of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), 
dozens of women's associations from all over the world met on 
10 and 11 December 2002 on the occasion of World Human 
Rights Day at the European Parliament in Brussels, for the 
"STOP FGM; international campaign" conference, launching an 
international campaign to eradicate female genital mutilation. 
Moussa Sdwdduyu 
"Yes to respect for other cultures, but only if 
they respect human rights": this was the gist of the pro-
posals presented by Mrs Anna Karamanou, MEP and 
President of the Committee on Women's Rights and 
Equal Opportunities. 
Female genital mutilation is a traditional practice that 
is particularly common in Africa and the Middle East, 
and it consists of the partial or total ablation of a 
woman's external genital organs. It may involve the par-
tial cutting of the external genital organs and a reduc-
tion in the size of the vulval opening. The most radical 
form of genital mutilation is known as 'infibulation'. 
FGM is generally carried out on young girls of between 
four and twelve years of age as a rite of passage from 
childhood to adulthood. Sometimes it is carried out just 
after a woman gives birth to her first child. 
According to the WHO (World Health Organi-
zation), some 130 million women and children, princi-
pally in Africa, have suffered FGM. The phenomenon 
continues, with an average of two million instances per 
^ 
m 
1 
-
*m 
' 
' 
-
Maake women in 
Lesotho 
participating in a 
female circumcision 
ceremony 
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Female Genital Mutilation 
Mutilations Génitales Féminines 
Mutilazioni Genitali Femminili 
Stop Excision 
The World Health Organization estimates 
that two million girls undergo FGM or female 
circumcision every year 
year. In Somalia, for example, 98 per cent of women are 
victims of this practice. 
Gaining ground throughout the world 
Nowadays, FGM can be found throughout the world, 
and owing to population migration the phenomenon is 
now observed in Europe, the United States, Australia 
and elsewhere. According to Mrs Isabelle Gillette-Faye, 
a sociologist and Director of GAMS (Women's group 
for the abolition of sexual mutilation), it now exists on 
the territory of the European Union — 180,000 women 
and young girls have either been mutilated or are under 
threat of mutilation. There are approximately 43,000 in 
France, 40,000 in Italy, 37,000 in Germany and 33,000 
in the United Kingdom. 
In the developing countries, particularly in a village 
environment, female genital mutilation poses serious 
hygiene and health problems. The instruments that are 
used - kitchen knives, pieces of 
glass or razor blades — are often 
not sterile, and may be used on 
several young girls in succession. 
This situation promotes the spread 
of blood-transmissible diseases, 
such as HIV/AIDS. In the case of 
infibulation, there are frequent 
obstetric complications. 
In some countries, in order to 
prevent female genital mutilation 
giving rise to disease and illness, 
the practice is carried out by med-
ical staff. Such is the case, for 
Syfia/M.-A. Leplaideur 
news 
example, in Egypt, where 50 per cent of the Operations' 
are carried out by doctors. Campaigners believe that 
this in no way alters the fact that mutilation is still a 
violation of a woman's physical integrity. According to 
the present campaign's initiators, "even though parents 
who arrange for the practice to be carried out on their 
daughters do not intend to cause them harm, this is still 
a violation of the acknowledged fundamental rights of 
young girls and women: the right to physical integrity, 
to health, to dignity and to equality, irrespective of the 
degree of excision". 
The "STOP Female Genital Mutilation" campaign, 
financed by the European Initiative for Democracy and 
Human Rights, aims to increase public awareness of 
this phenomenon in Africa and also internationally. A 
formal appeal has been launched, aimed at collecting 
the maximum possible number of signatures. In addi-
tion, the campaign intends to gather and circulate 
information on FGM, and an internet website has been 
created for this purpose (www.stopfgm.org). 
A genuinely democratic state 
- the prerequisite for abolition of the practice 
At international level, female genital mutilation is 
punishable under the law. The Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, ratified by all African countries, 
the UN Convention on the Elimination of Violence 
against Women, the African Children's Charter and 
many other texts condemn FGM. In several African 
countries, the practice is now regarded as a crime pun-
ishable by imprisonment. Women, nevertheless, have to 
monitor application of these various texts. 
It is in this connection that female MEPs have come 
up with a number of ideas: MEP Mary Banotti, from 
Ireland, is keen to see the conclusions of the meeting's 
v/ork better publicized both in her own country and 
within the European Parliament. Her colleague, MEP 
Kathalijne Buitenweg, a member of the Green party 
from the Netherlands, is calling for judicial cooperation 
on the subject at global level, and MEP Elena 
Valenciano, a member of the Spanish Socialist Workers' 
Party, is seeking to set up an international organisation 
along the lines of UNAIDS. 
MEP Emma Bonino, from Italy, a pioneer in the 
fight against FGM, is proposing to take the campaign 
into the political arena. According to her, "the subject 
has to be brought to politicians' attention, because 
African, Arab and Asian women will never experience 
freedom without the advent of 
political democracy in their coun-
tries". For many researchers, female 
genital mutilation is a means 
whereby men, in the traditional 
environment, continue to domi-
nate women, which amounts to 
saying that this practice will cease 
only if women can use every means 
available in order to assert their 
rights. 
A genuinely democratic state there-
fore seems to be a prerequisite. ■ 
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ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly: 
cancellation of the 5
t
h session 
The fifth session of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly (JPA), which was 
due to take place in Brussels on 25-28 November 2002, was cancelled over a 
disagreement on the participation of two parliamentary delegates from 
Zimbabwe who are on an EU travel ban list. The next session of the JPA is 
scheduled to take place in the Spring of 2003 in Congo-Brazzaville. 
Anne-Marie Mouradian 
Photo European Parliament 
The Cancellation of the fifth session of the Joint 
Parliamentary Assembly came after the decision of the 
Conference of Presidents of the European Parliament' not to 
allow access to the European Parliament premises to two 
Zimbabwean delegates. Paul Mangwana, Minister of State for 
State Enterprises and Parastatals, and Christopher Kuruneri, 
Deputy Minister of Finance and Economic Development, both 
members of the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic 
Front (ZANU-PF), are included on the EU travel ban list as a 
consequence of sanctions imposed on the Zimbabwean regime 
by the European Union. These sanctions, imposed in February 
2002 due to lack of respect for human rights, included banning 
President Mugabe and other senior officials from travelling to 
EU countries and froze their 
assets in Europe. However, 
the two ministers were sent 
by the Zimbabwean govern-
ment as part of its delegation 
to the the fifth JPA session, 
despite being on the EU list. 
After the cancellation, the 
ACP secretariat issued a 
statement which said that it 
had been informed only on 
Friday 22 November of the 
European Parliament's deci-
sion to ban the two dele-
gates. The ACP Group 
insisted that it was not up to 
the EU to decide on whom 
to exclude from ACP coun-
tries' delegations. In its view, the issue should have been dealt 
with by the Bureau of the Joint Parliamentary Assembly, 
which is the only body with the authority to decide who par-
ticipates in the workings of the JPA. Pursuant to article 17 of 
the Cotonou Agreement, representatives to the ACP-EU 
Assembly shall be designated by the Parliaments of the coun-
tries concerned. Furthermore, the ACP members stressed not 
only that the Cotonou Agreement confers privileges and 
immunities on members of the JPA but also that the EU 
Council Common Position of 18 February 2002 stated that 
exemptions to the ban on visas to Zimbabwean ministers may 
be granted where travel is justified on grounds of attending 
meetings of international bodies. Thus, the ACP group main-
tained that the Zimbabwean delegates came under this category 
and so were exempted from the travel ban by 
authorities. 
the Belgian 
For members of the European Parliament, however, the issue 
was more of a political nature than legal. The fact that the 
Zimbabwean government had sent rwo delegates on the EU 
travel ban list when they could have chosen an}' of a number of 
other Members of Parliament was considered a provocation. 
According to Mrs Kinnock, Co-President of the JPA and 
Member of the European Parliament (MEP), the decision to 
send those two delegates was provocative, and cancellation 
could have been avoided if other delegates had been sent. In 
addition, derogating from a European Parliament resolution of 
5 September would have amounted to displaying serious incon-
sistency towards the European electorate. Quoting European 
Parliament President Pat Cox, Mrs Kinnock furthermore main-
tained that the two delegates were parties to serious violations of 
human rights, and the travel ban was to be rigorously enforced. 
According to Adrien Houngbedji, JPA Co-President and 
leader of Benin's National Assembly, "we and our European 
partners are committed to the same values: liberty, democracy, 
good governance and respect of human rights. Many members 
of the ACP Parliamentary Assembly have devoted their lives to 
fighting for these values. We would therefore take exception to 
the accusation that we are supporting human rights violations. 
We have taken this stance simply to comply with the rules that 
we, Europe and the ACP countries, have drawn up together". 
Suggestions aimed at reconciling the two parties included plans 
to move the Assembly to a different venue, or holding the meet-
ing without the listed Zimbabweans and thus dropping the ques-
tion of Zimbabwe from the agenda. Despite a weekend of intense 
negotiations, all attempts to reach a compromise ended in failure. 
The joint session was thus cancelled. The two parties went their 
separate ways on polite terms, reaffirming their commitment to 
the Joint Parliamentary Assembly. Without doubt, the cancella-
tion of the fifth session of the Joint Parliamentary Assembly rep-
resents a difficult moment in Euro-ACP parliamentary relations 
even if the problem should not, in theory, resurface for the next 
session, scheduled to take place in Brazzaville (Republic of the 
Congo) 31 March-3 April this year. ■ 
1. The Conference of Presidents is made up of the lenders of political groups ami 
the President of the European Parliament. 
Adrien Houngbedji, JPA Co-President 
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The Joint Parliamentary Assembly: 
seeking a way forward 
The fifth session of the African, Caribbean, Pacific-European Union Joint 
Parliamentary Assembly (JPA) was due to have met in Brussels from 
25 to 28 November 2002. Its failure to convene has without doubt created 
something of a crisis for the institution. Here Rob Davies*, who has 
participated in JPA sessions since 1994, reflects on how the Assembly can make 
a distinctive contribution. He argues that the present crisis offers an opportunity 
to reflect on the broader issues and real challenges facing the institution. 
The immediate iSSUe underlying the dispute that 
made the convening of the fifth session impossible was a 
decision by the European Parliament to refuse access to its 
premises to two Zimbabwean delegates on the EU travel 
ban list, who were nevertheless issued with visas and admit-
ted into Belgium on the grounds that the travel ban rules 
exempted persons attending bona fide international meet-
ings. 
Underlying this were sharp differences of principle 
between the EU and ACP components on issues ol democ-
racy and good governance. For the majority of European 
parliamentarians the issue was one of the consistency and 
coherence of the European Parliament's repeated calls for a 
tightening of the travel ban regulations. Their leaders felt 
that these were incompatible with hosting persons on the 
travel ban list in the parliamentary precincts. For the ACP, 
and for the Greens and the United Left Group in the 
European Parliament, the principle at stake reached beyond 
the Zimbabwe travel ban and was fundamentally about 
respect for joint decision-making. The JPA as a joint body 
opetates according to joint rules, which are binding on 
both the strong and the weak. Developing countries are 
struggling for principles of good governance in multilateral 
institutions, which require stronger parties to submit to a 
rules-based approach and not resort to the unilateral exer-
cise of power when decisions based on the rules do not suit 
them. 
Identifying priorities 
The crisis this dispute has created for the JPA need not be 
all negative. It can also become an opportunity for broader 
reflection and introspection on the functioning of the JPA, 
with a view to finding ways to make it more effective. This 
article represents a modest contribution to such a reflec-
tion, written in an individual capacity by someone who has 
participated in JPA sessions since 1994. 
During the course of the exchanges preceding the 
impasse of 25 November, the EU Co-President, Glenys 
Kinnock MEP, issued a statement appealing to ACP partic-
ipants to recognise that the JPA's priority was to address 
items on the agenda that "deserve urgent attention — in par-
ticular the trade negotiations between the 77 African, 
Caribbean and Pacific countries and the European Union 
which have just been launched... las well asl other eco-
Issues of democracy and 
good governance are 
"essential elements" of the 
Cotonou partnership and 
need therefore to be 
debated in the JPA 
nomic, political and 
environmental issues — 
including the food short-
ages in Africa". One can 
only say "hear, hear" to 
that. But have issues like 
these really been the pri-
orities in JPA sessions? 
In my experience only 
a minority of MEPs, and 
an even smaller minority 
of ACP parliamentarians, 
come prepared seriously 
to engage on such issues. 
On the agenda for the 
abortive fifth session, the item on "Development coopera-
tion between the European Union and the ACP states in 
the framework of the Cotonou Agreement" was followed 
by sub-themes on the International Criminal Court, the 
New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and 
the follow-up to the Johannesburg summit. Relevant 
though all these sub-themes undoubtedly are, they do not 
deal direcrly wirh the Economic Partnetship negotiations 
between the ACP and EU. This matter, as far as I am able 
to discern, would have been dealt with at the fifth session 
largely in the question time sessions, where discussion 
would have been limited to follow-up by those who sub-
mitted questions in advance. 
The usual suspects 
In this context, I am reminded of the third session held 
in Brussels in November 2001, where the only substantive 
discussion on the Cotonou negotiations took place in a 
fringe meeting held during a lunch break. The fifth session, 
like most previous sessions, was, in short, destined yet again 
to be dominated by a highly uneven and unequal debate on 
the political situation in particular ACP countries. 
Most of the motions for resolution due to have been 
tabled at the fifth session once again dealt with che usual 
list of suspect countries — with the usual few new addi-
tions. These once again were mainly drawn up by 
European parliamentary groups enjoying access to 
research support that ACP delegations simply do not 
have. Although the Joint Bureau has taken steps to restrict 
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resolutions on specific countries to a limited number 
identified by the Bureau in advance, a glance at the reso-
lutions on ACP regions indicates that many of these were 
not really about the region as such but were rather com-
pendiums of comments about aspects of the political sit-
uation in a number of individual countries in that region. 
Many of the ACP delegations, led as they are by the 
majorities in the parliaments concerned, came with a mis-
sion to seek support for their own position in relation to 
these motions. The fifth session, like all other JPA ses-
sions, was thus destined de facto to have most of its atten-
tion focused on these issues. 
Absence of European issues 
Another feature of the uneven and unequal dialogue is 
that the region that has consistently received scantest atten-
tion is Europe. Perhaps in recognition of this, a motion for 
resolution on the EU was due to have been tabled at the 
fifth session. This was drawn up by a European group, and 
the only other discussion I can recall on a European issue -
on the rise of the far right in Austtia — saw only European 
parliamentarians participating. What did the draft resolu-
tion on the EU deal with? Floods in central and eastern 
Europe, linking this to hazardous chemicals and human-
induced climate change. These are important issues, parall-
eling similar concerns about drought, famine and the threat 
to small island states expressed in various resolutions on 
ACP regions. Missing once again, however, was any resolu-
tion on issues of politics and governance in Europe. 
Are there no such issues that impact on the ACP-EU 
partnership? What about apathy towards, and alienation 
from, established political parties by significant sections 
of the electorates and the associated rise of rightist, pop-
ulist forces in several EU countries? What about the fact 
that the ideological basis of many of these rightist, pop-
ulist groupings is often xenophobic and racist attitudes 
towards the immigration question? What about the fact 
that such attitudes can fuel negative perceptions towards 
the ACP? These issues are not likely to be taken up by 
ACP delegations, which generally lack the research 
resources and therefore the capacity to comment on them 
in any detail. 
For the Europeans they raise "sensitive" issues. The evo-
lution of the wording of one of the themes due to have 
been dealt with in the workshop session of the fifth JPA is 
highly indicative in this regard. At the Joint Bureau meet-
ing in Rarotonga it had been proposed to hold a work-
shop on "The rise of the extreme right in Europe and its 
impact on migrant workers and the EU immigration pol-
icy due to enter into force in 2003". The draft programme 
for the fifth session presented the theme in a sanitised 
form as "Migrations: reasons and problems". 
Losing sight of the "core business" 
A fundamental question that the JPA needs to reflect on 
is what has been the impact of the many, many resolutions 
on the political situations in particular ACP countries it 
has passed over the years? There can be no doubt that 
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particular "problem states" and opposing forces have 
focused considerable diplomatic and lobbying effort on 
JPA sessions. But I venture to suggest that by and large the 
impact of the resolutions has been negligible. Where there 
are sharp differences between the ACP and EU sides, 
there is often no resolution. Other resolutions are usually 
little more than comments that fail even to attract much 
press coverage. The JPA frankly does not have a compara-
tive advantage in this area. 
Focusing so much time and effort at JPA sessions on 
these resolutions comes at considerable cost in terms of 
diverting attention away from what ought to be its main 
business: providing a forum for joint parliamentary over-
sight of, and engagement with, the multilateral issues of 
the EU-ACP partnership provided for by the Cotonou 
Agreement. The desire of ACP parliamentarians to engage 
at this level was underscored by the fact that it was the 
Committee on Economic Development, Finance and 
Trade that was seriously oversubscribed when ACP mem-
bers had to indicate their preferences for participation in 
one of the three new standing committees. 
Adding value 
In seeking to respond to the current crisis in ways that 
can take the JPA forward, we need to re-focus the JPA to 
concentrate on areas where it has capacity to add value. 
One area where the JPA is unique is in providing a forum 
for joint parliamentary oversight of, and engagement 
with, the ongoing Economic Partnership Agreement 
negotiations, and linked to these the WTO Doha Round 
negotiations. Both processes are now at the point of 
detailed engagement at official level. Both could benefit 
from drawing key issues from the technocratic sphere 
back into the political atena — a task that the JPA is 
admirably equipped to perform. With the constitution of 
the Standing Committee on Economic Development, 
Finance and Trade, new possibilities have been created to 
enhance this work, including embarking on a programme 
of hearings and receiv-
ing of reports that can 
feed into informed 
debates in plenary ses-
sions of the JPA. This 
surely must become 
the "core business" of 
the JPA. 
Issues of democracy 
and good governance 
are "essential elements" 
of the Cotonou part-
nership and need 
therefore to be debated 
in the JPA. What has 
been missing, however, 
has been a generic 
debate on how to pro-
mote democracy and 
good governance 
(although this issue 
might have been 
touched on in the 
General Rapporteur's 
Focusing so much time and 
effort at JPA sessions on 
these resolutions comes at 
considerable cost in terms 
of diverting attention away 
from what ought to be its 
main business: providing a 
forum for joint 
parliamentary oversight of, 
and engagement with, the 
multilateral issues of the 
EU-ACP partnership 
provided for by the 
Cotonou Agreement 
Report that was scheduled to have been presented at the 
fifth session). We all agree that democracy and good gov-
ernance are essential to promote growth and develop-
ment, but different paradigms on the approach to these 
issues are discernible in our debates. 
At the risk of oversimplification, one such paradigm 
evident in certain EU circles, might be described as a vari-
ation of a "democracy and good governance first" or "con-
ditionality" approach. This sets up norms and standards 
of democracy and good governance, usually based on an 
idealised vision of European practice, and insists that until 
these are in place no partnership to address developmental 
issues can be effective. Any country seen as departing 
from these norms may, therefore, find irself excluded from 
the benefits of development cooperation. Against this is a 
paradigm, often implicit in ACP positions, of democracy 
and good governance as "processes". This would argue 
that démocratisation is not something that can be 
achieved in one fell swoop, and that the process of build-
ing democracy and good governance in ACP countries is 
inextricably linked to the struggle against poverty and 
underdevelopment. 
A fresh approach 
The debate over the NEPAD/African Union's African 
Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) has also surfaced some 
of these issues. While the African Union does impose a 
pre-condition for recognition — governments must have 
been elected to power - the emphasis of the APRM is on 
voluntary and non-exclusionary principles. Members will 
decide to submit to the APRM because they see it yielding 
benefits, including receiving advice from their peers. 
Those that do not will not be sanctioned as such, but will 
not receive the benefits of the APRM, including in their 
relations with potential investors and donors. 
These different approaches need, in my view, to be 
brought to the surface and frankly debated in the JPA. The 
Committee on Political Affairs could play a major role in 
preparing the ground for such an engagement. Discussions 
on the situation in particular countries or regions will still 
need to have a place in JPA proceedings, bur a much small-
er place than in the past. Perhaps an appropriate principle 
would be that any proposal for a resolution on the politi-
cal situation in any country or region should first be 
processed in the Political Affairs Committee and agreed by 
the Joint Bureau before being placed on the agenda of a 
JPA plenary. 
None of this will resolve the matter of participation by 
certain members of the Zimbabwean delegation in any 
future sessions of the JPA that may be held in the 
European Parliament. The Joint Bureau will need to find a 
way through this particular impasse. I am, nevertheless, 
convinced that the JPA needs to find ways to become more 
effective, and that the present crisis offers an opportunity 
to reflect on the broader issues and real challenges facing 
the organisation. ■ 
* Rob Davies is an ANC member of the South African Parliament, who has led 
several South African Parliamentary delegations to sessions of the ACP-EU Joint 
Parliamentary Assembly. This piece is intended as a contribution to debate and 
reflects only his personal views. 
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ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly 
Looking through the prism of history 
The Joint Parliamentary Assembly is the only institution of its kind in the 
world. It is an international assembly in which the representatives of the ACP 
states that, under the Cotonou Agreement, must be members of Parliament, 
meet their European Parliament counterparts in plenary session for one week 
twice a year. 
In this article, Karin Junker, Vice President of the Joint Parliamentary 
Assembly, Member of the European Parliament (MEP) and of the Party of 
European Socialists (PES), reflects on the uniqueness of the assembly and its 
evolution over time. The impasse of the 5th session must be viewed in the 
context of this history. She argues that there is no alternative to dialogue. 
The ACP-EU Joint Assembly, which has its origins 
in the Lomé Convention and has in the meantime been 
upgraded in the framework of the Cotonou Agreement to 
a Parliamentary Assembly, is a model for the international 
community. Nowhere else is development cooperation 
associated with parliamentary accompaniment, especially 
not in the case of activities which span continents, as is the 
case of ACP-EU cooperation. 
Over the years, the Assembly has experienced a kind of 
emancipation. While the European participants were always 
organised along party lines, it was not unusual in the early 
days for the ACP side to send government representatives or 
sometimes even European advisers to the meetings as dele-
gates. Latet on, more and more of the Europe-based ambas-
sadors of the ACP countries achieved recognition as dele-
gates. Not least as a result of pressure from the members of 
the European Parliament, the number of elected representa-
tives from the ACP countries gradually increased. This laid 
the foundations for a genuine Parliamentary Assembly that 
has since created its own accreditation procedure. 
Assembly reflects political evolutions 
This evolution was reinforced through the processes of 
political transformation that, following the fall of the Iron 
Curtain, also brought lasting changes to the political land-
scape of the countries of the South. In many cases, as we 
know, these changes did not pass off without conflict, and 
still continue to give rise to the type of unrest, which nowa-
days also regularly occupies the attention of the Joint 
Parliamentary Assembly. The result sometimes is repeated 
disappointment on both sides: the resolutions do not go far 
enough for some, but go much too far for others. Every 
now and then someone will feel misunderstood, or perhaps 
even mistreated. 
In order to be able to assess the failure of the November 
2002 meeting in Brussels, we must recall the history of the 
ACP-EU Assembly. It has developed, more and more, into 
an open discussion forum. Within the forum the discussion 
of topics previously considered taboo became possible; 
democratic values, the rule of law, human and women's 
rights, birth control and also more and more often the issue 
of HIV and AIDS in all its different aspects — not always to 
the delight of one side or the other. Many proposed resolu-
tions have failed, but we have always succeeded in keeping 
open the channels of communication. This has been my 
experience as a member of the Parliamentary Group of the 
Party of European Socialists (PES) in the European 
Parliament for a dozen years. 
It is damaging when the dialogue grinds to a halt after an 
Agreement signed by all sides has been reached which, even 
though it contains provisions for the interruption of devel-
opment cooperation in cases of non-respect of the essential 
elements of the Agreement, but also expressly encompasses 
political dialogue as an instrument. It seems to me to be a 
matter of urgency to return to such dialogue at the level 
of the Joint Parliamentary Assembly. It will not be easy 
to rebuild an atmosphere of trust and a willingness to 
cooperate. 
Impasse 
It is not necessary to explain here why the Brussels meet-
ing failed. Despite hours and even days of excruciating 
meetings of the ACP committee, both jointly and separate-
ly, attitudes had hardened; the European side referred to the 
resolution bv the Conference of Presidents of the European 
Parliament to refuse access to the Parliament to the 
Zimbabwean delegates on the banned list. They referred to 
the massive human rights violations perpetrated by the 
Mugabe regime, which led the Council to impose sanc-
tions. For its part, the ACP side insisted that the 
Zimbabwean delegates had entered Europe legally, since 
Belgium had granted them a visa, based on the provisions 
of the Cotonou Agreement. They asserted that the 
Conference of Presidents had not been lawfully entitled to 
make a resolution banning them, because the Joint 
Parliamentary Assembly is ultimately not an organ of the 
European Parliament, but an independent institution. 
Only the Bureau of the Joint Parliamentary Assembly is 
authorised to make such resolutions. This is all true, but 
not helpful in finding a way out of the impasse. 
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March 1999 Joint Parliamentary 
Assembly. 
The Assembly has evolved over 
the years and has laid the 
foundations for a genuine 
Parliamentary Assembly. The 
Cotonou Agreement specifies that 
"the members of the Joint 
Parliamentary Assembly shall be, 
on the one hand, members of the 
European Parliament, and, on the 
other hand, members of 
parliament or, failing this, 
representatives designated by the 
parliament of each ACP State" 
(Article 17) 
Photo European Parli 
The most serious accusation is the one made by the 
ACP side. They stated that refusing to grant entry to the 
two followers of Mugabe not only postponed the debate, 
but an opportunity was missed to publicly expose the 
Mugabe regime. This was corroborated by many 
European observers from the spheres of politics and the 
media, who support cooperation with the ACP Group of 
states. Their repeated comment that over the years 
Europeans sat down at the negotiating table with all kinds 
of dictators and their loyal helpers is unfortunately also 
accurate. 
Business as usual? 
At the next meeting in Brazzaville in the Republic of 
the Congo, it will be impossible to avoid encountering 
Mugabe's associates unless the Europeans opt to leave the 
room, and it would be ill-advised to do so. So should it 
be business as usual? That could scarcely be advised. The 
missed debate will of course take place rhere - but is that 
enough? Furthermore the next meeting on EU territory 
is bound to happen sooner or later. What happens then 
if Mugabe's chosen delegates are again granted visas 
because the issuing country regards the ACP Joint 
Parliamentary Assembly as justification for making an 
exception? As this article went to press the Council had 
not yet taken a formal decision regarding the prolonga-
tion of the sanctions after February 18. However, it is 
already clear that there will be exceptions to the travel 
ban in the future which will be a cause for disputes. 
At the time of the 5th session in November, most of 
the European delegates believed the ACP position to be 
one of false solidarity, and in principle they are right. 
Anyone who is not turning a blind eye knows that 
human rights violations are the order of the day in 
Zimbabwe, that dozens of opposition politicians have 
lost their lives and that millions are at risk of death 
through starvation. So why are delegates from Africa in 
particular under pressure to demonstrate solidarity? 
There are a variety of regional interconnections; 
political, ethnic, economic, ecological and so on. 
Conflicts jn Africa today are not wars between states, but 
an expression of regional instability: the Great Lakes 
provides a particularly striking example of this. The 
example of Côte D'Ivoire provides proof that neighbour-
ing states in West Africa are also heavily involved. 
As an African minister who is making serious efforts to 
implement democratic principles reproachfully asked 
me, how much solidarity are the EU Member States 
demonstrating? Do they not also always protect their 
respective spheres of interest, even, if required, against 
neighbouring states belonging to another sphere of 
interest? And don't the EU Members States also pursue 
economic and geo-strategic interests? We have to 
acknowledge the truth of this. The quarrels within the 
European Council about a possible participation of 
Mugabe at the summit in Paris and the EU-Africa sum-
mit in Lisbon cast a gloomy light on Europe. 
Nonetheless, no matter how understanding we are of 
sensitive questions and expectations of tolerance, some 
approaches are unlikely to ease the situation. It does not 
set a conciliatory mood when Mugabe is acclaimed at the 
ANC party conference as "our ally" and his actions are 
defined as a "struggle for emancipation". Even the ACP 
states must understand this. Self-criticism must not be a 
one-way street. 
Despite this, or perhaps because of it, there is no alter-
native to dialogue. We must return to it, and not just in 
Congo-Brazzaville. ■ 
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Niue - the smallest ACP state 
Premier Young Vivian pays a first 
visit to Brussels 
One of the newcomers to the ACP Group -joining along with five other 
Pacific states in 2000 - Niue faces development constraints similar to those 
in other small island states. These include geographic isolation, limited 
natural resources, vulnerability to droughts and hurricanes and a shortage 
of skilled labour. Young Vivian, who became the new Premier in April 
2002, took time during his first trip to Brussels to talk to the Courier. 
Dorothy Morrissey 
Niue's population is 
just 2,000 people, making it 
the smallest ACP State. Mr 
Vivian sees the population 
drift to New Zealand as a 
major problem for his coun-
try. "You could say our first 
problem is isolation, then 
population. But we can 
manage the isolation. For 
instance, we recently man-
aged to have a reasonable 
airline come to Niue '. This 
will encourage tourism, and 
we are now able to bring back our own people from New 
Zealand. So our main problem now is population". One of 
his government's key goals is to stem the flow of migrants, 
and "repopulate" the country, by encouraging Niueans to 
return. " If we can't do that, we can bring people from other 
countries", he says, adding that Niue already has people 
from Tuvalu and Tonga. He is confident that the country 
can easily reach a population of 3,000. The optimum num-
ber, he says, would be 5,000 on the 260 square kilometre 
island. In the 1960s, the country's population was about 
6,000, but, because of limited employment prospects at 
home many migrated, principally to New Zealand. Niue is 
a self-governing country in free association with New 
Zealand, a status similar to that of the Cook Islands. Under 
this arrangement, Niueans are New Zealand citizens, and 
have free access to New Zealand. 
Increasing self-reliance 
The standard of living in Niue is generally better than in 
many developing countries. Life expectancy is relatively 
high at 67 years, with low infant mortality rates and univer-
sal access to education and health services. GDP per capita 
South Pacific Tourism Organisation (SPTO) 
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was €4,650 in 2000. A major objective for the government 
is to provide employment opportunities for its people and 
increase financial self-reliance. The Premier sees a future in 
tourism. "We already have the inftastructure in terms of 
accommodation and the products that go with it. I think we 
can support 100 tourists a week". 
He also sees possibilities in small, niche products. 
"Organically-grown products, honey, vanilla, and small, exot-
ic products... these are niche areas in which we could trade 
with Europe. But if you think in bigger terms - in volume etc, 
we can't compete on that scale. In Europe the standards are 
very high. A small country can't trade with a large country, the 
requirements are very strict. Standards are very demanding". 
The Premier also sees potential in fishing. Niue has signif-
icant marine resources with an Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) extending to 390,000 knr. The government plans to 
make better economic use of the zone to start a fishing indus-
try. "We could envisage a fisheries arrangement with the EU", 
he says, adding that the EU is aware of the importance of sus-
taining marine resources. "Europe has overfished most of its 
own fishing areas, and has now learned a lesson about the 
importance of sustainability." The country played a signifi-
cant role in negotiations on the Tuna Convention
2, which is 
now signed and in the process of ratification. Niue is cur-
rently participating in negotiations for the setting up of a 
Commission to implement the Convention. 
Niue had been on the OECD Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF) list of non-cooperative countries in the area 
of money-laundering. The country is now taking measures 
to follow the international recommendations and, at the 
end of 2002, was removed from the list. "We have put in 
place the legislation as a starting point, and we are going to 
make more efforts to fulfil the requirements. But we need 
resources, human, financial and institutional, which are 
difficult for a small island country ro meet. For instance, 
one of the requirements is to make available the informa-
tion that is required, when it is required. But for this we 
need technical assistance. We have a small public service, 
which is already overstretched." 
Environmental model 
Like many developing countries, Niue is heavily depend-
ent on diesel fuel for its energy. To reduce the financial bur-
den (about 6% of the budget) and the negative environ-
south Pacific Tourism Organisation (SPTO) 
mental consequences, the government is looking for alter-
native sources of power. "We hope to become a fossil-free 
country, using solar, wind and wave energy. We have taken 
diat on as a major project with the European Community. 
It's the way a small island nation should go. We can't afford 
to pay high costs for fuel, and it's not good environmental-
ly, so fossil-free for us is the ideal. We are also looking into 
organically-grown products — and doing away with fertilis-
ers and chemicals. Our forefathers managed to do without 
chemicals and pesticides, and I believe we can too. We have 
a small educated population, who are supportive. They 
know how much a bag of fertiliser costs: $40 for a 20-kilo 
bag is expensive and you don't know what it does to the 
soil". 
Focusing on civil society 
There are 14 villages on the island, and the village coun-
cils play an important role in ensuring that all members of 
the community have an opportunity to participate in soci-
ety. The Premier recognises the role of non-state actors in 
the economic and political life of the country. "We are giv-
ing a strong focus to civil society. They are the natural 
forces, they have the freedom to do things, whereas the gov-
ernment has to keep to a mandate. We need to open our 
doors to them and formalise the dialogue wih civil society 
and the ptivate sector. The less you govern your people, and 
understand that they are contributing to developing their 
country, the better. It's not right if the government tries to 
keep all the power". But he says that great care must be 
taken in setting up the relationship with civil society: "If 
you try to create something artificial this can create diffi-
culties. They will then just want money from the govern-
ment. Once you start giving handouts it may encourage 
certain parts of civil society to form associations or organi-
sations for the wrong reasons ". 
Niue - EC cooperation 
The Country Strategy Paper outlining the strategies the 
parties have agreed upon for cooperation from 2003 to 
2008, was approved by the Commission in January. Under 
the 9th EDF, an amount of €2 million is available under 
the A' envelope which covers long-term development oper-
ations. A further €0,6 can be mobilised under the 'B' enve-
lope, to provide additional support if necessary as a result 
of unforeseen needs, such as natural disasters. The Country 
Strategy focuses on the energy sector, in particular the iden-
tification and use of new and renewable sources of energy. 
Approximately 10% of the A' allocation of €2 million is 
earmarked for non-state actors. Premier Vivian spoke of the 
importance of the Niue-EC relationship for his country. 
'One of the key things is the concept of reward for per-
formance. That is great motivation for us. Another aspect is 
the focus on good governance, accountability and trans-
parency. Being part of the ACP-EC relationship also raises 
the issues and problems of small island countries on the 
international agenda. It conveys to me also that big nations 
do care for us, the smallest island nation in the world, and 
they are taking us aboard. There's hope for us for the future, 
to work together in solidarity." ■ 
1. The Samoan flagship Polynesian Airlines, with flights twice a week from 
Samoa-Niue-Auckland and return. 
2. Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks in the Western and Centra] Pacific Ocean. 
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Towards more effective development cooperation: 
the Ell's coordination and harmonisation 
initiative 
At an international level there has been significant movement towards 
making aid more effective through enhanced coordination. In this article 
Marc Claret de Fleurieu* looks at what has been done and in particular 
at the work of the European Union in this field. 
Coordination and harmonisation have become buzz-
words that resonate through the corridors and meeting rooms 
of any gathering related to development cooperation. 
Coordination broadly refers to any activity between donors to 
mobilise aid resources or to harmonise theit policies, pro-
grammes, procedures and practices so as to use those resources 
most effectively. Coordination is not a new concept in develop-
ment. The Pearson Commission addressed the issue over thirty 
years ago in its report, "Partners in Development" (1970). While 
the present context is more encouraging, in the past the some-
times conflicting twin objectives of foreign aid worked against its 
effectiveness. After World War II, donors' underlying motivation 
was a combination of altruism and a more self-interested 
concern that, in the long term, the growth of poor countries 
would be to the benefit of their own economic and political 
security. Aid went to the political allies of major powers. So the 
strategic and developmental objectives were potentially, though 
not necessarily, at odds. 
Why does coordination matter? 
Today, support fot aid coordination stems from eagerness to 
increase aid's effectiveness, which is one of the overwhelming 
priorities of the international community. The change of era, 
the incteased number of donors, and the decreasing flows of 
official development assistance (ODA) constitute a more 
favourable context for increased policy coordination. 
First, the end of the Cold War opened up new possibilities for 
more effective aid. With aid no longer constrained by strategic 
objectives, there is now more emphasis on meeting its primary 
objectives of long-term growth and the reduction of poverty. 
More "political space" is available for enhancing policy coordi-
nation. 
The number of aid donors and the extent of their activities 
has, however, increased significantly. The number involved in 
development increased from seven in 1960 to more than fifty in 
the 1990s. Each donor has its own policies, priorities, proce-
dures and processes to which recipients must conform. The cost 
of all this is measured in time and in excessive demands on the 
scarce management capacities of governments in the developing 
countries. For example, in a recipient country with about 25 
donors, the absence of coordination and harmonisation implies 
that almost half the working time of five key local officials is 
dedicated to bilateral contacts. 
Because of budgetary constraints, the value of foreign assis-
tance has not kept up with political commitments. ODA has fill-
en since 1991 from $61.6 billion (0.33 per cent of donors' gross 
national income [GNI]) to $54 billion in 2000 (0.22 per cent of 
GNI). In order to compensate for the shrinking volume of aid, 
new ways must be found to coordinate it more effectively. 
European Commission (EPRD/RSA: 
Most Member 
States invest 
their bilateral 
aid in the same 
sectors, 
especially 
health and 
education. 
- Duplication can 
only be reduced 
via improved 
coordination 
In this context of decreasing ODA and increasing number of 
donors, donor groupings have voiced concerns about the effec-
tiveness of aid. They agree that it can be improved by coordinat-
ing policies, harmonising procedures, making multilateral and 
bilateral programmes complementar)', and untying aid. The 
same point was made in the debate about aid effectiveness ' that 
pteceded the Monterrey Conference^ when major donors made 
commitments to increase their ODA significantly. Confidence 
in its effectiveness was a key element in advocating more aid. 
What is coordination and harmonisation all about? 
Coordination and harmonisation involve reducing the 
administrative burden on partner countries, ensuring that the 
input of donors is coherent, and avoiding unnecessary duplica-
tion. Coordination entails a variety of activities such as 
exchange of information, informal and formal meetings, spe-
cialisation by donors, harmonising procedures, making policies 
complementary, pooling resources and implementing pro-
grammes jointly. 
There are three levels of content and three degrees of intensi-
ty in coordination. The content levels are (a) policies, principles 
and priorities, (b) procedures and (c) practices. The first is about 
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harmonising goals and activities. The second is about formiti 
institutional rules and regulations (including financial controls 
for disbutsement, accounting and auditing). The third is less 
formal than procedures. 
The three degrees of intensity of coordination ate consultation, 
cooperation and collaboration. Consultation is about sharing 
information between parties. Cooperation involves discussing poli-
cies, priorities and principles in order to identify areas in which 
harmonisation is possible. Collaboration means agreeing proce-
dures and practices in an effort to ensure smooth, shared imple-
mentation of agreed policies in line with agreed principles and pri-
orities. Joint action is probably the highest form of collaboration. 
Coordination at the most basic level entails awareness of what 
others involved in a particular sector, country or region are doing. 
The EU has encouraged information exchanges so that it can have 
a general overview of the activities planned and instruments used. 
These include monthly meetings between representatives of 
Member States and the European Commission, to see what they 
can do together. Coordination means keeping each other informed 
about policies, evaluations, missions, studies, and ongoing as well 
as planned aid activities. In this way the programmes of the 
Commission and of Member States can be adapted to avoid dupli-
cation and to highlight opportunities for reinforcement. 
Policy coordination 
Coordination in the field should go hand in hand with policy 
coordination back home. There has been a determined effort at 
international level to improve policy coordination since the late 
1980s. This effort has taken the form of a series of UN confe-
rences on children, food, social development, housing, popula-
tion, gender, AIDS, sustainable development, and finance for 
development. With the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), the international community has laid the groundwork 
for a new, coherent and practical attack on global poverty. 
At the European level, the European Comr 
ular high-level meetings with Member States. These meetings pro-
vide a forum to exchange views on best practice, common con-
cerns, current difficulties and new approaches to development. 
Agreeing common negotiating mandates is also important. The 
Commission stressed the value of coordinating the positions of EU 
Member States for the recent UN conferences in Monterrey and 
Johannesburg. The mandate given to the Commission by the 
Membet States, to prepare a report for Monterrey, was a sign of 
their growing confidence '. In Johannesburg Member States com-
mitted themselves to cooperation in the field of water and energy. 
Harmonising practices and procedures 
Harmonising donor procedures is a key element in improving 
efficiency and "ownership" by recipient countries. The major play-
ers in this field are the OECD's Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) and the World Bank. The DAC Ttsk Force on 
Donor Practices has been vety active and the EU has made impor-
tant contributions to its discussions. The Good Practice Reference 
Papers'' set effective benchmarking for improving harmonisation 
among donors and have been used as a reference framework for the 
EC pilot initiative started in October last year. 
The World Bank has worked on harmonising donor practices 
through online partnerships. Twenty-four multilateral and bilater-
al donor agencies have launched a joint website to share informa-
tion about analvtical work on developing countries. Based in the 
World Bank, "Country Analytical World Partnerships" will help 
donor institutions and their clients to use development resources 
more efficiently, avoid duplication, and build capacity. It also will 
provide information on development challenges in a particular 
country or region. 
The EU is also looking into harmonising procedures in order to 
promote collaboration between Membet States. Accotding to the 
2001 guidelines \ the European Community (EC) and the Member 
States will try wherever possible to harmonise procedures (formats of 
financing proposals, agreements and programme implementation 
procedures). Making progress in harmonising practices and proce-
dures is difficult - it is one of the oldest and most intractable of aid 
problems. But the long experience of die EU could provide a basis 
for agreement on mutually acceptable standards and practices. 
Complementarity 
Complementarity goes furthet than coordination. It implies 
that actors focus their assistance where they can add most value. 
Donors each have their areas of expertise and the EC and the 
Member States must work to ensure that these differing strengths 
are used to maximum effect. Complementarity calls for the best 
division of labout, given the comparative advantages of all play-
ers involved. So building on its experience, the European Union 
now has to move ahead and establish a division of labour between 
individual Member States and the Community. 
More specifically, specialisation by donors would help coordina-
tion. Several Member States'' have said they would act as cootdina-
tors in different sectors in a number of developing countries. So 
there is a definite willingness to exploit potentially powerful com-
plementarities between the EU donors. 
Complementarity could also involve the pooling of resources. As 
part of its follow-up to the Barcelona summit, the EC expressed 
willingness to facilitate this, especially in the health and education 
sectors. The 2001 guidelines suggest that where several Member 
States and the Community are active, joint studies, analyses and 
evaluations could also be carried out. 
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The role of partner countries 
Coordination also involves a leading role for partner countries, 
strengthening their involvement and their capacity to shoulder their 
responsibilities. The EU has emphasised the overall coordinating 
role of partner countries from the start
7. So the Commission has 
tried to strengthen their ability to perform this role, at the service of 
the development strategies diey themselves have defined. 
Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) place the developing coun-
try in the driver's seat, so that it both "owns" and directs the 
development agenda, with aid donors defining the support they 
will provide in their respective business plans. The EC also 
backs initiatives such as the Comprehensive Development 
Framework (CDF) where the pattner country coordinates the 
collective efforts of all the donors. 
Coordination at the top of the international donor 
community's agenda 
Since the mid-1990s, international donors have worked to 
coordinate policies and harmonise procedures, while strength-
ening recipients' leadership. In 1996, the Development 
Assistance Committee of the OECD clearly stated that its 
members were "committed to better coordinate aid efforts in 
line with the strategies of our partner countries, so as to max-
imise the development effectiveness of aid resources."" 
In 1997, the United Nations launched the first stage of its 
reform with the implementation of the UN Development 
Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and the Common Country 
Analysis (CCA). In 1999 a World Bank evaluation examined 
the track record of aid coordination. In the same year, the 
Wotld Bank launched the Comprehensive Development 
Framework (CDF)'' and the Poverty Reduction Strateg)' Papers 
(PRSP) in the context of the enhanced Highly Indebted Poor 
Country (HIPC) initiative (1999). The EC firmly supports the 
PRSP process, which is designed to promote coordination and 
complementarity among donors in low-income countries. 
In 2001, the European Union introduced its Country 
Strategy Papers (CSP), as part of the reform of external aid. The 
use of CSPs is also an important mechanism in ensuring greater 
coordination and complementarity. In the future, CSPs will as 
far as possible be developed at a local level by the Commission, 
together with the missions of Member States and partner gov-
ernments. The core principles of all these instruments are strong 
partnerships with public, private and civil society players. 
The European Union's commitment to cootdination traces back 
to the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (1992). Article 130x'" 
provides that the Community and the Member States shall coordi-
nate their development cooperation policies and consult each odier 
on their aid programmes, including in international organisations 
and during international conferences. The possibility of joint action 
and of a contribution by Member States towards implementing the 
Community aid programme are also mentioned. 
Article 180 of the Amsterdam Treaty vests the Commission 
with a right of initiative in promoting coordination. The 
Community should not consent to being merely a sixteenth EU 
donor in the area of development cooperation, but should pro-
mote and facilitate the search for new forms of European coop-
eration and governance. 
Guidelines 
To implement the provisions of the Treaty, the Development 
Council adopted in 1998 a set of "Guidelines for strengthening 
operational co-ordination between the Community and the 
Member States in the field of development co-operation". But 
despite improvements since then, Member States considered 
operational coordination within the EU to be only moderately 
satisfactory. New draft guidelines were produced in Januarv 
2001 ". Their aim was to reduce the burden on the partner 
country, avoid unnecessary duplication, and so to increase the 
EU's visibility to a level consistent with its contribution '
;. 
Because most Member States invest their bilateral aid in the 
same sectors, especially health and education, duplication can 
only be reduced via improved coordination. Since 2000, the 
Commission has developed sector guidelines for coordination 
between Member States. They have already been adopted in these 
areas: transport, agriculture, fisheries, forestry, education, health, 
aids and population. The EU Council in Barcelona " agreed to 
take further steps before 2004. This commitment was reinforced 
through the insertion of a similar element into the "Monterrey 
consensus". Member States decided in June 2002 to launch a 
joint pilot initiative
1' with the Commission, which analysed fout 
country cases: Morocco, Nicaragua, Mozambique and Vietnam. 
The purpose. of this exercise was to identify pragmatic 
approaches and methods that could help fully implement the 
guidelines mentioned above and further develop operational 
improvements at EU level. There was a specific focus on health 
and education. In the first half of 2003 the European Union 
will define a plan of action outlining the next steps. 
Increased visibility 
Increased coordination, harmonisation and complementarity 
within the Union offer many possibilities tor increasing the 
impact of aid, as well as the visibility of the European effort. 
Enhancing the ability of the EU to present common posi-
tions in international bodies will also increase its own impact. It 
is not a question of flag-waving, but of strengthening the capac-
ity of the Union to influence events and make a visible contri-
bution to the achievement of the common objective: to reach 
the Millennium Development Goals and ultimately to eradicate 
poverty in the wotld. ■ 
* Trainee, European Commission, Directorate-General for Development, Unit 
■'Relations with tliL' UN system. Member Stiltes and other OECD donors" 
1. See World Bank Report. 
2. International Conference on Financing for Development. Monterrey, Mexico. 
March 2002. 
3. At its meeting in November 2001, the Development Council asked the 
Commission to clarify' a number of issues and explore, through a dialogue with the 
Member States, potential initiatives to be implemented by them. 
4. The six Good Practice Reference Papers concern all the phases of the project and 
include: Analytic Work and Framework on Donor Coordination, Reporting on 
Financial Aspects and Auditing, Public Financial Management Diagnostic Work, 
Developing Performance Measures for Public Financial Management, Delegated Co-
operation, as well as Reporting and Monitoring. 
5. Guidelines for strengthening operational coordination between the Community, 
represented by the Commission, and the Member States in the field of External assis-
tancejanuary 2001, General Affairs Council. 
6. COM (2000) 108: Report from the Commission, Operatìona] coordination 
between the Community and the Member Suites of die European Union in die field 
of development cooperaüon. Mardi 2000. 
7. May 1999 Council Conclusions. 
8. Shaping the 21st Century: the Contribution of Development Cooperation, 1996, 
OECD-DAC. 
9. Partnerships for Development: from Vision to Action, 1998, WB. 
10. Now Article 180 of tile Amsterdam treaty (1999) 
11. lhe Council and Commission guidelines for improved operational coordination 
between the EC and Member States covering all countries receiving external assis-
tance from die Union were agreed during die 2001 Council orientation debate. 
12. Member States' bilateral aid and aid provided by the Community make the 
European Union the largest donor of public assistance in die world. 
13. The European Council in Barcelona affirmed its willingness to "take concrete 
steps on co-ordination of policies and harmonisation procedures before 200-i,both 
at EC and Member Suites level, in line widi internationally agreed best practices 
including implementing recommendations from die OECD Development Assistance 
Committee Task Force on donor practice". 
14. October 2002, Pilot Initiative on Coordination of Policies and Harmonisation of 
Procedures. Tile report presents the outcomes of die pilot exercise. It is based on the 
results of four field visits (Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Vietnam) and takes into 
account the work being done at the European as well as at die international level 
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Recognising truth, perseverance 
and courage 
Investigation, verification, disclosure: the formula is familiar and taught in every school of 
journalism. The Lorenzo Natali Prize is awarded to journalists who have best applied these 
principles in articles denouncing breaches of human rights and democracy. Raymond 
Archer is one such journalist. Overall winner of the Natali Prize 2002, this young 
Ghanaian won the gold medal in the 2002 Lorenzo Natali Prize - one of the world's 
leading awards for journalists. He is also the winner of the regional prize for Africa. 
Isabelle Saussez 
There ¡S not a Continent in the world in which human 
rights and democracy escape violation. Day after day, innocent 
people suffer all kinds of injustices and infringements against 
democtatic values which are a stumbling block in the develop-
ment process. For 10 years now the European Commission has 
awarded the Lorenzo Natali Prize fur Journalism to print jour-
nalists for articles on the subject of human rights and develop-
ment. This year, the Commission decided to expand the pro-
gramme to awatd journalists working in each of five regions 
around the world. The prize-giving ceremony, held in Brussels 
on 15 November 2002, was attended by the candidates and 
the winners in each category. Raymond Archer (Ghana-
The Ghanaian Chronicle); Asha Krishnakumar (India-
Frontline); Henrik Brun and Ulrikke Moustgaard (Denmark-
Information); Julio César Benegas Vidallet (Paraguay-
ABC Color) and Mauri König (Brazil- O Estado Do Paraná); and 
Mäher Chmaytelli (the Lebanon-Middle East Times, Daily Star 
of Beirut and Middle East Online). Each received a trophy 
together with a cash prize of €10,000. The prizes were present-
ed by the European Commissioner for Development and 
Humanitarian Aid, Poul Nielson. He drew attention to the risks 
incurred by investigative journalists in the harsh reality of the 
terrain; "reporting is not easy these days. Recent tragedies in 
places such as Afghanistan and the Middle East show that 
reporting is still fraught with dangers". According to Reporters 
Without Borders, 22 journalists have been killed since the 
beginning of 2002 and 111 are currently in prison. 
Two strengths: youth and determination 
Also for the first time this year, a special prize was awarded 
to one of the regional winners. The 2002 special gold medal 
award went to Raymond Archer. Obtaining this honour is the 
crowning glory for the young Ghanaian. It is also a sign of 
encouragement for him and all those who dream of a career as 
an investigative journalist. "In the future there will be more 
journalists than there are at present in the profession", he said. 
"Awarding such a prize to a member of the younger generation 
is a motivation for young journalists and for those of the 
future." 
Raymond Archer is full of ambition. His special gold medal 
was bestowed in recognition of his three articles "Ex-Minister 
in deportation scam", "Tragedy of youth deported for cash" 
and "Swedish Minister resigns over Amarkai scam" published 
in The Ghanaian Chronicle. In this series of articles that so 
impressed the jury, he unveiled the shady dealings of a syndi-
cate involved in the deportation of illegal immigrants from 
Sweden to Ghana. At just 26 years old, Raymond Archer does 
not have many years of experience behind him but he has 
already attracted attention, receiving commendation as first 
runner-up in the 2001 Natali Prize for West Africa. In that 
investigation, he uncovered and exposed a secret police station 
operating in the military barracks without the knowledge of 
the authorities in Ghana, and his resulting article, "Kangaroo 
police station inside Burma Camp", ultimately lead to its 
closure. 
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A burning desire for the truth 
Now an investigative journalist working for the Ghanaian 
Chronicle, Raymond Archer fell into the job by chance. 
'After I had finished school and my military service, I want-
ed to go to university. Only the Ghana Institute for 
Journalism was still taking in students. My friends told me 
that 1 would make a very good journalist and I was persuad-
ed". Shortly after completing his studies, Archer got a job at 
the Ghanaian Chronicle where he has been working and 
excelling ever since. With the steadfast belief that being a 
journalist must not mean acting as a mouthpiece for pro-
government propaganda, he has a clear picture of the direc-
tion he would like his career to take: "I believe that quality 
journalism only comes from investigation. It means reading 
between the lines and seeing what may be hidden behind 
what the authorities say or do not say. I don't go to press con-
ferences and things like that - I don't believe in them. I 
believe in searching for information, in long, in-depth inves-
tigations that reveal what people conceal. I believe in truth." 
For Raymond Archer journalism is more than just a job: it 
has become a real passion. Truth, perseverance and coutage are 
his watchwords. However, the conditions in which he has 
sometimes had to conduct his investigations might have put off 
a less determined individual. "The work I submitted to the jury' 
for the Natali Prize for West Africa last year was the most diffi-
cult I have ever done. I was under political pressure and received 
threats. The Ghanaian government at that time did not respect 
the freedom of the press." In Ghana, the 2000 elections saw the 
main opposition party, the 
National Patriotic Party 
(NPP), come to power. The 
immediate effect as far as 
journalists were concerned 
was the abolition of the crim-
inal libel law which up until 
then had acted as a gag on 
the media and hampered the 
work of reporters deemed to 
be 'dissidents'. Raymond 
Archer has every intention of 
making the most of this new 
situation. He now plans to 
set up a Ghana Centre for 
Public Integrity, using his 
prize money of €10,000 
from the European 
Commission. His aim is to 
create an association for jour-
nalists, devoted entirely to 
investigative journalism addressing the issue of human rights. 
Any resulting investigations will be made freely available to the 
Ghanaian media. In years to come, he intends to work to pro-
tect the achievements of democracy in his country. "It is not 
easy to predict the future. But I am not afraid of anyone and I 
will continue to do my job as a journalist whatever the condi-
tions imposed upon me". ■ 
The 2003 Natali Prize for 
Journalism is launched 
Call for entries. 
A Natali Prize worth €10,000 will 
be awarded to a journalist in each 
of the following five regions: 
Europe (EU Member and non 
Member States); Africa; the Arab 
World, Iran and Israel; Asia and 
the Pacific; Latin America and the 
Caribbean. 
*Submitted articles must have been pub-
lished between 1 st Jan uary 2002 and 31 st 
December 2002 
"•Entries close 31 May 2003 
For more information visit: 
httpV/www.if ¡.orali rights/lorenzo/inpr.html 
Or contact: Ann-Christina Hansen 
International Federation of Journalists 
International Press Centre, Résidence Palace 
155, ruédela Lei 
B-1040 Brussels -Belgium 
Phone: +32 2 235 22 07 
Fax:+32 2 235 22 19 
E-mail: proiects@ifj.orq 
"Deported for money": Syndicate exposed 
Published in November and December 2001 in The Ghanaian Chronicle, the three articles 
by Raymond Archer exposed the involvement of the Swedish government and the 
Swedish Consul in Accra in an illegal deportation syndicate. The affair brought the 
Swedish and Ghanaian governments under fire, leading to the resignation of the Swedish 
Minister for Migration and to the loss of power of several Ghanaian political figures. 
Nigerians, Togolese, Liberians, Ivoirians, Ugandans, Sudanese... large numbers of African 
asylum seekers in Sweden, irrespective of their nationality, have been the unfortunate 
victims of an illegal deportation syndicate run between Sweden and Ghana. Investigating the 
matter, Raymond Archer uncovered how this syndicate worked. At the centre of the lucrative 
operation was Amarkai Amarteiflo, former minister and Swedish honorary Consul in Ghana. 
It was a clever operation: once the application for asylum had been received, the Swedish 
authorities would record the refugee's voice and take his photo. Amarkai Amarteiflo, a 
lawyer claiming to be a 'language specialist', then received these documents and confirmed 
that the person was indeed Ghanaian and that he should be repatriated to Ghana. "In most 
cases, Mr Amarkai's judgements were wrong", wrote Raymond Archer. Once Mr Amarkai 
had given the green light, the asylum seekers were expelled to Accra, where Mr Amarkai 
awaited them. For these services, Mr Amarkai's law firm was automatically paid by the 
Swedish government. 
In his second article of the series, Raymond Archer focused on the case of Peter Ekwiri: On his arrival from Sweden at Accra 
airport, Mr Ekwiri was taken to the police station where he remained for nine months. Then he was transferred to James 
Fort Prison, after which he was brought back to the cells of Osu Police Station. In September 1996, Mr Amarkai acquired a 
Ghanaian travelling document for Mr Ekwiri, enabling him to travel to Uganda. However, he was refused entry at Entebbe 
airport and was flown back to Ghana. For months, Peter Ekwiri made appeal after appeal for help in the form of letters and 
petitions. His ultimate dream was to be repatriated to Sweden, his Utopia. "Six years after Peter Ekwiri was deported to 
Ghana, he is still in Ghana and depends on friends for survival", concluded Raymond Archer's article. 
Both the Swedish government and Mr Amarkai Amarteiflo were strongly condemned by international human rights 
organisations and the Swedish parliament. Shockwaves that had their consequences. The Swedish parliament branded the 
deportations 'unethical and illegal'. The Swedish Minister for Migration, Maj-lnger Klingvall, was charged with ensuring 
that such practices did not continue and that the nationality of persons deported is established by the Swedish authori-
ties before they are deported. Under pressure from many quarters, Maj-lnger Klingvall eventually resigned from her min-
isterial post. Immediately after the article was published, the illegal deportations stopped and the refugees who had been 
imprisoned illegally were released. The work begun by Raymond Archer is now being continued by NGOs. In Sweden in 
particular, human rights lawyers have taken up the cause to ensure that nothing like this ever happens again. focus 
European Parliament 
Sakharov Prize 2002 
Human rights activist honoured 
The 2002 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought has been awarded to 
Cuban Oswaldo José Paya Sardinas, founder of the Christian Liberation 
Movement for Peace in his country. The prize was presented by European 
Parliament President Pat Cox in an official ceremony during the December 
2002 plenary session in Strasbourg. 
Alexis Kela 
Bom ΟΠ 29 February 1952 in Havana, Oswaldo 
Paya is the 15th recipient of the Sakharov Prize, awarded 
each year by the European Parliament to an individual or 
association in recognition of their work to promote peace 
and democracy. An engineer by profession, he founded the 
Movimiento Cristiano Liberación (Christian Liberation 
Movement) in 1988, a non-violent opposition movement 
working for political and economic change in Cuba. The 
award is also a recognition of his courageous leadership of 
Proyecto Varela (Varela project), which uses a clause in 
Cuba's constitution allowing citizens to seek a national ref-
erendum if they can collect 10,000 signatures. 
In his speech at the award ceremony, President Cox 
praised the winner for his tireless work for democracy by 
non-violent means: "You represent for many Cubans today 
what Andrei Sakharov represented in the 1980s for many 
Soviet citizens (...). We salute [your] decision to use the 
pen and not the sword, to use signatures and not bullets, to 
use peace and not terror, as the pathway to democracy in 
Cuba". To a standing ovation from the Assembly, Oswaldo 
Paya declared that his prize was really being awarded "to the 
Cuban people, because they are the ones who deserve it 
most". 
The work of Oswaldo Paya has already been acknowl-
edged outside his country. He was named winner of the 
W. Averell Harriman Award for Democracy in September 
2002. On that occasion, however, he was not allowed to 
travel to the United States to 
receive the award. He told listen-
ers in Strasbourg that, in Cuba, 
the veil of fear is being lifted, even 
though it still hangs over the 
heads of his close friends and fam-
ily. Sentenced to hard labour in 
the 1960s, Mr Paya now heads a 
coalition of opposition groups 
under the manifesto "Todos 
Unidos" (All Together). Most 
notably, the coalition has drawn 
up the Varela project, which aims 
to gather the 10,000 signatures 
that the Cuban constitution 
requires for a bill of law to be 
tabled. This bill of law calls for a 
national referendum to bring 
democratic change in Cuba. ■ 
The award ceremony in Strasbourg, December 2002 
The Andrei Sakharov 
Prize was created by 
the European Parlia-
ment in 1988 to 
honour individuals or organisations. The prize is named after Andrei Sakharov, 
the Soviet dissident, nuclear physicist and Nobel Peace Prize winner who gave his 
blessing to a European Parliament prize bearing his name in clandestine contacts 
with the Parliament in the 1980s. At that time, he was living in internal exile in 
Gorky. In his writings, he drew attention to the relationship between science and 
society and to the issue of peaceful coexistence and intellectual freedom. In the 
eyes of the world, he came to embody the crusade against the denial of funda-
mental rights. 
Previous winners incude former South African President Nelson Mandela. When 
he was awarded the prize in 1988, Mandela was still under house arrest by the 
apartheid regime. 
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Mention the 'child soldier' and we immediately think of a small boy 
brandishing a rifle almost as big as he is. But what of the other children 
unwittingly caught up in armed conflicts? Girls in particular are largely 
overlooked and, consequently, reintegration and demobilisation programmes 
fail to address their specific needs and often exclude them altogether. 
Mounia Lakhdar-Hamina 
The number of Children directly or indirectly affect-
ed by armed conflict is enormous. According to UNICEF, 
between 1990 and 2000, two million children were killed 
and six million maimed or seriously wounded; approxi-
mately 10 million are now living as refugees or have been 
displaced and 300,000 have enlisted as soldiers. But war has 
other, less visible consequences too. The ensuing violence 
sees basic services such as schools and health centres 
destroyed, hampers vaccination programmes and threatens 
food security. Moreover, such conflicts provide the perfect 
breeding ground for HIV/AIDS. 
Despite the protests of the international community, 
children continue to suffer on the front line. For Yves 
Willemot, Director of Public Relations for UNICEF 
Belgium, increased awareness and lobbying in the West are 
just as important as efforts in the war-torn areas themselves. 
In his opinion, "we need to amass as much information as 
we possibly can to be able to inform public opinion, to 
incite political decision-makers to act and to raise the nec-
essary capital for rehabilitation and demobilisation pro-
grammes. We also need to look into potential new ways of 
protecting and reintegrating children". 
It was from this perspective that the international conference 
on "Children in war"
1, held in Brussels in Octobet 2002, set 
out to scrutinise the current definition of child soldiets and to 
dtaw attention to the issue of gender in armed conflicts. 
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SIERRA LEONE Port Loko. 
Doris Gbla (21) and Beatrice Sha riff (22), ex-child soldiers. 
Doris: "In 1998 I was caught by the AFRC. I was forced to 
fight, using drugs all the time. I didn't feel anything at all, 
wasn't afraid of anything. During the demobilisation of 
1999 I was released." 
Beatrice: "I had to marry a Liberian commander and 
received a military training from him. I was beaten 
constantly and forced to take drugs. When I got pregnant, 
he sent me to his mother in Liberia, but I escaped. I left 
the baby behind. The baby as well as my husband I never 
want to see again, never." 
Child soldier or child victim of war? 
The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child and its 
non-binding protocol of 2000 only take into consideration 
children actually fighting in wars and armed conflicts. 
Other children, just as much victims of war, are therefore 
excluded. So how are we to help children not covered by 
basic laws governing the protection of children in armed 
conflicts? How can we include them in specific reinsertion 
programmes or demobilisation operations? 
Among the key insttuments used to broaden the defini-
tion of the child soldier are the Graça Machel report, the 
"Impact of armed conflict on children" and the so-called 
Cape Town principles, which state that "any person under 
18 years of age who is part of any kind of armed force or 
armed group is a child soldier..., including those accompa-
nying such groups, other than purely as family members".' 
According to Hélène Ryckmans from the Belgian NGO 
Le Monde selon les Femmes (The world according to 
women), these principles have broadened the definition of 
the child soldier so that "it now includes any child directly 
or indirectly involved in armed conflict. Whether porters, 
cooks or messengers, or girls who have been sexually 
abused, all are to be regarded as child soldiers". Others pre-
fer the term "children in war", which they feel better con-
veys the multiplicity of roles that children can play in 
armed conflicts. 
Girls, the most overlooked of the child soldiers 
Little information ' is available on the recruitment and role 
of young girls in war. However, as Christina Clark, 
Programme Officer for the activist group Coalition to Stop 
the Use of Child Soldiers, explains, their roles are many and 
varied. They are enlisted "as combatants, as spies or to do 
household chores, but many of them are used as sexual slaves". 
"The girls in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Northern Uganda 
have largely been forcibly enlisted, whereas in Sri Lanka 
and Colombia, where ideological background and patriot-
ism are strong, the majority are volunteers. Some are flee-
ing poverty or long for greater social recognition, which 
they feel they will get in combat, where men and women 
are equal. In Sri Lanka, for example, the girls that serve in 
separatist Tamil Tiger groups (LTTE) feel 'protected', as 
sexual relations between combatants are forbidden." 
The country of recruitment is of huge importance, as this 
will form the basis for any demobilisation and reintegration 
programmes. Girls who have enlisted for purely economic 
reasons, for example, will be easier to demobilise than those 
fighting for a cause. In many cases, armed leaders have a 
huge psychological and physical hold over the girls and the 
only way to get them out is to demobilise them far away 
from the scene of the conflict. 
To gain a clearer insight into the role of girls in war and 
to develop adequate reintegration programmes, it is vital to 
recognise the different expetiences of girls and boys in order 
to determine their individual needs, taking into account 
their different social statuses and thus the different possi-
bilities for them within their communities. 
Specific needs 
Aid programmes therefore need to address the psycho-
logical, physical and social consequences of the violence 
suffered by girls in times of war but also their specific repro-
ductive health needs. These girls run a much greater risk of 
contracting HIV/AIDS and other more minor sexually-
transmitted diseases (STDs), and many fall pregnant and 
suffer extreme nutritional deficiency. 
According to Hélène Ryckmans, specific health and reinte-
gration programmes are vital: "These girls find themselves 
with a child to look after but are still only children them-
selves. How are they going to feed, take care of and protect 
this child in a time of war? How are they to come to terms 
with what.they have been through without psychological help 
and moral support? Just how many girls are cast aside because 
they are no longer virgins, have children and therefore lose 
any chance they may have had of getting married." ■ 
For further information: w ww.c hiki -soldiers,oru / www-tiniccf.org 
1. Conference held on lhe initiative of a number of Belgian organisations, includ-
ing the Commission on Women and Development, the Directorate Genera] for 
International Cooperation (DGIC) and the Nederlandstalige Vrouwenraad. 
2. 'these non-binding principles were adopted at the International Conference on 
Child Soldiers held in Cape'town, South Africa, in 1996. 
3. One source worthy of mention is the 'Voices of girl child soldiers' report coni-
missioned by Quaker.an organisation attached to the International Coalition to 
Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, which documents the experiences of 23 girl 
combatants in Angola, Colombia, the Philippines and Sri Utnka. 
Named and shamed 
In December 2002, UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan 
submitted a report on Children and Armed Conflict, for 
consideration by the Security Council, listing parties to armed 
conflict that recruit or use child soldiers. The list comprises 
23 such parties, governments and armed groups alike, from 
five countries on the Security Council's agenda, namely 
Afghanistan, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Liberia and Somalia. This report offers a whole new approach 
to the problem. As Olara Otunnu, UN Special Representative 
for Children and Armed Conflict, explains, "for the first time 
in an official Security Council report, those who violate 
standards for the protection of children affected by war are 
being named and shamed". Through this report, the Security 
Council is sending a message to governments and armed 
groups to let them know that they can no longer act with 
impunity and that they will be held accountable for the 
welfare of children in conflict and post-conflict situations. 
Other parties to conflict that use child soldiers are cited in the 
report but are not included on the list because they do not 
feature on the Security Council's agenda. These are, most 
notably, Colombia, Myanmar, Nepal, the Philippines, Sudan, 
Northern Uganda and Sri Lanka. 
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Industrialisation 
The process of industrialisation in developing countries shows major variations; 
in some cases it has been impressive, but in most it is disappointing. In particular, the 
so-called newly industrialising countries (NICs) have increased their share of world 
industrial production, while the role of developing countries in total trade of 
manufactured goods is still marginal. 
This dossier, which looks at alternative visions of industrialisation, is organised around 
the following key issues: 
1) export-oriented versus import-substituting industrialisation; 
2) dependent versus independent industrial policies, particularly in relation to foreign 
investment; 
3) instruments introduced by the Cotonou Agreement to foster industrialisation in ACP 
countries. 
As for the trade strategy a country adopts, there ¡s a major distinction between _ 
those countries that pursue an export-oriented industrialisation strategy, based 
on the export of manufactured finished and semi-finished products, and those 
countries that orient their industrialisation towards the home market, through an 
import-substitution industrialisation strategy. For a long time, import substitution 
was considered the only way to industrialisation, but today export-oriented 
industrialisation seems to be the most promising path for developing countries. 
Michael Tribe argues that the types of industrial strategies that are relevant to 
most African countries are closer to the traditional import-substitution model than 
to the export-promotion model (page 28). Christopher Cramer argues that 
processing primary commodities could be a bridge from dependence on primary 
commodities to industrialisation and development (page 30). Another alternative 
is provided by Yves Amaizo; the idea of a value chain. As a product passes 
through a series of chains in its move from conception to consumer, the final sale 
value can be decomposed into value created at the different points in the chain 
(page 39). 
The second major theme of the dossier is the role of foreign direct investment and 
transnational corporations (TNCs) in the industrialisation process. The debate on TNCs 
is still too black and white. On the one hand, apologists argue that TNCs are 
developmental, providing developing countries with income, employment, and 
technology (see interview with UNIDO's Director General Carlos Magariños, page 2). 
On the other hand, critics argue that TNCs are agents of exploitation, and that they 
distort the development of nation states (see John Madeley's article, page 36). 
Yet, when large-scale production is not feasible, small-scale industry is likely to be more 
efficient and therefore more appropriate. However, while small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) play a leading role in employment growth, in the long run only a few succeed, 
while the majority of them remain small or disappear (see case study on Angola, 
page 44). A variant on the SME model is the industrial district model, which is based on 
enterprise clusters. Dorothy McCormick, by focusing on six African clusters, argues that 
this approach can offer significant benefits in terms of collective efficiency gains, but 
success is not guaranteed if the wider institutional context is not favourable (page 33). 
The third set of articles focuses on the innovations introduced by the Cotonou Agreement with a view to fostering 
industrialisation in ACP countries. The Cotonou Agreement contains a comprehensive new policy and a broad range 
of institutions and instruments to support private sector development in ACP countries (see article by Escipión 
Oliveira, page 21). In this sense, two institutions play a major role: the Centre for the Development of Enterprise 
(CDE) and the European Investment Bank (EIB). The CDE supports ACP private undertakings, mainly those focusing 
on agro-industry and fishing (see interview with its Director, Fernando Matos Rosa, page 25). The EIB lends money 
to industries in ACP countries (see article by Stephen McCarthy on page 50). Finally, due to the positive role of EU aid 
in investment in ACP countries, Susanna Wolf maintains that the reform and expansion of private sector support 
introduced by the Cotonou Agreement should continue (page 53). . . 
Maurizio Carbone 
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This article reviews the 
development of the sub-
Saharan African 
manufacturing sector and 
takes a much more positive 
view than that of some other 
studies. In particular, while 
questioning the idea that 
Africa is currently in a phase 
of de-industrialisation, it 
argues that the concept of 
infant industry still provides a 
valuable conceptual basis for 
industrial policy in sub-
Saharan Africa. 
Michael Tribe* 
Τηθ Current State of industrial development shows major 
variations in industrial performance throughout the world: some 
de\'eloping countries have done very well in recent years, while 
many othets still lag behind. Manufacturing activity is heavily 
concentrated in industrialised countries, though developing 
countries are increasing their share. East Asia (including China) 
is the best industrial performer; it has the highest growth rates in 
manufacturing production and exports. Sub-Saharan Africa, 
excluding South Africa, ranks behind all other regions in almost 
all respects. The technological structure of its industrial produc­
tion and exports is regressing. Accounting for only one per cent 
of the developing world's manufactured value added (MVA) in 
1998, down from nearly three per cent in 1985, sub-Saharan 
Africa was the least industrialised region in terms of per capita 
values. Its small share of manufactured exports dropped by half. 
In per capita terms, exports from East Asia (excluding China) 
were 100 times those from sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South 
Africa). 
The Southeast Asia miracle 
Many African countries still have a comparatively undeveloped 
manufacturing sector based on a domestic market which is limit­
ed in size. A large proportion of manufacturing production is tar­
geted at local domestic markets rather than for export, and much 
of it is likely to be economically viable because of natural protec­
tion (ttansport costs in particular). This includes beer and ciga­
rette production, food processing as well as textile production 
and garment manufactures. However, manufactured exports may 
be constrained by product quality and by the undeveloped nature 
of international trading institutions rather than by productive 
efficiency and price. Neighbouring African countries, which 
could be potential export markets, have similar patterns of man­
ufacturing production so that there is limited scope for trade. In 
addition, many of the economic institutions that would facilitate 
intra-regional trade are still in the early stages of development. 
Added to these factors are political instability and conflict, which 
make regional cooperation very difficult. 
In this context, the debate about trade liberalisation as a basis 
for the development of manufactured exports is of limited rele­
vance to much of sub-Saharan Africa. The fact that, in general, 
manufactured exports are only a very small proportion of total 
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Manufacturing development 
and de-industrialisation: 
re-thinking the infant industry 
concept 
sub-Saharan African exports may be largely attributable to the 
low level of production of the types of manufactuted products 
demanded by the principal international markets. On the other 
hand, such types or manufactured products are produced in 
great quantities in the newly industrialised countries of 
Southeast Asia. 
It is evident that over the last three decades there has been a 
very considerable decline in manufacturing production in a num­
ber of African countries. Some countries have also experienced 
strong recovery, suggesting that many established industries are 
robust. The long-term issue is whether recovery and growth can 
be sustained in the longer period through the expansion of exist­
ing industries and the introduction of new ones. The types of 
industrial strategies that are relevant to most African countries are 
closer to the traditional import-substitution model than to the 
export-promotion model. Thus, it is far from clear that the expe­
riences of the Southeast Asian 'miracle' countries are directly 
transferable to sub-Saharan African countries: such international 
comparisons may be less informative than careful analysis of 
development potential based on African conditions and experi­
ences. 
Effective means of promoting industry 
The definition of infant industry might appear to be well set­
tled and its application to policy discredited as most ol the pro­
tected infant industries often proved to be "enfant terribles" -
having persistently high production costs without 'growing up'. Therefore, the infant industry justification for a range of policies 
supportive of the industrialisation process in less developed coun-
tries has been little mentioned recently, and the thrust of 
'approved' industrialisation strategy has shifted from import-sub-
stitution to expott-promotion. Nevertheless, the precise econom-
ic definition of the term import-substitution is still open to ques-
tion, particularly in relation to policy design within an industri-
alisation strategy in a post-trade-liberalisation wotld. It could in 
fact be possible that very-late industrialisers such as most sub-
Saharan African countries might be seriously disadvantaged by 
the apparent international rejection of the infant industry/import 
substitution approach to their industrial development. The 
extent of this possible disadvantage might be a basis for the argu-
ment that these countries face the prospect of de-industrialisa-
tion, or at least stagnation of industrial growth, in the face of 
international competition. Without any form of infant industry 
promotion sub-Saharan countries might indeed suffer relative de-
industrialisation due to inability to deal with the threshold or 
barrier problem at the point of establishment of new firms or 
plants. 
This does not mean that trade protection and restrictions 
have an unquestioned place in contemporary policy and strate-
gy in sub-Saharan Africa. Promotion or support of new indus-
tries can be provided by a wide range of policy measures apart 
from trade protection and conventional investment incentives. 
Protection of infant industries is simply one area of promotion-
al measures within a range of alternatives, many of which are 
not related to trade restriction at all. Such measures include 
public sector support for the carrying out of pre-investment or 
market studies, the construction of advance factories and/or the 
provision of industrial sites, and the easing of administrative 
obstacles. 
A focus only on trade liberalisation as a guideline for policy is 
likely to exclude a large number of options that are directly rele-
vant to industrial-manufacturing development. Indeed it is likely 
that import tariffs and quotas are actually ineffective means of 
protecting or encouraging industry. One of the problems with tar-
iffs and quotas is that they are more easily targeted on individual, 
or groups, of imported commodities than on the need for time-
bound support of individual firms and plants in the infant indus-
try context. If a trade protection approach were to be followed it 
would be necessary for the production conditions in new firms 
and plants to be closely monitored by government. This monitot-
ing process would possibly be closer than many private sector 
firms (not least transnational corporations) would be prepared to 
accept. The whole concept of using tariffs and quotas for the pro-
tection of industries which are being set up for the first time is 
therefore highly suspect as an effective policy instrument. The pre-
ferred fonm of infant industry promotion or support might there-
fore be based on time-bound measures, which do not require such 
close monitoring of industrial plants. In this context, any request 
for continuing support due to the failure of the firm or plant to 
establish itself in the original period envisaged would have to be 
subject to a fresh application from the investor and would be sub-
ject to scrutiny on the same basis as the original application. 
The suggestion is therefore that rather than abandoning the 
concepts of import substitution and infant industry, they should 
be defined more carefully that has possibly been the case in the 
past, and policy should be more imaginatively related to this 
broader definition of the concepts. ■ 
* Michael Tribe is a Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the Bradford Centre lor International 
Development, University of Bradford.niis article is largely based on work published by 
the author in "Industrial Development and Policy in Africa: Issues of de-industrialisation 
and development strategy", edited by Hossein Jalilian. MichaelTribe and John Weiss. 
Cheltenham. UK: Edward F.lgar. 2000, and also draws on UNIDO sources. 
Manufactured exports by income level and regions, 1998 
Country group, Value World shares Developing Per capita Growth rate Growth rate 
income level (billions (percent) economies'shares (dollars) 1985-1998 1985-1998 
or region of dollar) (per cent) Total Per capita 
World 
Industrialised 
economies 
Developing 
economies 
East Asia 
East Asia 
(without China) 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
(without South Africa) 
4,230.0 
3,125.5 
987.4 
686 
519 
19 
5 
100 
73.9 
23.3 
16.0 
12.1 
0.4 
0.1 
na 
na 
100 
65.9 
49.8 
1.8 
0.5 
821.0 
3,714.4 
242.2 
409 
11,178 
45 
14 
9.9 
8.8 
13.3 
14.5 
12.5 
9.0 
7.3 
8.3 
8.1 
11.3 
12.9 
10.6 
4.6 
4.4 
Source: UNIDO, 2002 
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Blighted by volatile prices and 
often by low prices for 
primary commodity exports, 
developing countries are 
drawn to diversification 
strategies. One strategy often 
proving successful and 
yielding a range of economic 
benefits has been vertical 
diversification, moving into 
processing of commodities. 
This article sets out the main 
domestic and international 
constraints on vertical 
diversification and argues 
that, while most of these can 
be overcome, ultimately the 
most pressing constraints may 
be political and institutional. 
Christopher Cramer* 
Should developing country 
industrialisation policies 
encourage processing of primary 
commodities? 
Processing Of primary Commodities has long been con-
sidered one of the bridges from dependence on primary com-
modities to industrialisation and development. The activities 
involved include shifting from exporting hides and skins to 
exports of leather shoes; exporting plywood, paper pulp or furni-
ture instead of just logs; processing cashew nuts domestically 
rather than selling all raw output overseas; rising up the chain 
from basic iron mining or cocoa or coffee production, etc. The 
rationale and prospects for choosing "vertical diversification" are 
not, however, sttaightforward. This strategy can run into chal-
lenging external constraints, it can come up against internal 
obstacles, and it can also provoke political contests that affect the 
outcome. Policies to promote resource-based industrialisation 
must, then, be weighed against "horizontal diversification" (into 
new primary commodity exports, e.g. horticultural products) and 
industrialisation that turns its back completely on primary com-
modities'. 
Encouraging diversification 
There are certainly good reasons to encourage diversification 
into processing primary commodities. One of the strongest is 
that it would help overcome developing countries' vulnerabili-
ty to debilitating volatility in commodity prices. For there is 
evidence over the long run that the prices or processed com-
modities are more stable than those of unprocessed commodi-
ties-. Beyond this, the usual benefits of industrialisation 
(greater linkages through the economy, greater employment 
prospects, productivity dynamics, etc.) might be captured by 
building on readily available commodity inputs and some 
degree of knowledge of international markets for products 
based on these commodities. Some of the most successrul late 
industrialising countries have incorporated in their sttategies 
the processing of primary products imported from elsewhere, 
given market prospects and available skills. And not only late 
industrialising countries: if there is any one activity associated 
with the take-off of the industrial revolution in the UK it was 
cotton processing and textiles production in the factories of 
Manchester. 
Nonetheless, the obstacles in the way of vertical diversification 
might be too great. Commodity processing is not always light on 
capital intensity and may, therefore, compromise the efficient 
allocation of a country's resources. Overall, there are two kinds 
of reason why it might be best not to commit to processing: 
external market conditions and internal economic structure. 
External constraints take the forms of, first, protective walls 
around OECD markets and, second, the presence and power of 
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Processing of primary commodities has 
long been considered one of 
the bridges from dependence on 
primary commodities to industrialisation 
and development 
vertically integrated firms or tightly con-
trolled "commodity chains" dominated 
by multinational corporations. 
'*mt 
Λ -j. 
International market constraints 
It is often argued that one of the main 
obstacles to developing country export 
success is the range of tariffand non-tariff 
barriers erected by, especially, the EU, the 
USA, and Japan and that the height of 
these barriers rises along with the steps up 
the processing chain. On top of this there 
are in developed country markets increas-
ingly demanding quality and phyto-sani-
tary standards that can be forbidding to 
the prospective new market enttant. 
Then there is the deterrent of the way 
markets are structured. Large, vertically 
integrated multinational corporations 
can dominate the supply of retail-driven 
markets to the extent that they effectively close out developing 
country efforts at entering these markets. Examples might 
include the commodity chain for prawns working to limit 
domestic efforts in Tanzania, say, to add greatet value before 
export. Such companies can use internal transfer prices, first 
mover advantages, market information and intricate links to 
retailers to control the chain. 
Internal market constraints 
If international market structures make successful diversifica-
tion into commodity processing a formidable challenge, there 
are often equally challenging internal problems. Unstable sup-
plies of power or other inputs, perhaps thanks to stormy macro-
economic conditions, undermine efforts to reach production 
targets and to establish a reputation in overseas markets for reli-
ability and quality. For example, in Cameroon 60 per cent of 
logs must be processed locally but by 1991/92 only about 
50 per cent of logs underwent any domestic processing - large-
ly due to obsolete machinery and the exorbitant cost of import-
ed inputs during a period of exchange rate overvaluation '. There 
are other, process-related constraints. Technological require-
ments can be sophisticated and often determined by very local 
specifics; classic externalities associated with investing in labour 
training may put off individual private sector entrepreneurs, as 
may the risks involved in producing sufficient output to reap 
economies of scale; and many of the raw material inputs to 
undergo processing suffer from rapid perishability, increasing 
the risk of taking on industrial scale production. 
Arguably, a large home market tor processed commodities 
helps provide a base for launching into export markets. One 
example would be the Indian market for cashew nuts as a basis 
for the Indian export industry, whose factories are supplied by 
both local production and imported raw nuts from, for exam-
ple, Tanzania. Lacking a large home market can be a constraint 
on successful export-oriented processing. At a more formal 
level, there are arguments that success in commodity processing 
is likely to be determined by relative factor endowments: not 
simply labour and capital but, in a recent version of factor 
endowment theory, skilled labour per worker and land per 
worker. According to this line of reasoning, regions like sub-
Saharan Africa should not run before they can walk, but rather 
should simply put in place an "enabling environment" to allow 
for the gradual increase in "human capital" formation '. 
Mixed record 
The record of developing country efforts to diversify vertically 
into commodity processing is, not surprisingly, highly mixed. 
Certainly, many developing countries have successfully diversified 
vertically, sometimes dramatically. Indeed, even in regions such as 
sub-Saharan Africa, where the experience with commodity 
processing has been less encouraging, there are some successes, 
including Côte d'Ivoire (fisheries and wood) and Senegal (fisheries). 
What is perhaps more important than the overall fact of develop-
ing country processing is that the successes seem to have a lot to 
do with effective policies to promote such processing. First, 
although the constraints already mentioned are genuine, success-
ful countries have broken into commodity processing in spite of 
these constraints — they are not insuperable. Indeed, less success-
ful countries, including many sub-Saharan African countries, have 
for example faced preferential access to European markets com-
pared with other developing countries, and the degree of trading 
advantage rises with additional processing. Second, the historical 
record does not quite match the idea that success or failure are 
simply determined by "human capital" levels. 
For example, a comparison of experiences with vertical diver-
sification in East Asian and Latin Ametican countries shows pro-
nounced differences in the export structure of the two groups in 
spite of their comparable human resources. Thus, timber-related 
exports from Chile and Brazil have historically been concenttat-
ed on the lower rungs of the processing ladder (pulp and pulp-
wood), while Malaysian and Taiwanese exports to OECD coun-
tries have been concentrated in plywood and furniture (in 
Taiwan's case based on imported timber). A similar story can be 
told for iron-related industries. Thus, Chilean and Brazilian 
exports have been mainly of iron ore, while Taiwan and South 
Korea have over time built up competitive advantage in iron and 
steel and metalworking machinery exports
5. What accounts for 
the differences in export structure (and hence in associated 
export earnings, productivity growth opportunities and market 
prospects) is selective and effective government policy. 
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Promoting the right policies 
There is no single, universally 
applicable set of policies to bring 
about successful vertical diversifica-
tion. However, it is possible to high-
light some of the main policies that 
have been associated with such suc-
cess. Research and development 
(R&D) needs prioritising and must 
be tailored to local producers' partic-
ular needs. Enterprise level training 
is necessary. And technolog)' trans-
fers through joint ventures with multinational corporations 
(MNCs) may play a role, complementary at least, in such efforts. 
But all these initiatives typically require selective government 
intervention. In Malaysia, which scored big successes in produc-
ing palm oil for export (as well as other commodity processing 
ventures), R&D investments were often financed by specific 
taxes or duties on production and/or exports, and by close pub-
lic-private cooperation. One of the most common, and often 
effective, policies (though by no means likely to work as a stand-
alone policy measure) is the protective boost to processing 
exports given by limits on exports of unprocessed commodities 
(high duties or legal restrictions). Brazil's limits on shipments of 
hides and skins, for example, were an important part of the mas-
sively successful shift into exports of leather goods (particularly 
shoes) between the mid-1960s and the late 1980s. Thailand's 
agro-processing success offers another example of the range of 
policy options. Promotional privileges and support for export-
oriented agro-processing have included import duty reduction 
on machinery imports; three year income tax exemption; export 
tax exemption; exemption from VAT on exports and locally pro-
duced inputs; lower electricity and transport charges condition-
al on location in selected industrial estates; subsidised credit to 
farmers participating in outgrowing schemes; quality enhance-
ment programmes; and bilateral inter-governmental negotia-
tions to bring down tariffs on imports of processed agricultural 
impotts from Thailand". 
Political constraints 
Effective policies can help developing countries overcome internal 
supply weaknesses and the competitive challenges of international 
markets. However, there is more to success or failure than purely 
economic calculations, or even than the abstract identification of 
workable policies. The lesson of experiences from Malaysia to 
Mozambique is that the question - whether to prioritise support tor 
commodity processing as an industrialisation strateg}' — cannot be 
answered at the general, abstract level. This is partly for product and 
context specific reasons, and partly for reasons of political economy. 
Policies have to be enforceable, and this is likely to depend on the 
particular configuration of interest groups around a given sector. 
Why in Malaysia the government managed effective interventions in 
palm oil production for export but has been less successful in pro-
moting timber processing; why the Mozambican government could 
not muster a coherent policy for the post-war revival and develop-
ment of the cashew processing export sector: these are ultimately 
political questions. And it may well be that the political constraints 
in some developing countries are the most pressing. 
The attraction of short-term profit from log exports, and the 
organisation of logging around large private concerns, has often 
made it difficult (e.g. in Malaysia and Indonesia) to develop and 
enforce effective vertical diversification strategies. The more general 
constraint for successful processing, a constraint with a variety of 
dimensions including the political, is the problem of securing an 
assured throughput of raw commodities into processing factories 
(both in tetms of quantity and quality). Particularly in agro-process-
ing, climatic and infrastructural factors can frustrate throughput tar-
gets. But there is also typically a tension between producers and 
processors over relative economic returns, in turn affected by fluctu-
ating world prices. Whether through vertical integration of activi-
ties, through joint representation of exporting processors and pro-
ducers on industry boards (which seemed to work well, for example, 
in the heyday of the Kenya Tea Development Authority), or through 
other mechanisms, particular countries, industries, and governments 
will have to find specific institutional solutions to this problem. 
Nonetheless, where political interests in favour of export process-
ing development (even if this entails short-run welfare losses) are 
strong enough, the historical record shows that it is not difficult to 
identify government policies capable of pushing such development 
and achieving successful industrial upgrading through primary com-
modity processing. ■ 
* Christopher Cramer is a lecturer in economics and convenor of the MSc in Violence. 
Conflict and Development at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), London. 
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African countries need to 
industrialise if they are to 
improve the quality of life of 
their people. Yet most African 
countries can best be described 
as "weakly industrialised"'. 
Large-scale industry is in 
disarray as a result of rapid 
market liberalisation and, at the 
same time, the micro and small-
scale sector continues to make 
products that have difficulty 
competing with the now widely 
available imports. Such countries 
need new strategies for making 
industrialisation happen. 
One such strategy is to foster 
enterprise clusters. This article 
takes a close look at the 
theoretical and actual benefits 
of enterprise clusters, using the 
example of six African clusters. 
Dorothy McCormick* 
Economists use the term "industrial" or "enterprise cluster" 
in various ways. In this discussion, a cluster is a group of enter-
prises involved in the same or related activities that are located 
near one another. It is, in other words, a geographical and sectoral 
agglomeration of enterprises
2. 
When similar firms locate near each other, both the firms and 
their environment change. Clustering seems to foster information 
sharing. It also creates opportunities for firms to learn from each 
other. In time, it may promote specialisation in some aspect of 
production or encourage some firms to shift from production into 
related trade or services. The environment also changes. The pres-
ence of many firms in the same location attracts customers, 
traders, workers with related skills, suppli-
ers of inputs and services, and additional 
producers trying to benefit from the mar-
ket being created. The interactions of the 
firms may also change existing institutions 
and promote the creation of new ones. 
Studies of clusters in various parts of the 
world have revealed a set of advantages 
that seem to accompany clustering'. 
Compared to dispersed firms, clustered 
firms appear to have better access to mar-
kets, skilled labour, intermediate inputs, 
and useful technologies. They also have 
more opportunities for many types of 
joint action. Taken together these advan-
tages are called "collective efficiency"'
1. 
Six typical clusters 
A study of six typical African enterprise 
clusters showed that only some of these 
potential benefits were actually present \ 
The six clusters were taken from three 
African countries and represent four types 
Can Africa industrialise 
through enterprise clusters? 
of activities (see box below). They vary in size from 500 to 8,000 
firms. The firms themselves also vary considerably. Four clusters 
consist almost entirely of small enterprises, with firm sizes aver-
aging between 1.5 and 6 workers. Two clusters have a mix of firm 
sizes. In the Lake Victoria fish cluster, firms range from one-per-
son trading enterprises up to industrial fish processors with 300 
workers. The Western Cape clothing cluster has both the widest 
range of firm sizes (5 to over 1,000 workers) and the largest mean 
size (126 workers). 
The three countries in which the clusters are located also differ 
from one another. Kenya and Ghana are very poor and in the 
early stages of industrialisation. South Africa is more developed 
overall, but continues to suffer from the legacies of apartheid. 
Cluster facilities vary greatly. The three vehicle repair and 
metalwork clusters - Suame, Ziwani, and Kamukunji — are large 
open-air .workshops with minimal infrastructure. The Lake 
Victoria fish cluster actually has two parts: the fishing beach and 
the industrial processing facilities. The beach portion has no elec-
tricity. Recent improvements have provided a tank fot chlorinat-
ing the water used for washing fish prior to shipping to factories, 
but general sanitation remains a problem. The industrial fish 
processors, on the other hand, operate from factory premises. All 
have the water and electricity required for processing and storing 
fish. South Africans Western Cape clothing cluster includes large, 
modern factories and home-based operations. Nevertheless, 
South Africa's higher level of development means that even the 
small firms generally have the electricity required to use industri-
al sewing machines. 
Collective efficiency gains 
Categorising the clusters into groups helps to make clear theit 
varying contributions to the industrialisation process. We found 
Six African clusters 
Eastlands: A grouping of approximately 600 garment-producing firms in two large 
Nairobi City Council markets. All firms are small. Markets are mainly domestic, including 
both Nairobi and distant towns. Recent research shows some (limited) export to neigh-
bouring countries. 
Kamukunji: An agglomeration of 2,000 metalworking firms on the edge of Nairobi. 
Products include consumer goods such as charcoal cooking stoves, buckets, pans, kitchen 
utensils, and products for agriculture and industry, such as wheelbarrows, watering cans, 
and small tools. 
Ziwani: A vehicle-repair cluster with some limited production of spare parts such as 
silencers, auto upholstery, and rubber bushes. Contains approximately 500 firms, six per 
cent of which are manufacturing. The market consists mainly of individuals based in 
Nairobi, especially owners of commercial vehicles. 
Lake Victoria: A geographically spread-out cluster that includes 15 industrial fish proces-
sors in Kisumu, a small lakeside city, and fisher folk and traders located at various beach-
es around the lake shore. For the latter, our research focused on a single fishing beach with 
more than 500 fishing and fish trading firms. The industrial processors produce frozen fish 
fillets and chilled whole fish, mainly for the export market. 
Suame: A vehicle-repair and metal-work cluster of over 8,000 firms. The market is similar 
to that of Ziwani, except that Suame also benefits from passive exports, i.e., customers 
coming to the cluster from across the border. 
Western Cape: A large clothing cluster consisting of over 500 clothing producing firms 
of varying sizes together with suppliers and distributors. The main market for the firms' 
products is domestic retail chains, though a minority of firms export. 
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three main rypes. The first category consisted of clusters with few 
signs of collective efficiency. We called these Groundwork clusters 
because they appear to be laying a foundation (or groundwork) 
for future industrialisation. I he Eastlands garment and 
Kamukunji clusters fell into this group. The second category con-
sists of clusters that are Industrialising, in the sense that they have 
begun the process of industrialisation and show clear signs of col-
lective efficiency. The two clusters in this group — Suame and 
Ziwani — in some ways resemble the two groundwork clusters, 
but their firms are more specialised and differentiated than those 
in Eastlands and Kamukunji. The third category has been named 
Complex industrial clusters, because these clusters include a mix 
of firm sizes and types, and are fully part of the industrial sector 
of their countries. Two clusters fall into this category: the Western 
Cape garment cluster and the Lake Victoria fish cluster. 
As expected, the research found different levels of collective 
efficiency in the three types of clusters. Groundwork clusters 
benefited greatly from market access, but only weakly from 
improved access to intermediate inputs. Locating within the 
cluster gave these micro and small firms access to visiting traders 
as well as individual retail customers. This boosted their sales 
and enabled them to produce in larger quan-
tities. On the other hand, the expected bene-
fit from intermediate input effects hardly 
materialised in these clusters. There were 
some efforts to make supplies available with-
in the clusters, but many producers still did 
most of their purchasing outside where they 
could get mote variety and better prices. 
Furthermore, there was little or no attempt to 
produce inputs in these clusters. Joint action 
took the form of scattered individual collabo-
ration - borrowing and lending of machinery 
or inputs — but very little general coopera-
tion. Kamukunji has an association, but it 
seems unable to move the cluster forward. 
Other potential benefits were either missing 
or negative (disabling). 
The existence of a cluster 
makes it possible for 
government, donors, 
associations, and even the 
financial sector to deliver 
needed services more 
easily than they could to a 
similar number of 
dispersed firms 
Like the groundwork clusters, 
the two industrialising clusters 
have benefited from better access 
to markets and intermediate 
inputs. But they show much clear-
er signs of collective efficiency 
than do groundwork clusters. 
The firms are more specialised and 
the cluster more diversified. 
Consequently, firms are more like-
ly to sub-contract or work togeth-
er. The result is greater efficiency. 
One cluster — Ziwani - had also 
taken important steps towards cre-
ating new institutions to compensate fot weaknesses in Kenya's 
institutional framework. The legal and judicial systems are cumber-
some and unfriendly to small business, so the Ziwani association 
developed its own mechanisms for resolving disputes that might 
arise either between firms in the cluster or with customers. 
The two complex industrial clusters share two important char-
acteristics, rheir small firms use simple technology and tend to 
depend on large firms for their markets. Perhaps more important-
ly, both clusters have been able to expand their market reach from 
local to national or global. They are, however, in other respects, 
very different from one another. Lhe Western Cape cluster has 
reached a high level of collective efficiency. It has clear benefits 
from access to markets and skilled labour. The cluster produces its 
own fabric, buttons, trim, and many other intermediate inputs. 
The cluster also has good potential for technological spillovers. Not 
only are some firms using the latest technology, but they are also 
willing to allow their less sophisticated counterparts to see it in 
operation. Joint action is also fairly strong. Firms cooperate with 
other firms in production and marketing, and the cluster has sev-
eral associations and organisations to promote common interests. 
Despite its complexity, the Lake Victotia cluster has experi-
enced few collective efficiency gains. Benefits 
of market access mainly accrue to fisher folk 
and traders. Industrial processors gain from 
being close to their source of supply, but their 
market access, which depends more on 
telecommunications, is not improved by 
being located in the cluster. The technologies 
used in fishing and fish processing are very 
simple, so there is little to be gained from 
spillovers. The cluster has little joint action of 
any type. The dealings of industrial processors 
with one another are marked by caution and 
mistrust. The fishermen have several organisa- it 
tions, including a cooperative, a beach organ-
isation, and welfare associations, but none of 
these horizontal groupings appears to be effec-
tive in improving their livelihoods. 1 he strongest linkage and most effective joint action seems to be ver-
tical, between the beach's largest trader and one of the industrial 
processors. This resulted in the development of new Facilities and 
procedures to satisfy European Union (EU) requirements for fish 
handling. 
Can clusters help Africa industrialise? 
Analysing these clusters in terms of collective efficiency has high-
lighted important benefits of clustering. It shows that clusters can 
help the industrialisation process, first of all, by giving firms 
improved access to markets. Clustering also creates opportunities 
for firms to learn from one another. Clustering sometimes 
improves access to skilled labout and occasionally results in 
improved technolog)'. 
Clustering also brings with it opportunities for firms to work 
together. In this way, it can help them to make good use of relatively 
small amounts of resources. The sort of borrowing and lending that 
characterise many small-enterprise clusters allows resources to be 
stretched and big purchases postponed until they are really needed. 
Production linkages can improve firms' efficiency. Joint marketing 
makes it possible to tap new and better markets. Associational activ-
ity provides a forum for sharing ideas and a means of advocating for 
improved services. It can also offer opportunities to create new insti-
tutions to make business work more smoothly. 
Finally, the existence of a cluster makes it possible for govern-
ment, donors, associations, and even the financial sector to deliv-
er needed services more easily than they could to a similar num-
ber of dispersed firms. This is an important benefit in poor coun-
tries where service delivery is costly and hard choices must often 
be made. 
The collective efficiency analysis, howevet, failed to answer a 
number of key questions about this set of clusters. 
• Why do some clusters fail to advance? 
• Why do some potential benefits turn out to be less helpful than 
anticipated or actually negative? 
• Why do some clusters experience significant joint action, while 
in others, firms remain isolated 
from one another? 
Satisfactory answers to such ques-
tions cannot be found in the clusters' 
internal structures. We must look 
instead at the context for clustering. 
Why do some clustets fail to advance? 
The stagnation of clusters like 
Kamukunji may have as much to do 
with quality of infrastructure as it 
does with cluster operations. A metal-
work cluster without electricity can 
use only the most basic technology, 
making it very difficult for the cluster 
to develop. Furthermore, ground-
work clusters' failure to advance is due also to their concentration 
on low-profit, low quality goods. Collective efficiency does not 
explain this choice. Rather the internal workings of the cluster have 
to be viewed against the backdrop of the market. Producers can 
improve product quality only when there is demand for higher 
quality goods. Ptoducets in poor countries like Kenya or Ghana 
recognise that their customers must of necessity choose price over 
quality, so they continue to make what they know can be sold. 
The fact that clusters attract labour should help by giving firms 
access to the best skills. In clusters like Kamukunji and Suame, how-
ever, it only adds to the already intense competitive pressures. 
Poverty and lack of access to education force many African young 
people into the labour market at an early age. They often get appren-
ticeships, but few can find employment when they finish. So they set 
up their own businesses in direct competition with their trainers. 
Finally, although it is not entirely clear why some clusters are able 
to act jointly while others are not, the experience of the Lake 
Victoria cluster suggests that trust and the institutions that guatd 
firms against predatory activities by others may be part of the expla-
nation. When the institutions of the state are weak, business people 
sometimes choose to protect their interests by secrecy and isolation. 
Can African countries industrialise by promoting enterprise clus-
ters? This analysis suggests that there are important benefits to this 
approach, but that success is not guaranteed. For the strategy to 
work, it must be two-pronged, addressing both the clusters and the 
wider institutional context. H 
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Transnational corporations 
(TNCs) are one of the most 
important actors in the global 
economy, occupying a more 
powerful position than ever 
before. In their persistent battle 
to increase profits, they have 
increasingly turned to the 
developing world, a world that 
holds many attractions for 
them. In this article, John 
Madeley* analyses the 
economic, social, and cultural 
effects of TNCs on the world's 
poor. He argues that 
transnational corporations have 
used their money, size and 
power to influence 
international negotiations and 
taken full advantage of the 
move towards privatisation to 
influence the policies of 
governments. The most serious 
charge, however, is that they 
have especially used their 
power to effectively cause 
hardship for millions of the 
poor in developing countries. 
Transnational corporations 
and developing countries: 
big business, poor peoples 
Fifty years ago, only a few hundred transnational corpora-
tions existed. Today there are some 65,000 of them, with about 
850,000 foteign affiliates across the globe. Sometimes called 
multinational organisations, they operate "across national 
boundaries in a context of nation states" and are engaged in 
almost every economic activity, most notably in agriculture, 
foodstuffs, fishing, forestry, pharmaceuticals, mining, manufac-
turing, energy, tourism, transport, and financial and other serv-
ices. 
Mostly based in Western economies, TNCs now occupy a 
powerful position in the global economy, accounting for around 
two-thirds of international trade. Wfiile most are comparatively 
small, some are huge. In 1999, 51 of the world's 100 largest 
economies were corporations, 49 were governments. One of the 
largest companies, General Electric, had revenues of §126 billion 
in 2001, more than the combined national incomes of sub-
Saharan African countries, except the Republic of South Africa. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is dominated by transnation-
al corporations. With TNCs boosting their investment, FDI in 
developing countries has increased dramatically in recent years. 
But FDI is highly concentrated: about 80 per cent has gone to 
only ten developing countries, while the smallest 100 recipients 
have received only one per cent. Almost two-thirds of the FDI to 
developing countries went to Asia, only five per cent to Africa. 
Size matters 
The size and nature of the corporations, the jobs they offer to 
create, and the taxes they might pay make for an unequal rela-
tionship between TNCs and the governments of developing 
countries and their peoples. When a government negotiates with 
a TNC that is thinking of investing in its country, the negotia-
tions are skewed in favour of the corporation. This raises ques-
tions about whether corporate power enables them to effectively 
subvert democracy. 
TNCs tend also not to consult local people about their plans. 
Even the affiliate of a TNC that operates in a developing country 
may have little say over how its company is run. Most decisions, 
the outcome of which affects the behaviour of foreign affiliates, 
ate taken by their parent companies on the basis ofinformation 
and expectations known only to them. David Korten describes 
TNCs as "instruments of a market tyranny that is extending its 
reach across the planet like a cancet, colonising ever more of the 
planet's living spaces, destroying livelihoods, displacing people, 
rendering democratic institutions impotent, and feeding on life 
in an insatiable quest for money'
1. 
The case for TNCs rests on the theory of comparative advan-
tage — that everyone gains when countries specialise and that 
TNCs help in their specialisation. But the theory of comparative 
advantage has lost its credibility; countries have specialised eco-
nomically but people have not gained. Furthermore, when TNCs 
invest in the economies of other countries, they do so because 
they believe that a profitable operation is possible. The money 
invested by a corporation is often not its own — it may have been 
borrowed from banks in developing countries, reducing the 
amount of money that the banks have available to lend to small-
er business in their country. 
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Most of the jobs 
in TNCs tend to 
be low-skilled. 
low-paid, and 
geared to a 
particular company 
operation.... 
A worker will 
perform a small. 
specialised task of 
a large operation. 
Such tasks are 
likely to turn 
workers into little 
more than the arm 
of a machine and 
not necessarily 
equip them with 
skills they can use 
elsewhere, 
in domestic 
enterprises for 
example 
Neither can TNCs be 
relied on to stay in a 
country, as they tend to 
be less interested in the 
long-term sustainable 
operations in any one 
country. They are more 
concerned about their 
own profit than with the 
welfare of a host country. 
Corporate efficiency is 
good for profits but it 
can drive small-scale 
companies in developing 
countries out of business. 
A new TNC-owned fac-
tory may create jobs but 
at the cost of existing 
obs in locallv-owned fac-
I 
tories. A net gain of jobs 
may not result. While 
foreign direct investment 
has created more than 12 
million jobs in develop-
ing countries, many of 
the newly created jobs 
have often displaced 
workers in competing domestic industries. According to an 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) report, the role of 
TNCs in job creation is "at best marginal". ILO points out that 
if TNC employment is growing at all, it is "due to acquisitions 
and mergers rather than to new employment opportunities"
 
2. 
Changing the life of the poor 
TNCs have been powerful enough to lead industrialisation in 
some countries. But there is evidence that such TNC led indus-
trialisation in several Asian countries has been achieved at a severe 
cost to agriculture and rural development. Governments have 
tended to keep farm-gate prices low, both to save money for 
industrialisation and to enable workers in the new export-orient-
ed factories to have cheap food and not demand high wages. 
Of particular significance is that the presence of TNCs in poor-
er countries has widened internal inequalities. Almost all the 
studies that have been done on the effects of FDI have conclud-
ed that it has led to an uneven income distribution in developing 
countties. TNCs produce goods and services for those who have 
purchasing power; they cannot meet the basic needs of people 
who do not have the money to express their needs in the marker 
place. The corporations apply their knowledge to make compar-
atively luxury goods and services. The nature of their products 
and knowledge may create biases against the poor, very few of 
whom are its direct customers, employees or sources of supply. 
Governments of developing countries may seek to attract 
TNCs because the corporations can provide the capital that a 
country lacks to invest, for example, in activities such as manu-
facturing and prospecting for mineral deposits. Attracting TNCs 
demands that governments allocate resources for the purpose; 
this means there is less for other sectors of the economy, such as 
agriculture, education and health care. Exporting processing 
zones have been set up with the aim of creating jobs and increas-
ing export earnings. Five, even ten-year tax-free arrangements 
have been offered to TNCs to attract them into these zones, plus 
the promise of cheap, non-unionised casual labour. 
Most of the jobs in such enterprises tend to be low-skilled, low-
paid, and geared to a particular company operation. "Advanced" 
technologv is used on mass production lines. A worker will per-
form a small, specialised task of a large operation. Such tasks are 
likely to turn workers into little more than the arm of a machine 
and not necessatily equip them with skills they can use elsewhere, 
in domestic enterprises for example. 
Impacting the WTO agenda 
Transnational corporations are powerful enough to exert con-
siderable influence on the agenda and rules of the World Trade 
Organisation. While it is corporations rather than countries that 
trade, the WTO is made up of countries. WTO decisions are 
usually in line with corporate expectations. Government minis-
ters and their officials conduct business at WTO meetings under 
the gaze of representatives from major corporations who may 
even be part of the official delegation. 
The company people expect to be heard when they lobby for 
decisions that help their business. "The role that TNCs can play in 
a nation's economy can make their host government a very accom-
modating and attentive audience; the cotporations have much more 
access to WTO decision-makers than citizens groups and NGOs", 
says Myriam Vander Stichele of the Transnational Institute. 
The WTO's Trade-related Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs) agreement was largely written by a consortium of cor-
porations. It gives TNCs the right to protect their patents in 
WTO member countries. But the consequences of this for 
developing countries are serious. It can hinder the development 
of a local drugs industry, for example, and farmers who plant 
crops that have been patented will have to pay royalties to the 
patent holder, even though farmers and their ancestors may 
have grown and helped to develop those crops for centuries. 
WTO rules are based on the principle of non-discrimination-
countries are not allowed to discriminate in favour of domestic 
companies, to the detriment of foreign companies. Under the 
WTO's Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) agree-
ment, any support, any special treatment that governments offer 
to their domestic companies they have to offer to TNCs. This 
agreement elevates trade policy over development policy, hinder-
ing the development of local industry. The rules also mean that 
TNCs are under no obligation to use local labour or materials -
they can shop around for the cheapest possible source. 
Responsibility, accountability, codes and regulation 
To improve their image, TNCs now talk more about corporate 
responsibility. The phrase is common in company reports. But 
especially when there are no changes in company policy on the 
ground, "corporate responsibility" may be nothing more than 
public relations. Thus, the debate "should shift its focus away 
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from corporate responsibility towards corporate public account­
ability", argues Judith Richter, author of a recent paper 
'Dialogue of Engineering of Consent'; "it should move away 
from relying on corporate statements of intent towards creating 
legal and political institutions to monitor and sanction socially-
and environmentally-harmful corporate practices". 
Corporations should be accountable to society if they expect 
to win the respect of society, but there is no international regu­
lation of TNCs. Corporations often plead that they can regulate 
themselves, that they can be trusted. But industry self-regulation 
is not possible when it interferes with maximisation of profit. 
Some TNCs — manufacturers of toys and shoes, for example -
have drawn up codes of conduct. They have done so, however, 
without any system of independent monitoring, making them of 
limited value. Codes of conduct are insufficient. TNCs are "too 
important and too dominant a part of the global economy for 
voluntary codes to be enough... they need to be brought within 
a framework of global governance, not just a patchwork of 
national laws, rules and regulations", says the UNDP Human 
Development Report 1999. Corporations need to be regulated 
at the international level if their power is to be harnessed. 
"A new global body is needed to oversee the regulation of 
multinational business, to ensure that its activities safeguard peo­
ple's basic rights and contribute to the eradication of poverty 
globally", recommends the UK-based aid agency, Christian Aid. 
"The regulation of transnational business is perhaps the most 
pressing problem of globalization... never in human history has 
a comparatively small number of private corporations wielded so 
much power. The power of the TNCs needs to be brought under 
democratic control". ■ 
* John Madeley is the author oPBig Business. Poor Peoples:The Impact ofTransnational 
Corporations on the World's Poor', published by Zed Hooks. 
Mining the poor 
Mining is the world's fifth largest industry. It is also, by its 
very nature, one of the most environmen:ally destructive 
activities. In recent years, TNCs have increasingly moved to 
the Southern hemisphere where the opportunities are larg-
er and the mining industries are less regulated; the envi-
ronmental standards that are expected of the companies in 
the North do not apply in most of the South. 
In the wake of liberalisation and privatisation, governments 
of developing countries, which were once suspicious of 
mining TNCs, are now changing their laws, easing their 
regulations and offering tax concessions to attract them. 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, 70 countries, including 
31 in Africa, have opened their doors to international min-
ing companies, and governments are selling state-owned 
mines at a rapid pace. 
Most mining is high-tech, open-cast and short-lived, and 
dependent on volatile markets. Large-scale mining can cre-
ate havoc with the lives and cultures of people in mining 
areas. During the last hundred years, mining has meant 
that probably 100 million people, most of them in devel-
oping countries, have been removed from land where they 
lived and farmed. In many cases the land was forest, which 
again had to be removed. Mines produce huge waste 
dumps, which are often health and safety hazards, threat-
ening, for example, to slip down hillsides. They can con-
taminate water sources, both near the mine and far away, 
sometimes very far away from the immediate area of a 
mining activity. 
Sustainability is not high on the agenda of m ning TNCs, and 
the world is hardly awash with mining companies with good 
records. Responsible mining is needed in which the corpora-
tions seek the consent of local 
people before mining begins. 
The World Bank and Inter-
national Monetary Fund could 
help by not giving loans for a 
mining operation unless local 
people have been consulted. 
International regulation of the 
industry is necessary to ensure 
labour and land rights and strict 
environmental standards. The 
world may need the materials 
that mining produces, but the 
people in mining areas should 
not be expected to pay for them 
with their livelihoods and cul-
tures. 
Mining in Zambia. 
Some countries see the privatisation 
of mines as a central plank in their 
economic strategies. 
In 1998, Zambia wa5 pinning hopes 
of economic recovery on privatising 
its state-owned copper mines. 
(^Ron Giling/Wildlifc- Pictures 
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For the past decade, the 
international community's 
asymmetric concentration on 
"trade" over "industry" has 
unfortunately led to the belief 
that it was sufficient to 
organise rules on the basis of a 
degree of free trade if nations' 
wealth were to be given a 
sound foundation. That poor 
countries should not gradually 
process their raw materials and 
exploit their energy sources for 
the benefit of their populations 
is not, however, humanly 
conceivable, nor is it desirable 
for long-term peace. 
Yves Ekoué Amaizo* 
It has to be admitted nowadays that the weakly industrialised 
countries (WICs)' that have adhered to the rules promoted by the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) are not the principal beneficiar-
ies of world trade. Quite simply, the teverse is often the case, and this 
could explain the developing countries' reluctance to opt for new 
post-Doha trade negotiations whilst the previous negotiations have 
not produced truly tangible results for poor countries. The continent 
of Africa has seen its gross domestic product (GDP) per capita fall 
between 1990 and 2000 (US$755 to US$673). East Africa, with 
US$241 per capita in 2000, exists on the margins of the global 
From industry 
to productive capacity: 
promoting local value chains 
system when compared with North Africa, which, as a region, 
achieves US$1385 per capita
2. Meanwhile, the share of manufactur-
ing value added (MVA) in the GDP of most countries in Aftica, the 
Caribbean and the Pacific (the ACP countries) remains below the 
minimum of the 16 per cent required on an ongoing basis if sus-
tainable development can reliably be expected (see graph). 
No industry = no trade! 
One of the missing links is industry, and without it "trade" cannot 
guarantee sustainable development. In 2001, Africa's share in world 
trade was 2.4 per cent for exports and 2.1 per cent for imports'. All 
WICs are in a similar situation, particularly since the manufacturing 
value added share in the global share is insignificant; on average, 
0.9 per cent for Africa between 1980 and 2001'. It is therefore not 
enough to advocate the creation of equitable conditions to enable the 
poor countries — those in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, in 
particular - to play an effective role in the global economy. Such 
countries play a full part, but passively, and without a convincing 
return in terms of improvement of their productive capacity. Indeed, 
the acceleration of market liberalisation and the resulting increased 
competitiveness have gradually altered the deal. The "import substi-
tution" or even "industrialising industry" approach is now obsolete 
except as part of the process that has helped convert credit's potential 
lever effect into mass indebtedness, with no reducing effects on the 
productive capacity of the indebted countries. Conversely, creditor 
Share of manufacturing value added (MVA) in GDP of some ACP and EU countries, 
1990 and 2000 (as %, 1990 prices)* 
Grenada Jamaica  Gabon Senegal Zimbabwe Mauritius Nigeria Kenya South Africa United France 
Kingdom 
■ 1990 J 2000 
* 16% of the share of MVA in GDP is equivalent to the minimum required for sustainable development 
Source: UNIDO. International Yearbook of Industrial Statistics, 2002, UNIDO Vienna Austria, pp. 39-43. 
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countries appear to use the debt trap as a 
new weapon with which to organise poor 
countries' productive capacity to their own 
strategic advantage. In fact, "effectiveness" 
in the production process is no longer 
restricted to the productive entity taken in 
isolation, but is measured by the yardstick 
of industrial solutions incorporated into 
local and global value chains operating not 
only regionally but also sectorally. Clusters 
- geographic conglomerations - arise as 
solutions, based on proximity. Other forms 
of conglomerations, particularly on a sec-
toral basis, extend beyond geographical 
frontiers, emerging in the wake of the new 
information and communication technolo-
gies (NICTs) and, to all intents and purpos-
es, the viftual disappearance of distances. 
Unfortunately, this powerful tool for disseminating technological and 
industrial know-how is in conflict with the concept of the accumula-
tion of capital; powet and the capacity to influence concentrated prin-
cipally at the level of transnational companies and the governments of 
industrialised countries. It is possible to neutralise "free trade" by 
organising delays, and these may include a ban not only on the pro-
duction of certain goods but also on the transfer of technologies capa-
ble of promoting the emergence of industries. Naturally, the capacity 
to absorb "industrial and technological" know-how in the weakly 
industrialised countries is sometimes lacking, but the existence of cer-
tain business practices cannot be denied. Therefore, identifying the 
requirements of a weakly industrialised country in terms of productive 
capacity in no way signifies, in the absence of suitable local conditions, 
that a factory will be built or that a transfer of technolog)' will take 
place. Often, given local constraints and an unpredictable institution-
al environment, this information is used to increase the export of goods 
from the industrialised countries to the weakly industrialised countries. 
Exporting processed goods 
The effect of the EU agricultural policy in terms of the neutralisa-
tion of entire sectors of embryonic, but sometimes emergent, local 
industries needs no further demonstration. Conversely, the exports of 
weakly industrialised countries may be "controlled" under initiatives 
involving concessional arrangements that are limited over time, such 
as the AGOA (African Growth and Oppottunity Act) in the case of 
the US, chapters of the Cotonou Agreement or "Everything but 
arms" in the case of the EU, a unilateral system dependent on the EU. 
In recent years, in fact, the global volume of exports from the ACP 
countries to the industrialised countries has begun to improve thanks 
to such initiatives. However, most exported products are generally 
unprocessed and, when they are processed, it is often by industries 
with a low level of technolog)', that are polluting and consume a great 
deal of energy. The non-diversity of the products exported and rules 
of origin are further factors with a neutralising effect locally on 
improvement of productive capacity and access to international mar-
kets undet minimum acceptable conditions of competitiveness, par-
ticularly in terms of the quality of the products and delivery dead-
lines. Lastly, on the basis of an excellent analysis of WIC productive 
systems, the concessional 
arrangements mentioned 
above and those signed on 
bilateral terms lead to a situ-
ation in which the WICs 
export globally, and accord-
ing to terms of trade that are 
far from equitable, only 
unprocessed goods thai often involve packaging costs thai .uv greatet 
than those of the contents themselves. 
Disseminating technologies and know-how 
in the public domain 
Processing of such goods locally would help to satisfy the local and 
regional market in the ACP countries, but would interfere with 
North-South exports. Thus, insidiously, the reality of trade negotia-
tions and the quarantining of "the industrialisation of the poor coun-
tries" focuses on diplomacy for neutralising trade if the latter is to 
contribute to increasing the poor countries' productive capacity with 
regard to products already being exported from North to South. The 
priority accorded to demonstrating multiple and multi-form aid to 
the poorest people in the WICs should not be misunderstood -
sometimes, it is a new way in which to thinly spread humanitarian 
action usefully and thereby "overlook" the urgency of disseminating 
the technolog)' and know-how that should accompany it. The essen-
tial part of the technologies required for processing agricultural pro-
duce into finished products for export and for reducing post-harvest 
losses in the WICs has already come into the public domain. What, 
then, is preventing the EU (which is closer than others to the con-
cerns of the ACP countries) in association with UN institutions, from 
setting up a technological and industrial database and making it avail-
able to people in the ACP countries through suitable training? This 
request has been formulated on many occasions by the industry min-
isters of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) at most major con-
ferences on development, but it has not been followed up. This wor-
rying silence is also the result of a strategy aimed at neutralising 
actions that promote productive capacities, such actions being the 
only real way in which to reduce systemic poverty. 
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to readers 
Dear reader 
In this issue we are asking for your help. 
The ACP-EU Courier has been distributed free 
of charge to subscribers for over thirty years. 
Over these 200 issues, the magazine has evolved 
continually. There is always room for improvement. 
To enable us to provide you with a magazine 
which best fulfils your needs, your views on 
the magazine are vital. 
We have drawn up a questionnaire which we ask 
you to complete. 
Please remove it and send it, completed, 
to this address: 
The Editor 
ACP-EU Courier 
DG Development (G12, 5/73) 
European Commission 
B-1049, Brussels, Belgium 
Please mark the envelope "Questionnaire". 
You can also fax it to: +32. 2. 299 30 02 
or reply to the questionnaire on-line: 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/development/ 
publicatlcourierlindex_en.htm 
Your views are important to us! 
Thank you for helping us to improve your 
magazine. 
The Courier team Part 1: How does the Courier reach you? 
Please tick </ the appropriate box 
1.1 Are you a subscriber to the Courier? 
a. Yes □MOI b. NO □ ,.O> 
1.2  If you are not a subscriber, 
a. Through the EU Delegation in 
c. In a library 
e. Via internet 
g. In a private company 
i. Through a school 
k. Other (please indicate) 
how do 
your country  _J 1 701 
—J 1 203 
-J 1 205 
—1 1,207 
J 1 209 
□ ,„, 
you get the magazine? 
b. Direct mail 
d. From a friend or colleague 
f. In a government office 
h.Through an association 
j. Through a university 
LJ 1 202 
-J 1 204 
LJ 1 206 
LJ 1 208 
□ ,2,0 
1.3 Do you read the Courier 
a. Never □■», b. Rarely Qu  c. Often  □ 
d. Each issue Ü,» 
(i.e. six "¡mes a year) 
<i Λ Including yourself, how many -i r Which year did you first see 
J-" people read the copy you see? -"^ or receive the Courier 
(Put an estimated number) 
1 e Have you visited 
■J·*
2 the Courier website? 
a. Yes □  b.NoQ,« 
1.7 Do you read the Courier (several answers are possible) 
a. To be informed about ACP-EU cooperation □, *» b. As a source of information about ACP countries □, 7 
c. To be informed about development issues □um d. Research or policy analysis ϋπ 
e. As part of your studles Qwos f. As a teaching tool Qw 
g. Other (please specify) 
Pa rt 2: Your o pini on of the Courier 
2.1 | consider the Courier to be 
a. Never useful 
—l ιοί 
b. Rarely useful 
LJ : 102 
c. Often useful 
—J ,03 
d. Essential reading 
LJ : ,04 
2.2 How do you judge the following elements? 
Insufficient 
a. Cover 
b. Layout 
c. Variety of sections 
(News, Focus, Country Report, Dossier, Culture etc) 
d. Clarity of articles 
e. Length of articles 
f. Relevance of the information 
g. Objectivity of the information 
h. Style of writing 
i. Subject matter 
j. Number of pages 
LJ 2.201 
LJ 2 205 
LJ 2 209 
□ 22,3 
□ 22,2 
□ .., 
□ 222S 
-J ? .'.' 
□ 2 233 
□ 2 23? 
Average 
IJ 2.202 
U22O6 
LJ221O 
□ 2 2,4 
LJ22I8 
□2222 
□222c 
UJ2230 
□22« 
LJ 2 238 
Good 
IJ 2.203 
—i 207 
□ 22,, 
□ 22, 
U; 219 
□2223 
□2222 
□223, 
□223s 
—1 ;:■■■' 
Very good 
_J 204 
U.' 208 
□ 22,2 
□ 22, 
—J 220 
□ 2224 
LJ222S 
□ 2232 
□ 2230 
—1 240 2^3 Do you read the following sections? 
a. Meeting Point 
b. News 
c. Focus 
d. Trade 
e. Book reviews 
f. Dossier 
g. Country report 
h. Readers' letters 
i. Culture 
j. Children 
k.Education 
1. Women 
never 
LJ 2 301 
—1 2 305 
LJ 2 309 
□ 23,3 
□ 23,2 
□ 232, 
□ 2325 
J 2 329 
□ 2333 
□ 233, 
□ 234, 
□ 23« 
sometimes 
J : 
Ü2 306 
□ 2.3,0 
□ 23,4 
U2 318 
□ 23« 
□ 232s 
LJ 2.330 
□ 2334 
LJ 2.33a 
□ 2,42 
LJ 2 346 
often 
LJ 2.303 
—1 307 
Q,.„, 
□ ¡3,S 
—1 319 
□ 2323 
□ 2 32, 
□ 233, 
□ 2.33s 
LJ 2.339 
□2343 
□2,42 
always 
LJ 2 304 
J 2 308 
□ 23,2 
□ 23,0 
-J 
□ 2324 
LJ 2 328 
□ 2332 
□ 23« 
J 2 340 
□ 2344 
LJ 2 348 
1A  Does the Courier 
a. Raise awareness about ACP countries 
b. Raise awareness about EU-ACP cooperation 
c. Raise awareness about development Issues 
d. Raise awareness about the EU 
e. Promote, through information, more effective communication 
between developing and developed nations? 
yes □¡.¿o, 
yes ^2 403 
yes ^2 405 
yes Û2 407 
yes Û2 409 
no —1 
no □2404 
no □.■.,·■ 
nO ^2 408 
no □2.410 
2.5 Do you think the Courier sufficiently reflects the diverse views and concerns of developing countries? 
a. Yes, successful in most areas Q2S01 b. No, seriously limited ^2502 
If no, which aspects do you feel are neglected? 
2.6 As regards information on relations between the EU and the ACP countries, the Courier is 
a. Your only source of information □ ¡«n 
c. An important source among others Ou«a 
b. Your main source □ ? 
d. Insignificant as a source of information □., 
2.7 Are there subjects you would like to see covered in the Courier ? If so, please name them 
If you have any other comments, please use this space Part 3: Who are you? 
3.1 Country of residence  3.2 Town 
3.3 Nationality 
3.4 Age 
a. Less than 20 years □ 
d. Between 40 and 50 years □ 
b. Between 20 and 30 years □ 
e. Between 50 and 60 years □ 
c. Between 30 and 40 years □ 
f. More than 60 years □ 
3,5 Sex 
a. Female  b. Male 
3.6 Level of education 
a. Primary □ 
d. University □ 
b. Secondary □ 
e. Post-graduate □ 
c. Studies after secondary school □ 
f. Higher studies equivalent □ 
to university 
3J  Professional activity 
a. Agricultural worker 
d. Unemployed 
g. Schoolgoer 
j. Government official 
m.Donor organisation 
p. Retired 
□ 
J 
□ 
□ 
□ 
J 
b. Librarian 
e. Consultant 
h. University student 
k. Politician 
n. Liberal profession 
q. Other (please specify) 
□ 
□ 
Ü 
J 
□ 
c. Researcher J 
f. Diplomat □ 
i. Teacher/lecturer □ 
I.Journalist □ 
o. Non-governmental organisation □ 
Thank you for the time you have taken to complete this survey. 
The Courier team Reducing the industrial gap or indirectly favouring 
extremism 
The improvement in productivity for enhancing production 
involves an enrire process of apprenticeship and innovation that the 
United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) 
highlighted in its Industrial Development Report 2002-2003'. It is 
important simultaneously to ensure constant progress in terms of local 
industrial capacity, strategically organising industrial upgrading and 
the complexity-increasing process. "Managing" one's industrialisation 
requires regular comparison - with the objective of continuous 
upgrading - with the other parties involved, not only at sectoral, 
national and regional level, but also at global level. Nowadays, there-
fore, the industrial gap can be summed up as follows: a day's work in 
the industrialised countries (talcing into account the level of produc-
tive efficiency achieved) can on average be equivalent to more than one 
and a half months' work (a comparison between France and Kenya) 
and sometimes more in the WICs. From 1980-84 and 1995-99, 
annual average manufacturing value added per worker changed, in 
Kenya, from US$2345 to US$1489, in Mauritius from US$2969 to 
US$4217, and in Zambia from US$11753 to US$16615, whereas in 
France it went up from US$26751 to US$61019, in Germany from 
US$34945 to US$79616, in the US from US$47276 to US$81353 
and, in Japan, from US$34456 to US$92582". It is worth noting the 
progress achieved by Iran, 
where the figure increased from 
US$17679 to US$89787, 
double that of Iraq (US$13599 
to US$34316). There can 
therefore be no serious and 
effective aid policy if no effort 
is made to improve productive 
capacities, focusing on the 
type of productivity that it is 
easiest to obtain by influenc-
ing the considerable level of 
Identifying the 
requirements of a 
weakly industrialised 
country in terms of 
productive capacity in no 
way signifies, in the 
absence of suitable local 
conditions, that a factory 
will be built or that a 
transfer of technology 
will take place 
interdependence that exists 
between agriculture and 
industry in the ACP countries. 
To make no effort to, together, 
find solutions aimed at bridg-
ing the industrial gap is to pro-
mote the dissemination of 
technologies and know-how 
by means of undemocratic circuits, far from the concept of human, 
women's and children's rights and controlled by financial oligarchies. 
The use of fire power or neutralisation, by refusing to cancel the 
ACP countries' debt, cannot dispense with a more-in depth action 
consisting of a review of the terms of access to productive capacity and 
the consequences ofthat on growth, employment and therefore immi-
gration, peace and the geo-economic equilibrium of the planet. 
Re-evaluating initiatives aimed at strengthening 
productive capacities 
Signatories to the agreements of the WTO, the WICs - whether or 
not they belong to the ACP group - can neither benefit from the dis-
mantling of trade barriers nor increase their market share by taking 
advantage of the transition period, that is set to end in 2007, without 
a review of their position. Indeed, the negotiations which began in 
September 2002 on the Economic Partnership Agreements must place 
the strengthening ot productive capacity at the centre of the debate. 
There will be no sustainable gains for the ACP countries if their com-
mon position as a group or as subregions is restricted solely to seeking 
cariff or trade concessions. The initiative of the East .Africa Chapter 
(EAC) of the Conference of .African Ministers of Industry that pro-
poses integrating the private sector into a regional initiative aimed at 
strengthening productive capacities in priority sectors such as agri-
foodstuffs, textiles and leather is deserving of financial support, partic-
ularly as this is the first operational proposal promoting local value 
chains at sectoral level to have been made under the aegis of the New 
Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). The other African 
subregions are to take up this innovative approach during 2003. 
Value chains: an essential rethink of donors' budgets' 
The concept of "industry" is progressively disappearing, to be 
replaced by that of "value chains". This is a systemic approach applied 
to the creation of added value, but structured around healthy competi-
tion based on a high level of sharing of know-how and knowledge, 
whose aim is to promote the emergence of an economy "drawn along" 
by training and innovation. The real challenge is largely unchanged: to 
make several multilateral institutions, such as UNIDO, the EAC, 
UNCTAD, the ILO and the WTO, alongside the EU's institutional 
partners, the African subregional institutions, representatives of the pri-
vate sector and, naturally, bilateral representatives, collaborate in order 
to genuinely ensure the strengthening of productive capacities within 
the framework of a regional economic partnership. Should the institu-
tions be reformed? Should there be a review of the objective-based 
approach, consisting of making institutions specialise to the point of 
neutralising collective synergies instead of promoting diese same posi-
tive levels of interdependence between "trade" and "industry"? The 
anticipated advantages of the liberalisation of trade and massive inward 
investment in the ACP countries cannot come to fruition without a 
gradual upgrading of private-sector support structures. Such structures 
will rapidly have to come under the control of the private sector itself. 
Large budget allocations aimed at supporting sustainable development 
must therefore be revised and there must be some guarantee that the 
majority of financial support is not concentrated solely on macro-
economic adjustments or infrastructures. Cooperation budgets must 
henceforth incorporate upgrading of productive structures whilst 
offering new opportunities for access to capital for small- and medium-
sized businesses, thereby "democratising" access to credit and training 
and improving the business environment. It is also important to 
strengthen local entrepreneurial networks in order to incorporate 
global value chains into industrial sectors, the only way to profit from 
the fruits of world growth and the opportunities offered by the 
global economy. ■ 
* Economist with I 'NIIX ) (which assumes no responsibility liir this article), joint-author of. L'Afrique 
est-elle incapable de s'unir? Lever l'intangibilité des frontières et opter pour un passeport com-
mun. [Is Africa incapable of unity?'The intangible borders must be lifted, a single passport intro-
ducete, 2002, published by L'Harmattan, París, 664 pp., with a preface by Professor Joseph Ki Zerbo. 
1. Yves Ekoue Amaizo, "LDCs orWICs", the Courier ACP-EU. May-June 2001. page 27. 
2. African Development Bank, Annual Report 2001. Abidjan. 
3. WTO, International Trade Statistics, 2002, Geneva. 
4. UNIDO, international Yearbook of Industrial Statistics 2002. Vienna, Austria. 
5. UNIDO, Industrial Development Report 2002/-2003, Competing through innovation 
anil learning, see www.unido r irg/idr. 
6. World Bank. World Development Indicators 2002, pp. 64-66. 
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In order to facilitate the 
achievement of the economic 
development goals of the ACP 
countries, the Cotonou Agreement 
contains a comprehensive new 
policy and a broad range of 
institutions and instruments to 
support private sector 
development. The SME sector 
contributes substantially to 
combating poverty by improving 
income distribution and reducing 
social exclusion while promoting 
the industrial development of the 
ACP states. 
Escipión Oliveira* 
Globalisation has affected the way people live and do business 
around the world. Innovations in telecommunications and trans-
port have shrunk the dimensions of time and space and expanded 
the notion of markets. Competition has become fiercer, putting a 
supplementary strain on the competitiveness of private enterpris-
es in ACP countries. The SME sector faces many additional obsta-
cles, "with small companies often struggling to compete in diffi-
cult local business environments that favour larger firms '". 
A four pillar strategy 
Τ he Cotonou Agreement emphasises the role played by the private 
sector in the sustainable development of the ACP countries. For the 
first time in the history of the relationship between the EU and the 
ACP Group, a new chapter sets out not only the specific goals for pri-
vate sector development, but foresees institutions, instruments, and 
structures linking principles with implementation. In particular, arti-
cle 74 states that "cooperation shall, through financial and technical 
assistance, support the policies and strategies for investment and pri-
vate sector development"; article 75 recognises the role of investment 
promotion in any process of economic development; articles 76 to 78 
set out a broad range of steps to be adopted for investment finance 
and support, investment guarantees and investment protection. 
Consequently, the ACP States and the European Union have con-
ceived and are implementing a four pillar private sector support strat-
egy that will contribute to the fulfilment of the main objective of the 
Agreement; that is, "teducing and eventually eradicating poverty con-
sistent with the objectives of sustainable development and the grad-
ual integration of the ACP countries into the world economy" 
(Article 1)\ A series of initiatives have been and will continue to be 
implemented to tackle the main challenges faced by the ACP private 
sector. "Private sector development in many ACP countries is held 
back by low business confidence associated with shortcomings in 
public policies and institutions and public infrastructure and by the 
weakness of private sector organisations, in financial and non finan-
cial services for enterprises and in the management capacities of 
enterprises themselves." ' 
Creating an enabling environment for business 
The first pillar of the ACP-EU private sector development strateg}' 
seeks the enhancement of the legislative, regulatory and institutional 
environment in which ACP enterprises operate. The promotion of a 
participative approach favouring public-private sector dialogue at the 
Promoting small and medium 
sized enterprises (SMEs) 
in ACP countries in the context 
of industrial development 
national, regional, and ACP-EU level is one of the key prioriries of 
the new Partnership Agreement. 
Structural adjustment programmes, the promotion of regional 
markets and the realisation of in-depth studies to identify the con-
straints of the business environment climate are the main instruments 
used to enhance the economic and institutional framework of the 
ACP States. In this context, DIAGNOS ' was a facility that helped to 
foster dialogue, undertake studies with the involvement of both gov-
ernments and the private sector, organise workshops, and propose 
priorities for action. 
Furthermore, through their national and regional indicative pro-
grammes (NIP-RIP), several ACP countries are engaged in the promo-
tion of their entrepreneurial culture, taking into consideration the speci-
ficities of each community while encouraging informal operators to 
gradually incorporate the formal sector so as to guarantee the safety of 
employees and consumers and contribute to the financing of the State. 
Modernising the economic infrastructure 
The second pillar concerns the modernisation of the economic 
infrastructure of the ACP States and the participation of the private 
sector in the realisation and financing of public works. As unreliable 
infrastructure undermines competitiveness and discourages invest-
ment, a stable supply and competitive prices for raw materials such 
as electricity, gas and water as well as an efficient transportation net-
work are essential for industrial development. Furthermore, deci-
sions are made to ensure the establishment of transparent public pro-
curement mechanisms with a view to favouring competition. 
The new Investment Facility (IF), introduced for the first time in 
the Cotonou Agreement and managed by the European Investment 
Bank (EIB), seeks to act as a catalyst in the expansion, modernisa-
tion and privatisation of ACP infrastructure. In addition, the 
launching of major infrastructural works is accompanied by support 
for SMEs in the construction and service sectors. This aid is chan-
nelled through the Centre for the Development of Enterprise 
(CDE), PROINVEST, and the EU-ACP Business Assistance 
Scheme (EBAS). 
Strengthening support institutions 
The third pillar deals with assistance to national and regional pro-
fessional and financial institutions servicing SMEs, by providing 
capacity building and financial support. Support institutions play a 
key role in the process of innovation, in particular, in helping SMEs 
and clusters to link with foreign markets and partners and to upgrade 
their technological and managerial capabilities. Therefore, the ACP 
Group and the EU promote the grouping of enterprises through pro-
fessional associations with a view to facilitating aid channelling while 
ensuring a coherent voice for their specific needs. A wide range of 
opportunities in this area is provided in the Cotonou Agreement; 
technolog)' centres, investment and export promotion agencies, stan-
dards and metrolog}' institutions, productivity centres, certification 
agencies, business development services, chambers of commerce; 
financial institutions, clusters, training institutes. 
As for financial support, one of the major constraints faced by 
SMEs in ACP countries is limited access to credit. The Investment 
42  the Courier ACP-EU n° 196 january-february 2003 Facility with a total budget of €2.2 billion seeks to improve the lend-
ing conditions in ACP markets by channelling loans through local 
financial institutions. This also allows SMEs to have access to loans 
that are longer-term than the ones generally available to them, whicl 
in turn will result in a positive impact on their liquidity' and financial 
stability. PROINVEST's Interpower Facility has been specially 
designed to support, on a regional basis, the improvement of inter-
median' organisations servicing SMEs, whilst CDE and EBAS play an 
important role in the support of regional and national private sector 
support institutions. 
Moreover, with a view to fulfilling the objectives of the Cotonou 
Agreement regarding the participation of non-state actors in the 
framework of the ACP-EU partnership, the ACP Secretariat, with the 
support of the European Commission, organised the first ACP and 
ACP-EU meeting on the operationalisation of the Cotonou 
Agreement in May 2002. This meeting led to the recognition of the 
ACP Business Forum as an adequate platform for uniting the ACP 
private sector with a view to participating in the implementation of 
the Cotonou Agreement. 
In the process of bringing together the ACP private sector, the 
Association of ACP National Chambers of Commerce, Industry and 
Other Economic Operators also plays a leading role, while the 
European Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC) acts as a 
bridge between ACP civil society and the EU institutions with a view 
to ensuring a greater understanding of EU policies. 
Granting direct assistance to enterprises 
The fourth pillar entails direct technical and commercial assistance 
to SMEs. Large enterprises can afford staff with specific knowledge in 
strategic functions and, when in need, often hire top consultants to 
advise them on important decisions. By delegating and/or outsourc-
ing such expertise, the top management of these companies can 
acquire a clear view of their opportunities and challenges and focus 
on the development of their company. On the contrary, SMEs have 
by definition a reduced management structure in which top execu-
tives usually assure several day-to-day responsibilities, which prevents 
them from concentrating on strategic decisions. Moreover, relatively 
few SME entrepreneurs in ACP States have built their technical and 
business skills through formal training. Instead they generally rely on 
informal apprenticeships, which are ideal for passing on traditional 
manufacturing skills but are not adapted to preparing such entrepre-
neurs for competition in a globalised world. 
Escrprõn oliveira 
Consequently, and with a view to upgrading the technical capacities 
of SMEs, the development partners have concentrated their efforts on 
promoting the business development services available in the ACP 
countries as well as providing support to firms in the identification, 
appraisal, preparation and implementation of specific projects. 
Furthermore, considerable efforts have been made with the aim of fos-
tering relations between ACP and EU companies as a way of ensuring 
investment and technology flows to ACP States. 
With regard to commercial assistance, initiatives seeking to create 
new markets, upgrade the competitiveness of ACP products and adapt 
ACP agricultural and industrial exports to the ever-evolving interna-
tional quality and phytosanitary standards are being implemented. 
This assistance is channelled through various all-ACP institutions and 
programmes such as the ACP-EU Technical Centre for Agricultural 
and Rural Cooperation (CTA), CDE, EBAS, PROINVEST and the 
ACP Pesticides Initiative Programme (PIP), RIP-fiinded institutions 
and programmes such as the Caribbean Export Development Agency 
(CEDA) and the Regional Integrated Development Exchange 
Programme (PRIDE) in the Indian Ocean as well as NIP-funded pro-
grammes such as PROEMPRESA in the Dominican Republic and 
the Private Sector Support Programme in Zambia. ■ 
* Expert, Private Sector, General Secretariat of the African, Caribbean ami Pacific (¡roup of 
States. E-mail: oli vcira''ïacp.scc.org 
1. SME Facts. Neivs about World Hank Croup Small and Medium Enterprise Initiatives, 
Volume 1, N° ljuly 20(K),page 1 
2. Along the same lines, the Compendium of Cooperation Strategies staters:'both Parties recog-
nise the need to support, through integrated and coherent initiatives, business development 
in lhe ACP countries with a view to improving substantially the macro as well as the micxo-
fbundations of competitiveness." 
3. Communication from the Commission to the Council anil the European Parliament. COM (1998) 
667.Λ European Community strategy for private sector development in ACP countries, p. 3. 
4. Some of the instruments mentioned in this article such as DIAGNOS, EBAS and PRIDE have 
either been finalised or are in the winding down phase. I lowever, the principles on which 
they were based will continue to guide t he ACP-EU private-sector support strateg)·. 
DIAGNOS closed down on April 8. 2002. 
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Small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) can be a major force 
for economic development but 
they often lack a tailor-made 
support system and a 
favourable business 
environment. Focusing on 
Angola, Bram Posthumus 
discusses some of the major 
obstacles that SMEs face in 
developing countries. 
Moving from small-scale 
trade to production: 
the missing link in Angola 
Wilco van Herpen 
Paulo LUÍS has a problem. He owns a reasonably success-
ful furniture company in the São Antonio area, a poor neigh-
bourhood in Angola's largest southern city Lubango. He would 
like to expand and make better furniture. "But our machines are 
very, very old. It's a miracle they still work at all. We must get new 
machines and upgrade our people's skills. Now we get by on our 
knowledge and our capacity for improvisation." Across town, 
Henriquet Correia runs a small sausage-making company tucked 
away behind a garage. "We actually make rather simple things," 
she says. "Black pudding, sausage and smoked sausage. I'd love to 
do more. I know how to make paté de foie for instance. 
But I don't have the equipment. I would love to turn this into a 
little production factory, out of town with room to expand." 
All of Lubango's poor areas resound with economic activity'. The 
picture is the same across the country. The civil war, which just 
ended, chased millions of people into bairros (poor neighbour-
hoods) that are glued to every city centre in the country. Their 
inhabitants have to survive one way or another. Biggest problem: 
finding work. Most have turned to trading in the huge markets 
that sell absolutely anything under the sun. But others, like Paulo 
Luis and Henriquet Correia, have turned to production. Between 
them, they employ 20 people. In a way, they are out of the ordi-
nary because they harbour ambitions to make their business grow. 
In spite of their energy and stamina, the Lubango enterprises 
have not been expanding significantly since they were started two 
or more years ago. Salomão Silvestre Davide Chipeio, working 
for one of the NGOs that is helping the SMEs in the city, 
explains why. "Management is weak, both in general terms and in 
terms of controlling capital flows. Performance and returns are 
below potential." Four reasons for this were given in an in-depth 
study of the SME sector in Lubango: lack of vision about the 
direction of the enterprise; very limited and obsolete production 
methods; limited technical skills; and finally, not well developed 
management and marketing skills. Going to a bank for credit will 
- by itself- not necessarily help. This is also the opinion of Jan 
van Monttort, who heads the local branch of SNV, a Dutch 
development organisation that provides support services to the 
Angolan NGOs. "People who run small enterprises will all tell 
you that they need credit to solve their problems. But that is not 
the real question. The real question is: why don't you produce 
your own capital so you can use that money to expand? That's 
when you find out that people have no idea how much money 
enters and leaves the company and that they don't really kno\v 
what the customer wants." 
Nevertheless, once a company is set for expansion, credit 
should be available. But traditional banks are not keen on open-
ing credit facilities for SMEs. One way around this is to set up 
credit associations that can rotate fairly large amounts of money. 
Another major obstacle to overcome is governments, which can 
be a hindrance to enterprise development. Red tape, corruption, 
political patronage, failure to provide decent infrastructures, are 
some of the major problems chat need to be addressed urgently. 
Money generated locally will be the engine of the economic 
resurrection of post-war Angola and a growing productive sector 
that is connected to the local market can only be good for the 
economy. Donor contributions to this sector should therefore be 
seen as an investment that will bring generous returns if produc-
tive SMEs ate allowed to flourish. Van Montfort says something 
about the Lubango situation that is equally true elsewhere. 
"Sometimes donors don't see that you already have a population 
that is economically very active. There is an enormous entrepre-
neurial drive here. It's true, most people are still in trade. But if 
they are provided with the necessary means they will definitely 
move into production." ■ 
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Over 90 per cent of Africa's 
cashew-nut production is 
exported unprocessed, mainly 
to India. After shelling, the 
nuts go on to the United 
States and Europe, generating 
a significant financial lost to 
African countries. 
Fernand Dansi Nouwligbèto 
InfoSud-Syfia 
African cashew nuts 
in a harsh world 
Africa's Cashew-nut processing industries are merely 
ticking over. Out of 18 plants in Mozambique, Africa's fourth 
largest producer of cashew nuts, only seven are still operating, 
and the continent's main producer, Tanzania, has refurbished 
only one plant out of the ten set up in the 1980s, the remain-
der having had to close within five years. In West Africa, the 
situation is scarcely any better: Guinea-Bissau, Africa's second 
largest producer, has still not got its single large cashew-nut 
processing plant up and running, Guinea-Conakry has no 
plants at all, and, in Côte d'Ivoire, the Sodiro cashew-nut 
processing plant is operating below capacity. 
Local processing 
As a result, African countries — which export, on average, 
90 per cent of their annual production of unprocessed nuts 
(slightly more than 350,000 tonnes, almost one third of 
world production), essentially to India — have an enormous 
deficit to make up, amounting to over $50 million (approx-
imately €51 million). According to Dr B.M. Quenum, for-
merly responsible for agro-industrial development of the 
ACP states at the Centre for the Development of Enterprise 
(CDE) in Brussels, "depending on their origin, cashew nuts 
fetch a sale price of between $300 to €700 per tonne, as 
compared with an overall price of $856 for processed 
products as a whole". This discrepancy gap would, in his 
view constitute an argument for processing cashew nuts to 
produce cashew kernels, in particular for African producers. 
However, all is not plain sailing for the industry in Africa, 
particularly given the high economic stakes. The first con-
cern involves supply: in Benin, for example, just like the for-
mer Sonafel cashew-nut plant (a public undertaking bought 
out without great success by a private operator), Sept, a pri-
vate company, is now facing the same eternal problem. 
Company director Loukman Sani Agatha sadly admits that 
"the plant will not be able to operate this season", although 
his company would need only 1,500 tonnes of nuts of the 
30,000 to 35,000 tonnes that Benin exports each year. 
For Moudja'idou Soumanou, domestic trade director, 
such difficulties stem from a "problem of financing that 
faces industrialists in Benin. At the start of the marketing 
campaign, purchase prices for nuts are low, so they could 
quickly fill a market slot before higher bids come in. This is 
particularly the case since regulations in the sector allow 
them to contact planters direct without going through 
intermediaries. That's one advantage they have over 
exporters". 
Indian competition 
The supply issue is, however, more complicated than that out 
in the field. The African cashew-nut market is dominated by 
Indian exporting companies who generally offer planters better 
prices. "Industrialists [from Benin] who approach us offer prices 
that are too low — between CFAF 225 and 250 per kilo [0,34 -
0,38]. Understandably, we prefer to wait for prices to rise, and 
then sell our nuts at CFAF 300 or even 375 per kilo [0,46 - 0,57] 
to intermediaries acting for Indians," Emmanuel Odjo, chairman 
of a producers' association, confirms. Without batting an eyelid, 
he continues: "What would you do in our position?". 
According to André Tandjiekpon, a researcher at Benin's 
Agricultural Research Institute, just back from a trip studying 
cashew-nut trees in Tanzania, the supply problem could be over-
come if industrialists were able to control their production costs, 
prices on the international market and the volume of orders 
received from their clients: "Unfortunately, this isn't the case. 
Control would mean that local industrialists would know which 
price scale was competitive when approaching planters and could 
at the same time build in a certain profit margin". 
In terms of cashew-nut problems, competition from India and 
Pakistan is not the end of the story: there is reluctance on the part 
of banks to extend loans to the sector; there are too many inter-
mediaries in the marketing chain; and too few markets where the 
processed or semi-processed products could be sold quickly, 
owing to a poor marketing policy. ■ 
Africa, India and the cashew nut 
India's supremacy in the cashew-nut sector is overwhelming: it 
is at once the world's premier producer (375,000 tonnes in 
2001-2002), the largest cashew-nut processor (600,000t/year) 
and the biggest exporter (100,000t/year). 
World cashew-nut production stood at 1.178 million tonnes 
in 2001 -2002. India's share in that production was 32%, with 
Africa some way behind, at 28%. The continent's main pro-
ducers are Tanzania (8% of world production), Guinea-Bissau 
(8%), Côte d'Ivoire (6%), Mozambique (3%) and Benin (3%). 
Over the last few decades, Africa's share has diminished. 
Between 1950 and 1970, the continent as a whole supplied 
70% of world cashew-nut production. This fall has been due 
firstly to Tanzania and Mozambique's problems in the 1970s 
and 1980s, and also to problems that currently affect African 
cashew nuts: lack of high-performance plant material, attacks 
by parasites, bush fires, poor management, the commanding 
position of oligopolies formed for the most part of Indian 
companies that dictate the law to local producers, etc. 
The USA and Europe account for 75% of world imports of 
shelled cashew nuts, which are essentially nibbled with aperitifs. 
Jérôme Adjakou Badou/lnfoSud-Syfia 
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Advocates of 100 per cent 
chocolate have nothing to 
fear from shea butter 
producers in Burkina-Faso. 
A lack of suitable equipment 
and strict EU quality 
standards mean current 
production is at seriously low 
levels. 
Boukari Ouangraoua 
InfoSud-Syfia 
Burkina Faso: 
a missed 
for shea 
opportunity 
butter producers 
January 2003 saw the adoption of the European direc-
tive of 28 October 1999, sanctioning the inclusion in choco-
late of up to five per cent vegetable fats (palm oil, mango ker-
nel, shea and other tropical products). The directive is sure to 
have a positive impact on sales of shea butter, a substance 
derived from the nut of the shea tree which is found growing 
wild in the savannahs of Africa. Traditionally exported and 
best known for its use in the pharmaceutical and cosmetic 
industries, shea butter represents an attractive proposition 
for chocolate manufacturers. It is widely available, inexpen-
sive and, in combination with cocoa butter, prolongs the 
shelf life of chocolate. 
Economic sense dictates that shea butter producers in 
Burkina Faso ought to be rejoicing at this opening in an 
otherwise depressed market. Not so, however. On the 
contrary, as the January 2003 deadline approached, there 
were evident signs of mounting frustration. Burkina may 
hold the monopoly on shea butter production and sales but 
it is far from equipped to seize such an opportunity. 
Rudimentary technology 
In the Gounghin area of the capital Ougadougou, women 
producers of shea butter, members of an organisation known as 
the Union Faso kaité (Ufk), struggle, their clothes drenched in 
sweat, to extract the butter with antiquated and often manual 
techniques. Churning by hand is far from conducive to mass 
production. Even with the use of a nut crusher and mill, this 
exhausting procedure limits the Ufk's production capacity to 
30 tonnes a month and it is constantly forced to seek outside 
help to honour its large orders. For Madeleine Ouédraogo, 
coordinator for the Ufk, "churning may provide good quality 
butter but it is too much of a struggle for the women. We need 
to find alternative techniques". 
The melting down of butter for export, a necessary require-
ment of international standards (one to two per cent acidity, 
and impurity levels and a moisture content of one per cent), 
increases production costs, thereby reducing profit margins. As 
a result of poor technology, Burkina exports only 650 tonnes of 
butter a year for a revenue of just CFAF 250 million 
(€381,000), compared with 18,000 tonnes a year of 
unprocessed almonds, which bring in CFAF 1.2 billion 
(€1,830.000 million). The shea butter industry provides a 
livelihood for hundreds of families, requiring gatherers, collec-
tors, processors, transporters and exporters. 
Over the last ten years or so, the government, through the 
implementation of its national shea project, has made a con-
scious effort to equip these women with the presses and mills 
that they need. But a number of these mills, fitted with iron 
grinding wheels and therefore largely unsuitable for grinding 
fats, have since been abandoned. Despite a number of serious 
setbacks, however (the continued need for churning by hand, 
problems with packaging and the unavailability of parts for 
semi-industrial presses, etc), the activity of these women of the 
Ufk is considered an overall success in Burkina. 
A number of institutions have criticised the absence of any 
real policy granting communal access to available technology 
and the inefficiency of support structures. According to 
Seydou Fofana, president of the Table filière karité, a group 
rodu ction, transportation and export of  specialising in the 
shea butter, "support does not begin and end with training. 
Production means are also needed to accompany the 
process". 
More male involvement 
The productivity slowdown is even more pronounced in 
the villages. Low storage capacity means a shortage of raw 
materials. Few women have access to formal credit. The nuts 
have to be crushed one by one and water is often in short 
supply. 
This endless run of problems deters the men of Burkina, 
who prefer to content themselves with exporting the 
unprocessed nuts. The president of the Ufk would like to see 
men more involved in the processing of the shea butter to 
increase its added value. He believes that "processing, a tradi-
tionally female activity, could become a male domain, provid-
ed modern production technology is made available". 
To turn this dream into reality, all eyes are on national 
research institutes. Having invented a machine for crushing 
the nuts, they now need to devise a churning machine to alle-
viate the women's suffering and enable mass production. And 
if no such steps are taken? "The European directive will bene-
fit no one if producers lack the necessary technology to 
increase their production capacity and create added value", 
predicts Mr Fofana. ■ 
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The CDE was set up in 1977 
under the Lomé Convention 
system, as the Centre for the 
Development of Industry (CDI), 
to support the development of 
small and medium-sized 
industrial undertakings in the 
ACP countries. Under the 
Cotonou Agreement it became 
the Centre for the Development 
of Enterprise (CDE). Although its 
mandate is now more wide-
ranging, covering all private 
enterprise activities, it still aims 
to support the ACP 
industrialisation process through 
its many programmes. 
Its Director for the past three 
years is a native of Portugal, 
Fernando Matos Rosa. In this 
interview with Kenneth Karl, 
he explains the crucial role of 
the centre in developing private 
undertakings, including those 
focusing on processing. 
Under the Cotonou Agreement, the CDE's remit was 
expanded. How much of its activities now focus on 
industry? 
The CDE's current mandate covers enterprise in general, and 
a number of activities have indeed been added to what we did 
previously, particularly service-oriented activities and those 
aimed at institutional capacity building. Nevertheless, industrial 
processing as a business is still a significant part of our work and 
represents about two thirds of our current activity. Overall, our 
activities focus on a fairly large and diverse range of sectors that 
arc important for the ACP countries, such as agro industry and 
fishing. We are involved in services, such as tourism and trans-
port, and we are also present in the field of health, where we help 
set up the small healthcare units that the ACP countries badly 
need. 
Without investment in the ACP countries, 
industrialisation will be difficult. The centre is 
currently running the new PRO€INVEST initiative. 
What is the added value of this programme 
compared with your traditional activities? 
I like to think of the PRO€INVEST programme as a genuine 
boost to our activities. As you know, the centre has a five-year 
budget, but given the incteasing importance accorded to the 
private sector it must be given more resources if it is to become 
more active in the ACP countries. This is what we have done 
through the PRO€INVEST programme — it has a budget of 
€110 million spread over seven years. September 2002 was the 
official start of the programme, and there is already a whole 
series of meetings and activities scheduled for 2003. 
The activities of the centre and those of the PRO€INVEST 
programme complement one another perfectly. The centre 
Centre for the Development 
of Enterprise (CDE): 
an institution on the front line. 
Interview with Fernando Matos Rosa 
focuses on dealing with wider aspects relating to the private sec-
tor overall, whereas PRO€INVEST is more geared towards 
promoting investment and technology flows to the ACP coun-
tries. Primarily, through its several components, PRO€INVEST 
concentrates on developing different sectors. One of our first 
initiatives was in the agro-industrial field, which is a dominant 
sector in our activities, with the organisation of the recent 
aero-industrial forum in West Africa. A number of targeted 
workshops were organised with PRO€INVEST help, and the 
whole experience was extremely positive. We are now in the 
folic 
Industrialisation has made only moderate progress in 
most ACP countries. What, in the CDE's experience, 
are the main factors preventing the ACP countries 
from industrialising more quickly? 
Obviously, there are many constraints slowing down the 
ACP industrialisation process, but the business climate is, in 
our opinion, an extremely important element. In the absence 
of political, economic 
or monetary stability, it 
is difficult for a coun-
try or a region to 
attract inward invest-
ment, capital and, 
therefore, new tech-
nologies. Investors 
need a motivating and 
stable business envi-
ronment that offers 
ongoing guarantees of 
security, and one com-
ponent of the 
PRO€INVEST pro-
gramme addresses just 
such aspects. It con-
sists, for example, of 
helping groups of 
enterprises or associa-
n° 196 january-february 2003 the Courier ACP-EU (47) Dossier 
Main sectors and type of assistance 
1995-2000: 
By type: 
Network development 
and maintenance Marketing assistance 
4^ Feasilility studies 
TI. 
ACP-UE Contacts 
Z4% 
Oireet Technical Assistance 
39% 
By sector: 
Chemical/Plastii 
1ΊΛ 
General/Other 
Leather/Textile Mechanical 
Processing of sea products so that they comply with 
European norms is one of the programmes supported 
by the CDE 
tions of professionals to formulate applications and proposals 
for submission to the authorities and to strengthen their 
capacity for dialogue with governments with a view to enhanc­
ing the context for investment. A company on its own could  ipi 
not manage tins. 
Through its enterprise-support activities, the CDE is 
an essential link in integrating ACP countries into 
the global economy. To what extent are you involved 
in the current EU-ACP trade negotiations? 
The centre is not directly involved in the negotiations, but we 
are prepared to monitor what goes on in case our opinion is 
required, and we will make proposals when we think the time is 
right. The negotiations have just started and on the ACP side 
we are monitoring the meetings. On the European Union side, 
we are also in contact with the relevant Directorates-General. 
Naturally, our thoughts turn to the implications of any future 
Economic Partnership Agreements, because without an 
improvement in operating conditions in ACP enterprises their 
competitiveness and ability to integrate into world markets will 
be problematic. The manufacture of good quality products -
something we support through our interventions - enhances 
the position of ACP enterprises not only in international mar­
kets but also in local markets. 
The ground has been prepared for decentralising 
CDE activities, primarily with the opening of regional 
offices. What do you expect of this? 
For us, this is an essential process, as we were no longer able 
to continue, on a year-by-year basis, to deal with over a thou­
sand business interventions 
from our headquarters. We sim­
ply lack the human resources. 
We have therefore chosen to 
decentralise part of our activi­
ties, especially preparing proj­
ects and everything connected 
with the analysis and formula­
tion of proposals. Our new 
decentralised management units 
have taken on this work. Wc 
give them the training they need 
to carry out an initial evaluation 
of dossiers submitted to them, 
and help them become better 
advisers to entrepreneurs in the 
field. In the near future, we are 
hopeful that these units will be 
able to take on the actual setting 
up of assistance. With these new 
units, we are closer to private 
enterprise in the ACP countries, 
which enables us to target their 
needs and their problems better, 
and to contribute mote easily to 
capacity building. 
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are provided for in support of the private sector. 
Do you feel that coordination between these various 
instruments is working properly? 
The centre is accustomed to working in a completely com-
plementary way with other initiatives and mechanisms relating 
to our activities, even outside the European Union system. 
However, it is always possible to improve coordination and the 
consistency of action between a number of initiatives. The 
PRO€INVEST programme is, for example, managed by us 
under the supervision and with the collaboration of the 
European Commission. For instance, just a few days ago at our 
offices, we also took on a fisheries programme, to assist with 
harmonisation of health standards. Management of this pro-
gramme is not directly within our remit, but is covered by the 
centre's objectives, and thus complements what we ourselves 
do. Also, within the context of the Investment Facility — also 
introduced in the Cotonou Agreement — we have an excellent 
working relationship with our colleagues at the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) who manage that instrument. We will 
probably be one of the first agencies, after the EIB itself, to 
inform and train enterprises in the many opportunities offered 
by this facility. We work in close collaboration with the EIB 
and a number of other institutions, and it is also as part of this 
desire for coordination that we bring training programmes to 
the attention of local financial institutions. In addition, we 
seek to enhance local skills networks in the three ACP regions. 
Do you think there are any further ways in which 
the centre could improve its operational efficiency? 
We do not possess inexhaustible financial or human 
resources, but in our case we have to begin by rationalising the 
decision-making process within the centre. Next, to be more 
efficient, we would have to target and programme our inter-
ventions better in each country, region and sector. As things 
stand, 60 to 70 per cent of our activities for 2003 are already 
programmed, and we also intend, by the end of 2003, to 
become one of the first institutions in this partnership to be 
ISO-certified ' - we're currently working on this, and it is an 
additional source of motivation for our staff. All these changes 
are aimed at enhancing various CDE activities for supporting 
ACP business development. ■ 
1. The International Organization lor Standardization is the "globally recognized quality 
standard covering design, manufacturing, distribution and all relative operational 
responsibilities that can affect product or sers ice consistency in adhering to a 
busincss's quality bench mark'. 
The CDE and the Cape Verde fisheries sector 
The fisheries sector is essential to Cape Verde's economy because of the export income it generates. For this small country in the 
ACP Group, a signatory to the Cotonou Agreement, the sale of fisheries produce is its principal budget resource, and the sector is 
a significant local employer. In 1998 more than 900 tonnes of fish were exported to the EU, which is Cape Verde's main outlet. 
In 1999, however, following an inspection mission by the EU veterinary service, Cape Verde was removed from the list of countries 
provisionally authorised to export their fisheries produce to the European market. The EU mission had detected serious shortfalls in 
compliance with health standards by the sector's private businesses. Shortcomings were also revealed in the operation of the nation-
al body certifying that export companies were complying with legislation and requirements for monitoring their products. This exclu-
sion from the European market could have had a significant impact on the survival of the sector and on the nation's economy, so 
the authorities and the main private fishing companies in Cape Verde applied for CDE support. 
After a fact finding mission to assess the precise nature of the situation, the CDE devised a programme costing €97,000, financed 
jointly with the Luxembourg Foreign Ministry. It was launched in September 2001 (to run until June 2002) and was implemented in 
Cape Verde by the CDE. Its objective was a rapid return to the previous situation through actions targeting not only the competent 
authorities, but also private businesses in the sector and analytical laboratories. 
The four main focus areas were: 
- supporting improved management of fisheries at government level; 
-training official laboratory staff, responsible for monitoring the cuality of fisheries produce; 
- providing technical assistance for the country's principal fishing companies; and 
- rehabilitating associated infrastructures. 
A further inspection by the EU veterinary service in 2002 year noted that progress had been made. The ban was therefore lifted, but 
a series of recommendations was issued, aimed at consolidating this progress. A new programme to monitor these recommenda-
tions was started in September 2002 and will be financed equally by the CDE and the Luxembourg Foreign Ministry. Its purpose is 
to guarantee that the actions undertaken within the framework of the first programme are followed up. 
Through its technical assistance, the CDE is helping to build the capacities of private businesses in the processing sector. As this case 
shows, it is also using its expertise to help entreprises to reach compliance with the technical requirements of European legislation 
for access to Community markets. Dossier 
The European Investment Bank 
(E1B) has been financing ACP 
industrialisation for more than 
twenty-five years, initially in 
francophone African countries, 
and, since the signing of the first 
Lomé Convention, throughout 
the ACP. During this period there 
has been a great deal of 
evolution in the process of 
industrialisation and in its 
financing, such that the discourse 
on industrialisation in the ACPs is 
now fundamentally different 
from what it was just two 
decades ago. The purpose of this 
article is to distil in a qualitative 
way some of that evolution, at 
least as it has been experienced 
through the activities of the EIB, 
and then to look tentatively and 
speculatively towards the future. 
Stephen McCarthy* 
Industrialisation, 
the Financial Sector, Diasporas 
and the European Investment 
Bank (EIB) 
SMEs could never survive without subsidised loans. Moreover, 
the DFIs were almost entirely dependent on external sources of 
finance from development agencies, from which they borrowed 
loans that were usually denominated in forex and also at sub-mar-
ket rates of interest. They had no formal links with the domestic 
financial sector. 
Nevertheless, there were (and are) considerable merits in 
financing industrialisation through lines of credit to the DHLs. 
This approach draws on the local knowledge of the DFI and 
enables much smaller enterprises to be financed than is possible 
from the EIB s headquarters in Luxembourg. Overall it repre-
sents an efficient way of distributing development funds, par-
ticularly for such a lightly staffed organisation as is the EIB, and 
In the early days in most ACPs, development planning 
drove industrialisation. The planners would assess where the sup-
posed comparative advantage of an economy lay, or what strate-
gic industries needed to be established, and then set about creat-
ing them — often, but not always through the public sector. Out 
of this process emerged cement plants, textile factories, metallur-
gical plants and many agro-processing facilities. The EIB partici-
pated in this wave of industrialisation, offering significant loans 
for the establishment of these factories. 
But it was industrialisation in isolation and many of these 
plants have since fallen into disuse and decay. We now know that 
the process is much more complicated than that. There has to be 
a whole tissue of small supporting industries, not least service 
industries, to sustain such large set-piece industrial plants, as well 
as an extensive skill base. Moteover, it has become apparent that 
only the private sector has the flexibility, the discipline and the 
capacity to innovate which industrialisation needs. 
The Financial Sector and the EIB 
With these changes has come an evolution in the EIB's own 
support to ACP industrialisation. Initially, most of the ACPs, 
particularly the anglophone ones, had established state owned 
national development banks, or similar development finance 
institutions (DFIs) whose purpose was to finance and support 
smaller-scale manufacturing and services enterprises (SMEs). In 
common with most other international finance institutions, the 
Bank, from the late 1970s onwards, began to make lines of 
credit available to these local publicly owned DFIs in the coun-
tries concerned. Indeed, the DFIs could be seen as creatures of 
the international financial institutions (IFIs). They adopted the 
same approach to project appraisal and financing, which mostly 
consisted of long term fixed interest lending. Almost invariably 
the loans were subsidised, since the prevailing view was that 
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process. 
But the focus, particularly in the early years, remained dis­
tinctly on the enterprises that were being financed. This reflect­
ed the conventional thinking of the time with its concern to 
create productive, usually manufacturing, investments. The 
intermediate institution, although it was required to take the 
commercial risk on the loans being made, was seen as no more 
than a financial conduit for the line of credit. 
By the early 1980s, however, it was clear that matters were 
going badly wrong. The DFIs were publicly owned institu­
tions. They had always been subject to political interference, 
some more so than others, though the financing agencies, 
including the EIB, tended to overlook this except in blatant 
cases. But in all cases the DFIs remained small, financially 
fragile and completely isolated from other financial institutions 
in the economy concerned. So when most ACP economies 
started to stall and then decline, the DFIs themselves got into 
serious financial difficulties and many collapsed. 
Clearly the financial inter­
mediary institution also mat-
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regarded as a simple financial 
transmission mechanism. One 
consequence was a new inter­
est, on the part of the EIB and 
the other IFIs, in financing 
industrialisation with and 
through the local commercial 
banks. Most of the commercial 
banks were financially stronger 
than the DFIs and less subject 
to political pressures, particu­
larly when they were foreign 
owned. Moreover they had 
close client relations with the 
whole SME sector (though not 
unbanked micro-enterprises). 
So by lending through the 
commercial banks the range of 
potential borrowers which 
might access EIB finance was 
increased. 
Of course, this type of long 
term fixed interest finance was 
new to most commercial 
banks, which had usually lim­
ited their activities to operat­
ing payments systems and very short term loans or overdrafts 
to their best clients. Initially at least they were often not keen 
to offer medium and long term loans, particularly when the 
external source of finance appeared to be considerably more 
expensive than their marginal cost of funds in the domestic 
market — the local deposit rate. In addition many of the com­
mercial banks were, and still are, extremely risk averse. 
By now, however, the practice of passing EIB funds through 
the commercial banks is well established in many ACP coun­
tries. Moreover other types of financial institutions supporting 
the process of industrialisation, such as venture capital funds, 
have also emerged as partners to the EIB and the other IFIs. So 
it is now well recognised that it is the financial sector as a whole 
that is engaged in this process of financial intermediation. The 
old national development banks, where they still survive, can 
still play a role but they are increasingly in competition with 
other more commercially driven financial institutions and can 
no longer rely solely on a flow of funds from the external 
agencies. 
Industrialisation and the Financial Sector 
Thus over the years perceptions have evolved. The focus of 
attention shifted firstly from the industrial plant being estab­
lished to the intermediate financial institution and then to the 
financial sector as a whole, together with the broader political 
and business environment. If the financial sector is functioning 
well, then appropriate investment finance should flow to those 
individual industrial entrepreneurs who have viable businesses 
and investment propositions. Hence the Cotonou Agreement, 
as part of its support for the private sector, specifically recog­
nises the importance of financial sector development as one of 
its specific objectives. 
Nevertheless, in most ACPs the financial sector does not 
function well, remaining undeveloped and both shallow and 
narrow '. 
One point is clear. However many resources the external IFIs, 
such as the EIB, dispose of for industrialisation in the ACPs, it 
can never be sufficient for the need, particularly if economic 
growth rates of five per cent a year or more are to be achieved. 
So the financial sector has to tap other potential sources of 
finance, notably the mobilisation of domestic savings and for­
eign private investment. In both cases the ACPs will need deep­
er and broader financial sectors than they now have. 
First, on the mobilisation of domestic savings, ACPs do 
indeed have savings instruments, but these are usually limited 
to short term deposits with the commercial banks. Only a small 
proportion of such deposits can be safely passed on as medium 
or long term loans, hence the tendency for the banks to lend 
mostly through overdraft facilities. What is needed is a way of 
securing savings over the medium and long term. That primari­
ly means creating a market in bonds, and eventually equities. 
There are perhaps two principal obstacles to doing so: 
• First, a bond market will only emerge in a stable institutional 
and financial environment, with low rates of inflation. If savers 
do not have confidence in the medium term financial outlook, 
or feel there is a danger of their savings being eroded by infia­
li
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tion, they will not be interested in medium term savings instru-
ments. 
• Second, there has to be a secondary market for such bonds; 
savers will not buy them if they have no possibility of selling 
again before maturity. To this end a number of ACP countries 
have indeed established stock markets in recent years. But the 
usual pattern is for these exchanges to be very illiquid and in-
active with few listed stocks and little active trading. 
In the right circumstances, the Cotonou Investment Facility', 
managed by the EIB, may be able to play a role in encouraging 
the emergence and deepening of such markets. For example, 
rather than lending to a particular enterprise, the Investment 
Facility could offer a partial guarantee for a bond issue by that 
enterprise on the local market. Such an action would not only 
finance the particular project but also contribute to the liquid-
ity of the local stock exchange and thus to a 
deepening of the financial sector in the 
country concerned. 
jppc 
Industrialisation and Diasporas 
The second possible source of industrial 
investment is foreign investment. It is well 
known that ACPs have captured only a very 
small share of international flows of foreign 
investment and this often just for petroleum 
or mineral projects in a small number of 
countries. Generally the risks and uncer-
tainties of private sector investment in the 
ACPs still seem very high and discourage 
potential foreign investors. There are also 
market failures; international markets are 
not well informed of the investment oppor-
tunities and risks and the cost of acquiring 
such information is high. Moreover, even 
where risks have actually diminished, as a 
result of an improved domestic policy envi-
ronment or greater economic and financial 
stability, the perception of risk frequently 
remains strong and declines only slowly. 
It is easy to paint this familiar gloomy pic-
ture. Yet there are also positive elements. One is the emergence 
of a middle-class, a bourgeoisie, often people with professional 
skills and qualifications. This is a social group that scarcely 
existed in many ACPs at the time of independence less that two 
generations ago. Unfortunately, many of this growing class of 
educated and professional ACP citizens have left their home 
countries to join the expanding middle-class diasporas abroad. 
These diasporas, particularly from the island countries of the 
Pacific and Caribbean, are very large. Yet they remit consider-
able income back home, and they increasingly invest back home 
as well. 
Although there are so far few systematic studies of diaspora 
investment, there is plenty of anecdotal evidence. The invest-
ments made do not usually grab major headlines but are rather 
for SMEs and often in the service sectors. Thus, several ACPs -
Over the years. 
perceptions have 
evolved. The focus of 
attention shifted from 
the industrial plant 
being established to the 
intermediate financial 
institution and then to 
the financial sector as a 
whole, together with 
the broader political and 
business environment 
for example Fiji and Samoa — now boast small private hospitals 
set up by doctors and surgeons who have trained and worked 
abroad before subsequently returning and investing their own 
money and skills. Both the Catibbean and West Africa have a 
number of banks and financial companies established by 
nationals who have previously worked on Wall Street or in the 
Square Mile of London. And we have all come across ACP cit-
izens who, having spent a life working abroad, have then 
returned home to invest their retirement savings in, say, a small 
hotel or guest house. 
The characteristic of these diaspora investors is that they 
straddle two worlds. With their professional qualifications and 
their years of experience working in Europe or the US they are 
thoroughly familiar with the functioning of modern 
economies. But they also know how things work back home, 
where the opportunities are and where the real risks lie, in a 
way that is often very difficult for a foreign 
investor to ever fully understand. So their 
assessment and perception of risk is conse-
quently more sophisticated and their will-
ingness, and indeed ability, to invest suc-
cessfully is much greater. For them foreign 
investment is home investment. 
So, however much one may regret the 
growth of the ACP diasporas, as an indica-
tion of skills leaking abroad, they exist. 
And this trend towards diaspora invest-
ment will continue to grow, perhaps partic-
ularly as the first highly educated genera-
tion approaches the age of retirement. So a 
development agency which is seriously 
interested in encouraging "industrial" (in 
the widest sense of the word) investment in 
the ACPs, should consider what measures it 
could take to nurture and support this 
trend. What are the key social and eco-
nomic characteristics of potential diaspora 
investors? What constraints do they face 
and what might be done to overcome 
them? Can they be targeted through their 
own support networks and organisations? 
And could the home countries devise specific financial instru-
ments marketed at diaspora savings, even the savings of those 
who have no intention of returning home or of starting their 
own businesses? In short, support for the process and financing 
of ACP industrialisation continues to throw up new questions, 
challenges and opportunities. ■ 
* Head of Division, European Investment Mank, 
The views expressed in this paper are personal and do not necessarily express those of 
the E1B. 
1. For example. South Africa is the only country in sub-Saharan .Vírica with a ratio of M2 to 
GDP greater than so per cent. In most cases the commercial banks dominate the sector 
with more than 90 per cent of financial assets.They generally have intermediation 
margins over five per cent and in some countries more than 15 per cent, reflecting 
either oligopoly or inefficiency or both. 
These data are drawn from an internal EIB paper by Gustaaf Heim. 
2. The Investment Facility, introduced in the Cotonou Agreement, aims to strengthen 
private sector activities in ACP countries and attract greater i'< )reign direct investment. 
See article'The European Investment Bank ami the Cotonou Investment Facility', 
in The Courier ACP-EU »* I') I (March-April 2002) page 32. 
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In recent years, the discussion 
on the effectiveness of 
development aid in promoting 
growth has deepened. As the 
impact of aid on growth is 
generally assumed to work via 
investment, aid can be effective 
only if complementary 
investment conditions are 
favourable, in this article, 
Susanna Wolf*, focusing on the 
EU-ACP partnership, maintains 
that a positive relationship 
between European Union aid 
and investment in the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
countries can be expected. 
Against this background, direct 
support for the private sector 
and investment promotion is 
now a key element of the 
Cotonou Agreement. 
The European Community (EC) became the world's fifth 
largest donor of de\'elopment aid — and therefore one of the most 
important — in the 1990s. The ACP countries receive relatively 
more EC aid than other developing countries after controlling for 
size and GDP of a country. Together with aid from its Member 
States, the EU provides more than 50 per cent of all aid going to 
European aid 
to ACP States: 
Does it increase investment? 
ACP countries. At the same time international trade and invest-
ment flows seem to have bypassed the ACP countries to a large 
extent in the past decades. Less than two per cent of worldwide 
foreign direct investment (FDI) was directed towards the ACP 
countries in 2001. Domestic investment in the majority of the 
ACP countries is also lower than the world average because of low 
savings rates and in some cases high capital flight. The low level 
of investment corresponds with the low level of GDP per capita 
in most ACP countries. 
These developments create severe obstacles for the long-term 
growth perspectives of the ACP countries as new investment is 
needed to improve productivity. 
Increasing the share of private investment in GDP is important 
for ACP countries for several reasons. At the moment the invest-
ment rate is hardly high enough to maintain the existing capital 
stock. In some African countries investment has fallen to less than 
10 per cent of GDP whereas the minimum investment needed to 
replace depreciated capital in Africa is estimated at 13 per cent of 
GDP. As private investment is expected to be more productive 
than public investment, it thus contributes significantly to eco-
nomic growth. Furthermore, new investment is needed for struc-
tural changes and a diversification of the economies. 
Support for private sector development 
To overcome the low private investment ratios that prevail 
in the majority of the ACP countries, investment support has 
Figure 1: Investment-growth relationship in the ACP States, 1975-1999 five year averages 
8 
private inv./GDP 
Source: own calculations from World Bank, World Bank Development Indicators, 200
1. 
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been further improved in the Cotonou Agreement. The spe-
cial private sector chapter makes it visible that private sector 
support is a primary objective (Article 1), and brings the 
existing provisions into a more coherent and refined frame-
work. One of the main areas of support is therefore 
"Investment and private sector development" (Article 21). 
Economic and institutional reforms are recognised as a pre-
condition for growth and should create a favourable environ-
ment for private investment. In addition support in various 
areas is foreseen (for more details, see issue n° 181 of the 
ACP-EU Courier). 
A new instrument compared to Lomé IV is the availability 
of investment guarantees. Through reinsurance schemes, 
foreign investors should be protected "against legal uncertain-
ties and the major risks of expropriation, currency transfer 
restriction, war and civil disturbance, and breach of contract" 
(Article 77). 
In principle, direct investment support by the EU was 
already provided under the Lomé Conventions. However, 
despite a large number of possible measures, only a small 
fraction of EDF finance was spent for productive sector sup-
port and nothing was explicitly provided for investment pro-
motion. The additional risk capital provided by the EIB 
amounted to 10 per cent of the total. To reach the goal of 
increased private investment, not only has the share of 
resources allocated for this purpose been increased but, espe-
cially, the participation of the private sector in formulating 
priorities and implementing programmes will help to better 
focus aid resources. As high risk is seen as a major obstacle by 
foreign investors, the new investment guarantees are a step in 
the right direction. 
However, the facilities to reduce risks for entrepreneurs 
should not only be directed towards foreign firms or firms in 
the EU Member States. Local investors might be hit even 
harder by unforeseeable risks as they have fewer possibilities 
to diversify. For local investors, the provisions that are aimed 
at facilitating access to capital, training personnel to improve 
productivity and management, and upgrading essential infra-
structure like electricity, transport and communication are 
well designed to meet the needs of the private sector. Because 
export promotion is of crucial importance for various 
reasons, special emphasis of the support programme should 
thus be given to local investors. As there is asymmetric infor-
mation about investment opportunities and investors tend to 
stick to the countries where they are already operating, an 
active marketing of the advantages a country has and the pro-
vision of information for potential investors is crucial to 
attract FDI. 
Interestingly, in the New Partnership for Africa's 
Development (NEPAD), private sector development also has a 
high priority. The need to diversify the economies on the basis 
of natural resources is stressed. Support for private enterprises 
should be directed mainly towards micro-enterprises and small 
and medium enterprises as these are the main contributors to 
value added and employment in most African countries 
(NEPAD, Article 156). As NEPAD acknowledges, the devel-
Figure 2: Use of EC aid in ACP countries, 
percentage of payments by instrument in 2000 
Programmed Aid 
47% 
Sysmin + 
Stabex 
6% 
Emergency Aid 
2% 
Risk Capital 
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Source: European Commission: Annual Report on the implementation of the 
European Commission's external assistance 2001, Brussels, 2002 
opinent of the continent is the prime responsibility of African 
governments. This could complement the Cotonou 
Agreement in the sense that ownership of the development 
strategies is increased as the creation of "the necessary political, 
social and economic conditions in Africa that would serve as 
incentives to curb the brain drain and attract much needed 
investment" (NEPAD, Article 125). Yet, it is primarily the 
responsibility of the ACP states to simplify administrative pro-
cedures and improve the legal system. The G8 Summit in 
Kananaskis made a commitment to help Africa to attract for-
eign and domestic investment in the context of its support for 
NEPAD, for example through the increased use of develop-
ment finance institutions. 
The aid-investment relationship 
There are various channels through which aid can impact 
on investment in a developing country. Often only the 
direct channel of using aid resources for investment is con-
sidered. Traditionally this means that aid inflows are spent 
for infrastructure investment. More recenrly, private sector 
support programmes aim at increasing private investment. 
On average 40 per cent of aid is spent on investment proj-
ects; therefore investment should increase at least by this 
amount. 
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investment, but other forms of aid could increase investment 
indirectly. At least part of aid will be spent for consumption 
because of urgent needs such as drought or after a violent 
conflict. This additional consumption will be partly realised 
through imports but also partly through a rise in demand for 
domestic goods. Savings and investment will also increase 
through employment and income generation. Aid that is 
spent for technical cooperation and technology transfer (e.g. 
through agricultural extension schemes) can help to acceler-
ate technical change and therefore increase productivity. 
Support for health and education programmes could also 
increase productivity and hence contribute to an increase in 
investment opportunities. Aid could indirectly increase pri-
vate investment if it contributes to the improvement of poli-
cies. If aid can be used for government consumption or as 
budget support high tax rates could be lowered and thereby 
the investment climate improved. 
In general, there are various reasons why larger amounts of 
aid do not necessarily mean better results with respect to invest-
ment and growth. On the political level, "soft budget con-
straint" describes the phenomenon of aid flows allowing gov-
ernments to put off necessary reforms - such as reforming the 
tax system — and continue with unprofitable policies. Aid can 
help bad governments to keep their legitimacy in the view of 
other states or their own people. Aid dependence is considered 
to be a negative consequence of large aid flows over an extend-
ed period of time as a country's need for aid grows while the 
actual effect fails to show. Countries depending on aid tend to 
be quite vulnerable to sudden changes of donor policies. 
Foreign aid could lead to crowding out private investment 
as it might raise the wages of skilled personnel or the prices 
of other scarce resources. Especially if the recipient govern-
ment starts to increase its expenditures by borrowing money 
from the bank, raising taxes or creating credits to raise coun-
terpart funds that are often required by donors, a crowding 
out of private investment is likely to occur. In addition, high 
levels of aid in general imply that a large number of donors 
are involved — which can amount to more than 40 for larger 
countries like Kenya and Zambia. Negotiations with many 
donors are a burden on the limited capacity of recipient gov-
ernments, and furthermore, the lack of aid coordination on 
the side of donor and/or recipient can affect the success of 
programmes. 
A series of highly debated papers that served as input to the 
World Bank's "Assessing Aid" report in 1998 was published in 
recent years. They stress the positive effect of aid in "sound 
policy" surroundings. In contrast, aid to countries with poor 
policies will lead to crowding out private investment, because 
it supports public investments. Therefore foreign aid will be 
most effective in countries that decide to carry out reforms on 
their own initiative. However, other researchers came to the 
conclusion that aid has the same positive effect on growth in 
every policy regime. In sum, theoretical and empirical findings 
suggest that there is a positive but declining impact of aid on 
investment. 
The effect of EC aid on ACP investments 
Although the overall success of the Lomé Conventions in terms 
of eradicating poverty in the ACP countries and increasing the 
export and investment performance is limited, it cannot be said 
that it was a waste of money given the limited availability of 
funds and the adverse external circumstances. To get more insight 
into whether the effect of EC aid on investment is different from 
the effects of total aid used in previous studies, total aid to each 
ACP country can be divided into aid from the European 
Commission (EC aid) and aid from other sources. 
In an empirical analysis it was confirmed that aid has a signifi-
cant positive but declining effect on investments in developing 
countries regardless of their location. This result is robust for dif-
ferent sets of control variables. However, aid from the European 
Commission was found to have a positive effect on investment 
only after controlling for ACP membership. Then however, a sig-
nificant positive relationship between EC aid squared and invest-
ment was found. EC aid therefore also increases total investment 
although its effect seems to be weaker than that of total aid. This 
limited positive impact of EC aid on investment might have sev-
eral explanations. One of them is the limited share of resources 
that were spent for private sector development and risk capital. 
Only in recent years has spending in this area increased and there-
fore effects might not be observable yet. Another factor might be 
the fact that EC aid is disproportionately directed towards ACP 
countries. They generally have more difficulties in attracting 
investment, which is indicated by a significant negative coeffi-
cient for the ACP dummy in the investment regressions. 
Therefore relatively higher amounts of aid might be necessary to 
overcome the obstacles to investment. 
As a consequence, the reform and expansion of private sector 
support under the Cotonou Agreement should continue. The 
support for productive investment in manufacturing as well as 
in services and agriculture should focus on the creation of an 
enabling environment — through rhe creation of finance insti-
tutions and indirectly through a favourable macroeconomic 
climate. A direct involvement of donors in production activities 
is less desirable as this is not likely to lead to competitive enter-
prises. Facilities to reduce risks for entrepreneurs should not 
only be directed towards foreign firms in the donor countries. 
Local investors also need protection against unforeseeable risks. 
More generally, on the country level, aid could be seen as an 
insurance against external risks and could be used by recipient 
governments for the continuation of reform programmes. In 
this respect the Cotonou Agreement provides some flexibility, 
with the possibility of balance of payment support and the 
review of programming that might increase available resources 
for governments that face external shocks and stick to reforms. 
EC aid will therefore contribute to improving the overall invest-
ment climate. If the reforms in the Cotonou Agreement are 
implemented, it is likely that EC aid will contribute to increas-
ing investment in the ACP countries. ■ 
* Center for Development Research (ZEF Bonn), University of Bonn, 
D-53113 Bonn, Germany. Email: s.wolft" uni-honn. tie 
n° 196 january-february 2003 the Courier ACP-EU (55) culture 
Nha Fala 
("My Voice" ¡n Portuguese Creole) 
Nha Fala, a lively musical comedy directed by Flora Gomes, was one of the films 
nominated at the 59th Venice International Film Festival. Nha Fala, which 
received European funding, is centred metaphorically around the theme of 
freedom. With an original score by Manu Dibango, it tells the story of Vita, a 
beautiful young girl from Guinea-Bissau who leaves her native village for France. 
Vita's family is afflicted by an ancestral curse according to which any woman in 
her family who sings will die. However, once in Paris she falls in love with a 
young musician... 
A native of Guinea-Bissau, Flora Gomes studied in Cuba and Senegal. A multi-
award winner who cites his country's legendary revolutionary leader Amílcar Cabral 
as a strong influence, the veteran film-maker wants to show another side of Africa. 
Dorothy Morrisey 
What made you get involved in cinema when it 
has such a small following in Guinea-Bissau? 
It's an adventure. I am very forward-looking. When I was 
voting I did not really know what I wanted to be and I ¡ust fell 
into film-making. Now I am glad that I did because I think it is 
very important to let the world see images of our land, images 
that tell the story of our history. My colleague, Sana (Na N'hada), 
and I do not tegret our chosen path, even though it is not easy. 
ica di Venezia - Official Competition 
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Nha Fala is full of dance and music, and slightly 
surreal scenes; starting with the funeral of a 
parrot and ending with a huge, colourful "fake" 
funeral. What inspired you? 
I wanted people to see our Africa, the Africa of my 
dreams, the Africa that I love and that I would like my chil-
dren to know one day. It is a happy Alrica, where people-
dance, where people can speak freely. It is my take on the 
future for a new generation. I am a dreamer. Whenever 
Africa is spoken about or depicted, it is always in terms of 
the aid we receive, war, people dying ol starvation, sick 
people... These things do of course exist in Africa: Africans 
kill other Africans, and nobody knows why we go to war yet 
it still goes on. But there is another side to Africa, and that 
is what I wanted to show. It is a side you never see on your 
television screens in the West. That is why 1 made this film. 
You have created a very modern film that 
nonetheless incorporates age-old traditions. Would 
you say it is an accurate reflection of Africa today? 
While it is true that many Africans set great store by 
tradition and magic, the continent is definitely changing. I 
know that in every civilisation in the world, and every 
country in the world, there are always two cultures and a 
point at which they meet. I share the belief that the future Ht 
of this world lies in the intermixing of cultures. It is 
inevitable. Your culture mixed with our culture can give rise 
to an identity, and this identity will define our country. 
This is why I made this film, thinking all the while of the 
generations to come: those who have not experienced 
colonisation, who want to go abroad to study but return to 
their own country to work, to build it up. Because I believe 
that the future of mankind is Africa. 
Why? 
Because we have so much to offer, particularly on a cul-
tural level. I believe that when all the ethnic, cultural and 
religious conflicts have ended, Africa will find itself. It will 
truly be a place where we can live in peace and harmony. 
Why did you decide to film in Cape Verde? 
My aim was to make this film in an anonymous setting. 
It is not meant to be Cape Verde, it is just some unidenti-
fied place. 
As for the cast, are all the actors from 
Guinea-Bissau? 
Many are, although the actress who plays the 
lead role, Vita, is French, of Senegalese origin. 
She learnt Creole (the language of the film) in 
two months for the part. 
Some are experienced actors: Bia Gomes, 
who plays Vita's mother, is the only actress who 
has appeared in all my films. I have also worked 
with the young actress who plays Vita's friend, 
Tina, as well as Georges and Amelia, all of 
whom are professionals. 
The dance and crowd scenes in the film 
must have been choreographed. How 
did you manage this? 
I did this my own way. We had a choreogra-
pher, Clara, a Portuguese woman, and a West 
Indian woman. I did not want American-style 
Edgar Moura 
culture 
choreography, because it would not fit in 
with the film. I wanted it to identify with the 
real Africa. I wanted to make a film, a musi-
cal, from our point of view, a million miles 
from the very 'controlled' American style. 
Is the film based on a true story or is 
it something you have invented? 
The story is a figment of my imagination, 
but it is based on truth. People have told me 
that this sort ofthing did go on at the time. 
Take Salik, the Malian singer, for example. 
Apparently, he wasn't allowed to sing 
because he belonged to a very high caste in 
Mali, who are not supposed to sing. 
Why did you decide to break the 
taboo in your film? 
For me, singing is an expression of free-
dom. If we are silenced, we are disadvan-
taged. Music has always been extremely 
important in our lives. It is so often said that 
in Africa nothing has worked since inde-
pendence. But music is the exception. Look at Cesaria 
Evora, Youssou N'Dour or Manu Dibango, who did the 
soundtrack for the film. This is my way of paying homage 
to all those people who, one way or another, in Africa, 
Europe or elsewhere, have done something for African 
music. 
A recurring ¡mage through the film is of two men 
transporting a statue, looking for a place to put 
it. Is this a statue of Amílcar Cabral? 
Yes. Amílcar Cabral was an extraordinary man, a vision-
ary, who did much for his country. But you don't see it 
because the people didn't follow what he said. Those young 
people who are going around with the statue - they are 
looking for a place to put it, but nobody wants it because it 
bothers them. Cabral is still waiting to see those things for 
which he gave his life. He should have his place. I will not 
stop making films until I have made a film about him. ■ 
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Two and a half years after democratic 
elections, Senegal now has a fourth 
government. Drawing its strength from the 
ruling coalition, the task of the new team is 
to deliver what the people want, changes 
heralded in 2000 when President Wade came 
to power, marking a peaceful end to forty 
years of socialist rule. On the down side, 
Senegal's growth rate is slowing. But the 
campaign to alleviate poverty, 
unemployment and corruption is a major 
priority for the government, in a nation 
included in the list of LDCs (Least Developed 
Countries). On the positive side, new 
development strategies have been drawn up, 
the country's overall debt looks set to 
diminish, regional integration is continuing, 
and discussions aimed at ending the conflict 
in Casamance are ongoing. Just like the Lions, 
its national football team, Senegal is winning 
away and hoping to score a home victory. 
Report and photographs (unless otherwise 
indicated): Francois Lefèbvre 
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Political changeover: 
the challenges ahead 
In November 2002, a new government took the helm in Senegal, the fourth since the 
country's political changeover of March 2000. President Abdoulaye Wade, whose 
election put an end to forty years of socialist rule, has surrounded himself with a loyal 
team made up of members of the PDS (Senegalese Democratic Party) and the Sopi
1 
coalition that brought him to power. Led by Idrissa Seek, the new team now must 
turn its attention to a very heavy agenda. Two-and-a-half years after the changeover, 
people are still waiting for the political changes to make a difference to their daily 
lives. Poverty, unemployment and corruption are priority targets for a state that now 
ranks among the world's Least Developed Countries (LDCs). 
In November last year the topic of conversation in 
the streets centred on the imminent appearance of the 
moon that would signify the beginning of the Islamic holy 
month of Ramadan. Meanwhile, discussions of a more 
sombre nature were being held in the carpeted corridors of 
power. The dissolution of the government, which had been 
announced some time previously, had now taken place. 
After two days of consultations and press speculation, 
Idrissa Seek, one of the President's close aides, was named 
prime minister of the new, enlarged government (31 min­
istries against the previous 24). He replaced Madior Boye, 
the first woman to have held such a post in Senegal. 
Although the change of team had been expected since the 
local elections in May, events were hastened by the sinking 
on 26 September of the Ziguinchor-Dakar ferry, the Joola. 
After the tragedy, in which up to 1500 people lost their 
lives, many called for a radical change. 
Liberalisation 
Idrissa Seek is Senegal's third prime minister since 2000, 
the year of the changeover. This game of political musical 
chairs is part of the process of democratic consolidation in a 
country that enjoys a reputation for stability. At least relative 
stability - a separatist movement has disrupted life in the 
south of the country (Casamance) for over 20 years. 
Nonetheless, the reins of power have passed smoothly 
between the three presidents that have headed the Senegalese 
state since independence. The first, Leopold Sedar Senghor 
(1960-1980), was replaced after his retirement by his heir 
apparent, Abdou Diouf (1981-2000). He in turn was suc­
ceeded by the leader of the PDS, Abdoulaye Wade. 
Well before the other countries of French-speaking black 
Africa, Senegal set to work on the liberalisation of its polit­
ical system, a process that has been consolidated as the years 
have passed. After a hesitant and somewhat limited start
2 
under President Senghor, a true multiparty system was 
established in 1981 with Abdou Diouf. This liberalisation 
encouraged many political formations to come out of hid­
ing, and the development of a press that offers analysis and 
commentary and even criticism, as well as the emergence of 
political and trades union movements. The country now 
has at least 65 political parties. 
Senegal's President Abdoulaye 
Wade raises his arms in a sign of 
victory in March 2000, after results 
of the presidential elections put 
him well ahead. Contrary to 
alarmist predictions, these elections 
went without a hitch. 
The presidential elec­
tions in 2000 and 
Abdoulaye Wade's acces­
sion to power marked a 
turning point in the his­
tory of Senegal. With the 
support of the Front for 
Change (FAL), the eponymous coalition (Sopi) finally put an 
end to forty years of socialist government. Contran' to the 
alarmist predictions and despite some disputes over the prepa­
rations for the ballot, these presidential elections went without 
a hitch. In the first round the outgoing President, Abdou 
Diouf (now the secretary-general of the International 
Organisation of the Francophonie), received only 41 per cent 
of the votes and was thus forced to face his rival, Abdoulaye 
Wade, in a second round. By rallying; almost all the other can-
chelates to his cause, Wade was elected President of Senegal 
with 58 per cent of the votes. This was the first time since the 
country's independence that there had been such a democrat­
ic change of government. To the great relief of the Senegalese 
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backlash and that the process would be blocked, Abdou Diouf 
quickly acknowledged his defeat and accepted the changeover. 
Sopi 
Created in 1974, the PDS took advantage of the deterio-
rating economic and social situation in the 1990s as the 
Socialist Party (PS) took most of the blame for the crisis. 
Under pressure from the structural adjustment pro-
grammes, the Socialists had opted for a liberal economy 
while social well.ire suffered from .1 serious Lick ol invest-
ment. Thus, on the eve of the presidential elections in 
2000, the PDS and the Sopi represented the country's only 
real hope. The native Wolof word has gradually come to be 
the slogan of a broad spectrum of the discontented. 
In 2001, President Wide organised a constitutional refer-
endum to give himself the institutional means of bringing 
about the change he had promised the people. The legislative 
and local elections that followed went in favour of the ruling 
alliance. Although the changeover has indeed taken place, it 
must be said that there was often little to differentiate 
between the policies of the two major parties during the coali-
tion periods. Now, with the constraints of globalisation, their 
political agendas are growing increasingly similar once more. 
Senegal's foreign policy, however, has taken on a new 
shape since the election of President Wade. With the South 
African President, Thabo Mbeki, he is working to change 
the image of Africa and increase the power of African heads 
of state beyond their national borders. The promotion of 
democracy and development of the African continent are 
two top priorities. In two years the President has increased 
the number of Senegalese diplomatic missions and has also 
sent soldiers to join the UN troops in the Congo. 
Together with Thabo Mbeki and Nigerian President 
Olusegun Obasanjo, he founded the New Partnership for 
Africa's Development (NEPAD). Now, as President of the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), he 
is dedicated to the search for a negotiated solution to the Côte 
d'Ivoire crisis. Some of his views have met with disapproval from 
other African leaders. For example, during the last Organisation 
of African Unity (OAU, now African Union) summit, Mr Wade 
staunchly advocated recognition of Marc Ravalomanana as 
elected President of Madagascar whereas the OUA had already 
expressed its support for the organisation of new elections. 
Turning words into action 
In Senegal the political changeover has raised hopes to 
another level. The President's statements on corruption, the 
inquiry into corruption within the previous government, 
the creation of a human rights office attached to the presi-
dency, the partial staff overhaul of the armed forces and the 
announcement of large-scale infrastructural works have all 
come in response to this wave of expectation. However, 
two-and-a-half years down the line there is growing criti-
cism from certain sections of the media, from young peo-
ple, women, people in rural areas and the opposition par-
ties. They are denouncing the growing insecurity and call-
ing on the government to make good its promises. 
The new Wade administration faces sizeable challenges: 
the continuing of institutional reforms deemed necessary to 
improve management of public affairs; the search for a last-
ing solution to the Casamance problem; the fight against 
Senegal's capital, Daka 
In Senegal the political c. 
has raised hopes to another level, 
but the new administration faces 
sizeable challenges 
poverty and corruption; 
improvements to public 
health; the education of 
young people and the 
accessibility of employ-
ment. It must also pro-
vide proof that international aid is being used effectively 
and transparently. People's social expectations are growing 
ever more apparent. In 2000 the country slipped into the 
ranks of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). In the 
capital, poverty is everywhere and beggars are on every 
street corner. The gravity of the situation can be summed 
up by a single figure: 67.8 per cent of the Senegalese popu-
lation survives on less than US$2 per day. 
Although the 2000 elections and Abdoulaye Wade's vic-
tory allowed the country to breathe a collective sish of 
relief, expectations run high. The new leaders must see this 
victory not just as an electoral battle won, but as an ulti-
matum from their people to reinstate public morality and 
initiate real changes. With the next presidential elections 
scheduled for 2007, the president and his new prime min-
ister have the time they need to make a reality of the Sopi, 
on which people have pinned all their hopes. ■ 
1. Sopi means 'change' in Wolof, Senegal's national language. 
2. In an Africa where the single party system was the rule. Senghor embarked on 
a controlled experiment with political pluralism: Law 76-26 created a limited 
multiparty system restricted, at first, to just three parties then, from I 978, to 
lour parties, representing the main Ideologies of that time: socialist democratic 
(Socialist Party. PS), liberal democratic (Senegalese Democratic Party, PDS), 
Marxist-Leninist (African Independence Parly. ΡΛΙ) and conservative 
(Senegalese Republican Movement). 
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A brighter economic 
future? 
Senegal's fortunes have taken a turn for the better since 
1994 as the country has enjoyed positive if precarious 
growth. But the forecast for 2003 is less optimistic in the 
context of a downturn in the global economy. 
For the Senegalese government, which has made alleviating 
poverty one of its top priorities, this slow-down means even 
less room for manoeuvre over policy. The weight of 
expectation bears heavily on a country that is still struggling 
to raise the standard of living of its people and close the 
ever-widening gap between the haves and the have-nots. 
Senegal has been classified as one of the world's Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs) since 2001 and the social and 
economic benefits of the political transition have yet to be 
felt. However, new development strategies have just been 
drawn up, the burden of debt should soon be alleviated and 
regional integration continues. It is time, in collaboration 
with the country's partners, to "convert the tries". 
Following the dramatic devaluation of the CFA franc in 
1994, the Senegalese economy took its first steps on the road 
to recovery. From 1995 to 2000, the growth rate averaged 
5%, peaking at 5.7% in 2001, despite inflation. This spurt 
was essentially fuelled by the revival of the tertiary sector, in 
particular transport, telecommunications, trade and admin-
istration. The tertiary sector dominates the country's econo-
my and accounts for 60% of gross domestic product (GDP). 
Slow-down 
But in 2002 it all began to go wrong. Growth estimates were 
lowered: to 2.4% according to the West African Economic 
Monetary Union (WAEMU) '. The root of the problem was 
the slow-down in activity of the primary sector (agriculture, 
fishing and stock rearing), which employs more than half the 
working population but represents just 20% of GDP. An 
underachieving groundnut sector and the generally poor per-
formance of agriculture (production and trade) could lead to a 
fall of 7-8% in the primary sector. Fishing, the country's pri-
mary source of income, has not been spared. It suffers from 
dilapidated equipment and a lack of investment. This is a wor-
rying situation, particularly as Senegal's exports are concentrat-
ed in four areas of activity: groundnuts, fishing, tourism and 
phosphates. In addition, inflation is on the rise at 3% whereas 
it stood at 1% until 2002. 
This has been a hard blow for Senegal, all the more so since 
its performance has always been markedly below par, in par-
ticular when taken in the context of its population growth 
(2.4%). Senegal has now been relegated to the LDC division, 
despite substantial aid from donors (10% of GDP). Senegal 
has borne the brunt of the fall in exchange rates caused by the 
drop in the price of raw material exports. Unlike some of its 
Central African neighbours, the country does not have a 
wealth of natural resources. In addition, overpopulation and 
drought have placed a strain on the environment and exacer-
bated desertification. 
Buying power and savings levels in Senegal arc alarmingly 
low. The story is the same for internal and external invest-
ment, both public and private. Indeed, investment has 
pretty much dried up as a result of red tape and corruption. 
While the latter is difficult to measure, the latest report by 
the NGO, Transparency International, ranks Senegal in 65th 
place out of 95 countries
2. In the same vein, the instability of 
the legal and justice system is a deterrent to many investors. 
Another problem: public finances do not add up. Spending 
increased as a result of the subsidies granted to state companies 
in difficulty, but tax income remains insufficient
1. This is 
mainly because of the size of the informal sector, which repre-
sents 60% of GDP and employs almost 90% of the workforce. 
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The informal sector represents 60% of GDP and employs 
alrrfost 90% oj the workforce 
However, the public deficit should be reduced with the 
introduction of a single VAT rate of 18% (something that is 
not unrelated to the increase in inflation). Another significant 
thorn in Senegal's flesh is its debt, which hovered at around 
73% of GDP in 2001. Here at least help is at hand. Senegal 
should soon reach the Highly Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC) Initiative's completion point'. If it is to obtain a 
reduction of 18% in its global debt, Senegal must gain IMF 
and World Bank approval of its Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper and of the privatisation of two state companies (Senelec 
and Sonacos), as well as reforms in other sectors. 
Low achievement but high expectations 
Within Senegal, the economic and institutional frailty is pal-
pable. With little hope of experiencing the benefits of growth, 
people at least expect something to come of the political 
changeover. The country has a per capita GDP of $459, a life 
expectancy rate at birth of 53 years and a literacy rate of 37.3%, 
ranking 154th out of 173 countries in the 2002 UNDP human 
development index. The prevalence and perception of poverty 
is keenly felt by the population. According to recent surveys, 
65% of households consider themselves poor and 64% believe 
that impoverishment has become worse in recent years. Poveri)', 
already manifest in rural areas, is creeping into the towns in step 
with runaway urbanisation. The rate of illiteracy is 72% for 
women and 52% for men. 
Health figures are equally poor. A quarter of the population 
suffers from malnutrition, infant mortality rates have reached 
80 in 1,000 births, and every year 56 women in 10,000 die in 
childbirth. Bv contrast, the government's voluntarist policy is 
paying off in the fight against AIDS, for which the country has 
the best record in Africa. Just 0.5% of the adult population is 
infected with HIV. The social sectors have on the whole suf-
fered from under-investment for many years, partly because of 
structural adjustment programmes that focused on the produc-
tion sector in the early 1980s. 
A new course and grounds for hope 
In the light of the grim situation the government decided to 
steer a new course. The country committed itself to investing in 
areas such as good governance, infrasttuctures and regional inte-
gration. This was in line with the objectives of the New 
Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), the WAEMU, 
the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper linked to the HIPC 
Initiative, and the "Tenth plan for economic and social devel-
opment (2000-2007) in Senegal". 
These new targets are also contained in the Strategy Paper 
which provides guidelines for use of the 9th European 
Development Fund (EDF) for the next five years. In April 
2001, the EU allocated to Senegal an envelope of €282 million. 
All that remained was to decide how this money was to be used. 
As a result, non-state actors, representatives of the EU and of 
the state, worked together to define the country's development 
priorities. During the five years from 2002 to 2007, the sector 
that will receive most attention, if not in financial terms at least 
in terms of political importance, will be good governance, fol-
lowed bv road infrastructure, sanitation, health and education 
programmes and support for the economic integration process 
under way within the WAEMU and the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS)'. In addition, 
Senegal can make use of funds available under the new 
Investment Facility' managed by the the European Investment 
Bank (EIB), and under the EIB's own resources. 
From a commercial point of view, Senegal and the EU, after 
nine rounds of negotiations, have also renewed the fishing pro-
tocol under which European boats can catch fish in Senegal's 
maritime zone in return for payment of €16 million a year". 
Moreover, in view of its LDC status, Senegal can try to take 
advantage of the European ''Eventhing but arms" initiative that 
would grant the country almost total access to EU markets 
except for arms and munitions. The EU and Senegal will also 
negotiate, on a regional basis, new Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs) in line with WTO rules, with the potential 
of reinforcing regional integration. 
The 9th EDF has also provided for aid to help Senegal 
negotiate and finance impact studies. But Senegal must make 
its products competitive, create an environment favourable to 
investment and reach a level of growth that can support 
sustainable development if it is to benefit substantially from 
access to European markets. The means, the opportunities, 
the plans, the strategies are all in place. But time is short and 
social issues are becoming ever more pressing. Regardless of 
the demands of globalisation, most Senegalese have no wish to 
be left behind. ■ 
1. The WAEMU \V;LS created by a treat}' signed in Dakar on 10 January IWt by the heads of 
state and government of the seven West African countries who shared a common currency, 
the CFA franc.Illese were: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger. Senegal and Togo. 
The Treaty ux>k effect on 1 August that year following ratification by the member states. 
On 2 May 1997, Guinea-Bissau became the eighth member state of the union. 
2. See interview with Alioune Tine, Chairman of Forum Civil on page 66. 
3. According to lhe WAEMU, tax income did not exceed 20» of GDP between 1992 and 20(11. 
4. The HIPC Initiative comprises two main phases. First, the countries must adopt a 
number of measures before they can IK- eligible for special aid (decision point). Once 
accepted, they are granted a special reduction formula and must Implement certain 
measures and fulfil certain criteria in onler to qualify for total relief (completion point). 
The process is ven- flexible as then- is no specific timetable attached to the two pitases. 
5. The ECOWAS was created as the result of a treaty signed on IH May 1
 
()~s in lagos (Nigeria). 
Its mcinliers are Ilenia Burkina luso. Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Liberia, Mali. Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal. Sierra Leone andTogo. 
6. Compared with the previous protocol, the financial compensation has risen from CFAF 
31,485,936,000 to CFAF 41,981,248,000. Fishing possibilities on coastal demersal species 
have been reduced from 2,131 GrossTonnes (GT) to 1,500 GT.with fishing possibilities on 
deep demersal fisheries reduced from ~,H69 GT to 6,500 GT.The number of EI I pole mid-
line tuna boats was increased from 12 to 16 vessels.The number of surface lining vessels 
remained unchanged while the 11 licences granted to pelagic trawlers under the previous 
agreement wen· revoked. By revoking tiie.se licences to lìsli sardinella, Senegal aims to pre-
serve one of the most important species for food for its poorest people. 
7. 'Hie traile aspea of the Cotonou Agreement provides for the implementation, from 200H. 
oí Economic Partnership Agreements (I:l'.\s) between Europe on one hand and the ACP 
countries grouped into regional blocks on the other (agreements with individual countries 
are also possible).They involve the creation of zones for free trade between the El' ;md its 
At Ρ pan tiers.'Hie Cotonou Agreement merel) states the objectives and the general Iramc-
wnrk for future· negotiations. Negotiations on the fil'As. which llegan in September 2IKI2. aa-
set lo run until 2(X)8,und the agreements will lx- implemented over a twelve-year period 
between 2008 and 2020.The geographic areas covered, goods concerned, liberalisation 
pnxess and accompanying measuR-s will lx- defined in regional or bilateral lil'.Vs per sc·. 
'Illese arc· essential elements of the negotiations. 
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EU-Senegal Cooperation 
A new basis 
Senegal and the European Commission will soon sign a strategy document 
outlining cooperation between the two partners for the period 2002-
2007. This framework, prepared in collaboration with civil society, covers 
all aspects of cooperation and aims to support poverty alleviation efforts. 
Top priorities are good governance, road transport and sanitation. 
Budget support has also been provided for. Under the 9th European 
Development Fund (EDF), €282 million has been allocated to Senegal. 
Mr Abdoulaye Diop, Economy and Finance Minister and also EDF National 
Authorising Officer (NAO), answers the Courier's questions. 
Non-state actors have been involved in preparing 
the 9th EDF cooperation strategy document. 
How have their concerns been taken into 
account? 
Non-state actors participated in the work of the various 
subject-specihc groups. In this way, their concerns have 
been largely taken into account in the final strateg)' docu-
ment under the 9th EDF, as have other players who have 
contributed to the work. Moreover, certain subject-specif-
ic groups have been chaired bv members of civil society. 
This has been the case, for example, of the technical group 
on governance. 
Good governance is a priority sector in the 
cooperation strategy with the EU, albeit perhaps 
not in financial terms. Why is that? And how can 
the targets set be achieved? 
Good governance is a primary target area for govern-
ment action in that it enables us to respond to the need 
for participation, transparency, accountability, efficiency 
and the pre-eminence of the law. The objectives targeted 
by the national good-governance programme that was 
drafted in 2002 focus particularly on improving the civil 
service, most notably in those sectors where social 
demand is very high in terms of people's improved stan-
dard of living and fulfilment. These objectives will have 
to be achieved by carrying through in-depth administra-
tive reform that will include streamlining che organisa-
tional and institutional structure on the one hand and 
setting up a top-quality civil service on the other. We are 
also devising development policies that target the private 
sector, that are are capable of meeting social demand and 
that are based on the widest possible dialogue. We would 
also like to promote local management of problems by 
increasing local governance and improving the legal envi-
ronment, so as to confirm the pre-eminence of the law. 
This means promoting an equitable justice system at 
grassroots level, under which we can also promote eco-
nomic development. Lastly, we are seeking to reinforce 
the capacities of Parliament so that it can fulfil its role as 
the monitor of public policy. 
To go back to the issue of justice for a moment, 
how can efficiency be improved? 
This comes under the national good-governance pro-
gramme. In addition, at the time of the 2001 update of 
the private-sector support strategy, it was recommended 
that a programme be set up to modernise the justice 
system. That recommendation reflects the President of the 
Republic's guidelines; he has emphasised, on several occa-
sions, the need to modernise Senegal's courts in order to 
strengthen the rule of law, improve the business environment 
and to improve material and physical security. In accordance 
with those recommendations, the government has initiated a 
study to look into the setting-up and implementation 
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of a sectoral programme for the 
justice system. Reform of the legal 
system — including financial trans-
parency - is something that not only 
the country's citizens but also, and in 
particular, Senegalese and foreign 
companies and our partner organisa-
tions in the world of economics hold 
very dear. The aim of the justice 
system sectoral programme (PSJ), 
which is currently being drafted, is 
to improve the performance of those 
working in the justice system, so that 
they can better meet the expecta-
tions of those who have to deal with it (citizens, govern-
ments, business circles, investors, etc). Substantial efforts 
on the part of the government and cooperation agencies in 
this field can therefore be pursued and developed under a 
global programme that takes into account the degree of 
priority to be given to the legal system and the judiciary 
from now on. 
How do you envisage speeding up the release of 
aid funds, both from the EU and other donors? 
Plans for the 2003-2005 period aimed at improving the 
rate of release of foreign funding can be summarized as 
follows: improving the programming of public invest-
ment; enhancing capabilities for identifying and prepar-
ing projects and programmes; building project and pro-
gramme monitoring capacities through modern manage-
ment and planning techniques (thanks, in particular, to 
the new information and communication technologies), 
and, lastly, by creating a timetable — that we shall adhere 
to — for periodic project-portfolio review meetings. 
A new fisheries agreement has recently been signed 
with the EU. What measures are in the pipeline for 
protecting resources and 
non-industrial fishing? 
Fifty per cent of resources under the fisheries agreement 
- approximately CFA5 billion a year [€7.6 million] - has 
been allocated by Senegal's government to financing devel-
opment projects in the fisheries sector under the consoli-
dated investment budget (BCD. A 
°
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significant part of this amount has 
been earmarked for protecting 
fisheries resources. Let me give you 
an example. Under the 2003 BCI, 
a number of projects will be 
implemented in order to protect 
resources: fisheries surveillance 
equipment and infrastructures will 
be set up; six launches will be pur-
chased; a fisheries remote surveil-
Fifty per cent of resources under the 
recentJy signed EU-Senegal fisheries 
agreement - approximately CFA5 billion 
a year [EUR7.6 million] - has been 
allocated by Senegal's government to 
financing development projects in 
the fisheries sector 
Each donor involved 
in Senegal should set 
aside a specific 
priority-intervention 
financing programme 
to benefit Casamance 
lance radar system will be installed; 
the fisheries zone surveillance aircraft 
will be overhauled; the Fouta patrol 
boat will be repaired; information 
will be gathered on inland fisheries 
and surveillance of these will be set 
up; and fisheries statistics will be 
improved. 
What importance is attached to 
rural development in terms of 
EU-Senegal cooperation? 
Rural development is a major pri-
ority. Stabex' interventions are help-
ing to promote rural development, particularly in rejuve-
nating the peanut production sector. Under Stabex, and 
within the context of the 8th EDF, €15 million will be 
allocated to financing priority action programmes in this 
area. The strengthening of such cooperation is dependent 
on the production of a policy document for the farming 
sector. This document is now being finalised. Our partners 
have been examining it and their views have been taken 
into account. Furthermore, a number of planned interven-
tions in decentralisation and education and health infra-
structures directly relate to the rural sector 
Can cooperation instruments help promote a 
peaceful solution to the Casamance crisis? 
The relaunching of investment in the south, for instance 
the creation of basic social infrastructures, the completion 
of hydro-agricultural development projects, job creation, 
etc, is an important way in which to boost economic activ-
ity and therefore to help peace return to the region. Given 
the government's limited means, it would be desirable for 
international cooperation resources and instruments to be 
used in achieving that investment. Just like USAID, the 
World Bank and German Cooperation, each donor 
involved in Senegal should set aside a specific priority-inter-
vention financing programme to benefit Casamance. ■ 
1. In the 1970s, new EDF instruments were Introduced to cope with the 
commodity crisis.The stabilisation of export receipts for agricultural products 
(Stabex) gave funds to offset losses on a wide number ofagriculttir.il 
products; cocoa, coffee, groundnuts, tea and others, as a result of crop 
failures and price falls. .country report 
Forum Civi 
ten years an advocate for transparency 
Created in January 1993, Forum Civil is a voluntary body committed to the 
promotion of democracy, good governance and genuine citizenship in Senegal. 
Forum Civil is also the Senegalese national chapter of Transparency 
International, the international NGO devoted to combating corruption. The 
group's other main concern is the emergence of a genuine form of citizenship. 
Forum CÍV¡I'S VOlunteer-memberS all have a character-
istic in common: they do not belong to any political party (the 
association's prerequisite lor membership). Lawyers, tech-
nocrats, teachers, administrators and high-ranking civil ser-
vants have come together to campaign for their understanding 
of democracy to become a reality in Senegal. For nearly ten 
years, Forum Civil has promoted an all-encompassing democ-
racy with political, economic, social and cultural dimensions. 
It is also committed to the difficult tasks of upholding good 
governance and transparency and of combating corruption. 
Forum Cavil is not just a talking shop that carries out stud-
ies or lobbies the authorities. It is more than that. Among 
other things, the Forum has set up an organisation to provide 
assistance to the victims of the MV Le Joola ferry disaster', 
offering them free legal aid. It has created two legal and 
CO D 
administrative assistance centres, to help the Senegalese 
people cope with the administrative maze. The Forum also 
plans to establish institutes to act as "governance watchdogs" 
in the provinces and to develop a method for managing local 
community associations. They will provide access, after inves-
tigations, to a good governance "seal of approval" in order to 
promote decentralised cooperation. All these are initiatives 
born of civil society, demonstrating its organisation, 
dynamism and vigour within Senegal. 
Forum Civils president, Maître Mame Adama Gueye, a 
Dakar Appeal Court lawyer gave this interview to the Courier. 
One of the Forum's objectives is the creation of a 
genuine form of citizenship. Is citizenship 
currently less than genuine? 
Working for a new citizenship means attempting to re-
establish the otder of things, and citizens have to be aware that 
they are the principals; that the government is only an official 
representative that has to carry out a task and be accountable. 
Although citizenship exists on paper, we believe that it could 
become even more genuine if decision-makers really wanted 
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to make their citizens true citizens. An interesting change is 
taking place, however, thanks to the combined work of civil 
society's organisations and the emergence of radio stations that 
highlight the importance of national languages. 
In 2000, we did a great deal of work to increase the level 
of electoral registration, which had an interesting result. 
Because there was a potential very, very serious political con-
flict between the opposition and the government, alongside 
our electoral register work we acted as mediators between 
the two sides. At the time, foreign embassies had even made 
arrangements to evacuate their citizens. Our mediation led 
to both sides accepting an audit of the electoral register, 
supervised by experts from civil society. Both sides also 
accepted the results of that audit. Our next mediation task 
was to persuade the candidates to accept the results of the 
elections, which they did between the two rounds. 
And good governance, your other commitment...? 
Yes, we've also done a great deal of work in connection 
with corruption and transparency. Forum Civil has been 
instrumental in breaking taboos. Up until 1999, when the 
first seminar on transparency in public revenue manage-
ment was organised, this issue had not been addressed. But 
nowadays corruption and transparency are recurrent topics 
on the national agenda. That's quite a major step forward. 
At the beginning of this year, we published the first survey 
on the perception of corruption in Senegal and, I must say, 
it caused quite a fuss. We're also founder members of an 
international coalition campaigning for transparency and 
against corruption: in all, the coalition consists of about 
20 organisations from all walks of life. 
Does this involvement in promoting good 
governance lead you to address issues of 
cooperation with donors? 
Indeed it does. For example, we were involved in an inter-
esting exercise with the EU regarding the drafting of the 9th 
European Development Fund (EDF) cooperation strategy, 
done as a tripartite meeting of non-state actors, the govern-
ment and the EU. Generally speaking, it all went very well. 
The government played the game. In actual fact, we believe 
that all three parties should have the same level of involve-
ment, but all that is under review. The State now recognises 
civil society and makes sure it is involved. For the time 
being, the Forum is also involved in reviewing the texts of 
contracts being signed between the Finance Ministry and 
the World Bank. That's just one more example. 
Going back to corruption, do you not regard it as 
generating, to some extent, a redistribution of 
wealth, thereby contributing to social stability? 
No, I don't think that the money generated by corruption 
constitutes a redistribution. Here, redistribution proceeds 
from the very essence of our society: one does not have to be 
corrupt in order to distribute. Everyone who receives a 
salary, who works, who does business, or who is in the infor-
mal sector, redistributes. That is what maintains the social 
balance. The other factor in that balance is the money that 
comes in from the diaspora. Senegalese people can be found 
throughout the world and they contribute to the survival of 
a great many other people. If we had only the product of our 
domestic economic activity, terrible instances of disequilib-
rium would be created. Also, if any money generated by cor-
ruption were to be redistributed, it would be absolutely mar-
ginal in its effect on the balance of our society. 
Yes, but it is understandable that a poorly paid or 
unpaid customs officer should resort to corruption 
in order to live. 
In Senegal, all customs officers are paid — that at least is 
a fact. To my mind, a low wage is no justification for resort-
ing to corruption, and I refuse to accept this kind of expla-
nation even if, admittedly, one might think that a higher 
wage would reduce the likelihood of corruption. No, 1 
refuse to allow corruption to be explained by low wages, 
because there are people who are poorly paid or who have 
no means of subsistence but are not corrupt. 1 would add 
that major corruption is not the fault of low wage earners. 
How, then, do you explain this phenomenon? 
There are any number of explanations. Impunity, for 
example. You might call it "state practice". Usually in the 
past, people caught with their fingers in the till, who were 
guilty of misappropriation of public funds, were not prose-
cuted. They would be transferred and sometimes offered a 
promotion. This reinforced the idea that one could be cor-
rupt or be tempted to misappropriate public funds without 
having cause for concern. Also, there is political vote-
buying. If one embezzles money while in power, one need 
have absolutely no fear of the consequences. In that con-
nection, we had a major divergence of view with the cur-
rent government — just as we did with the former govern-
ment - regarding a central monitoring structure within the 
government, whose monitoring was worthless in practice. 
By this I mean the General State Inspection Board. Since 
such a structure can be mobilised only by the president of 
the republic, who is the sole recipient of any reports and 
who has discretionary power over how to process any 
reports (political processing, inevitably), the result is a fore-
gone conclusion. We practically never saw any high-rank-
ing civil servants prosecuted on the basis of the General 
State Inspection Board's reports. 
/ take it this applies also to the audits currently 
being conducted? 
Certainly. We proposed that the General State Inspection 
Board should be disestablished; that there should be an 
independent body with the authority to take up issues for 
itself, and whose reports should be sent to the president for 
the parry in government. If, however, irregularities were 
observed, the matter should be referred to the courts. This 
is the sort ofthing that is helping corruption to take root in 
our society. In the end, values are also corrupted. These 
days, money can buy credibility - that is what has encour-
aged the proliferation of these illegal practices. 
Do you not feel that this is a universal 
phenomenon? Although corruption at the lowest 
level is less visible in Europe, it does exist higher up. 
Certainly, it does. And, as you can see, the same causes 
produce the same effects. In Europe there is also a kind of 
impunity. But things are nevertheless changing. Take 
France, for example. A few years ago it would have been 
inconceivable for an examining magistrate to refer to a 
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president's position. There has been an evolution. Bosses of 
large companies have been imprisoned. In Senegal, corrup-
tion is still infinitely more widespread and has a greater 
influence than in Europe, that is obvious. There is a form 
of citizenship and a notion of public service that prevents 
junior civil servants from getting involved in corruption. 
Here, this notion has disappeared to the point that if one 
comes across a civil servant who has done his job well, one 
feels almost obliged to reward him. 
Does that not suggest that there is a lack of 
knowledge about rights and therefore a lack of 
education? 
Education is a good investment and, overall, the govern-
ment has not done badly in terms of education and chan-
nels significant sums into it. Yet, is this money well spent? 
I'm no expert, but traditionally education has been a prior-
ity, even if the results have been unsatisfactory. 
Is there as much investment in the legal system? 
No, not enough is invested in it. Aside from a few courts 
here in Dakar, the rest of the system has completely broken 
down. Our justice system lacks human resources and 
equipment, and is eaten away by corruption. 
Do you think that will change? 
I am not certain, and I am not a little discouraged. What 
is more, I learned that the State had not spent much of the 
money (CFA
2 7 billion - about €10,7 million) allocated to 
the legal system. It is terribly frustrating when one sees just 
how much the legal system needs. I myself have verified 
this, because I chair the good governance technical group 
(within the framework of the involvement of non-state 
actors) in defining the strategy document that will serve as 
a guideline for interventions under the 9th EDF. Even 
today, the Justice Ministry is rarely represented when there 
is an opportunity to propose programmes or projects that 
could be financed. The money is there! That's the problem. 
So far, there is no sectoral policy relating to the legal sys-
tem, but an appeal for a demonstration of interest in a jus-
tice sector project has been launched. One more example: 
some time ago I worked as a consultant with other legal 
firms on modernising and computerising the legal registry, 
using World Bank funding. When the funding ended, we 
had just finished our project, but only because of the enor-
mous effort we had put in — certain parties had underesti-
mated the cost of this work. Well, we finished the work at 
our own expense. Next we had a meeting with the then 
minister. His conclusion was concise and to the point: the 
funding had run out, so everything had to stop. Since then, 
all our work has been mothballed. 
One might think that there is a desire in political 
circles not to promote issues connected with the 
legal system? 
There are several things: a lack of political will, certainly. 
There is also the issue of comprehension, by which I mean 
a difficulty at Justice Ministry level to formulate projects. 
Lastly 1 might mention a lack of vision. Incoming ministers 
have to have a project, so perhaps with the new Prime 
Minister, who has a fairly rational outlook, we might be 
able to make progress. The legal system is absolutely fun-
damental, and essential if we are to attract investment. 
Does the newly formed government look like one 
that favours transparency and good governance? 
I'm waiting for proof. The formulation of political will is 
one thing, as you know, but mere formulation does not get 
things moving. That will has to be given concrete form, and 
measures have to be taken, acts committed and reforms imple-
mented. That same political will also has to be transferred to a 
level where implementation takes place, as far as the lowest 
echelons. So you see that where political will is concerned 
there is a gap between formulation and implementation. We 
have seen this in connection with corruption issues. The polit-
ical will is very clear. In his first speech, President Wade called 
for transparency and a campaign against corruption, but two-
and-a-half years later everyone has realised that there has been 
no real movement - not publicly, at least. And the informa-
tion we get simply shows us that the same practices are con-
tinuing. I'm therefore waiting for proof. ■ 
1. On 26 September last year. 1.2(10 people are believed to bave lost their lives 
when the overcrowded ferry sank in a storm on its way from Ziguinchor in 
the sooth to the eapital. Dakar. 
2. Communauté Financière Africaine francs. 
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Senegal's mangrove forests: 
problems and prospects 
A lush ecosystem threatened by man and climate, Senegal's mangrove forests 
are in sore need of help. In the Saloum delta, a project supporting community 
management of the natural resources of the mangrove forests is attempting to 
reverse the forest's degradation and embark on a reforestation programme, 
while taking into account the interests of the local population. 
Τπθ deltS where the seasonal Sine and Saloum rivers meet 
the tidal waters of the Atlantic is a maze of tributaries. From the 
water's edge, the mangrove stretches for 65,000 hectares. Dense 
vegetation on a deep bed of silt, its roots provide a home for vast 
colonies of oysters. It is an extraordinary world, this amphibi-
ous forest whose best-known resident is the mangrove tree, 
perched on its stilt-like roots. In the midst of these long-legged 
trees, where access is only possible by canoe, pink flamingos 
dwell, as well as herons, otters and the (very) odd manatee. 
At first glance, an idyllic environment. 
Mangroves in danger 
But the Saloum delta region is under threat from coastal ero-
sion and from the salinity of the soil. The mangrove forest is 
vital to this area; it prevents the soil from being washed away, 
supplies the essential nutrients for young fish and shelters the 
oyster colonies. The mangrove tree also provides a stock of 
medicinal plants used by locals and a significant source of 
income tor the women who farm the shellfish. However, ever-
lower rainfall levels and chaotic exploitation of the forests have 
accelerated the decline of the tree population, with the result-
ing deterioration of the environment and dwindling resources. 
Together with the plants and animals, the local communities 
are the primary victims of the degradation of the mangrove 
ecosystems. However, because they themselves remove a sub-
stantial part of the resources, local people also play a role in this 
degradation. Mangrove forests are cut down for firewood and 
as lumber for construction. In addition, for many years local 
people have cut down the mangrove trees at the roots in order 
to harvest oysters. The trees are being felled faster than the for-
est can regenerate itself, hence the diminishing wood resources 
and ensuing damage to the ecosystem. The link between the 
disappearance of the mangrove and the fall in income which 
results, is not yet fully appreciated. 
The challenge is obvious but formidable: to protect the 
mangrove forests while allowing local people to benefit from 
the resources. In an attempt to balance these different needs, 
Waamé, a Senegalese NGO and its Belgian counterpart, 
ADG (Development agency of Gembloux), have launched a 
wide-ranging biodiversity conservation project in the Saloum 
delta. Under the supervision of the Senegalese National Parks 
Authority, which manages this protected area, and in collabo-
ration with the rural communities, the programme will target 
35 villages over three years at a total cost of €1.54 million -
€1.23 million of which is allocated by the European Union. 
Mangrove forests are one of the most productive and 
biodiverse ecosystems on earth, but they are under threat 
Village management 
Specifically, the "mangrove project" will draw up manage-
ment and development plans with local communities to pro-
mote sustainable exploitation of this great resource. The project 
managers will either be able to collaborate with existing man-
agement committees or will help to set them up. These com-
mittees will then define the rules that govern the individual and 
collective use of the mangrove forests. A mangrove reforestation 
programme will be implemented, planting the Rhizophora vari-
ety of mangrove, and tree nurseries for other species of tree will 
be set up in the villages to encourage plant diversification. 
Another important aspect of the project is training and educa-
tion. The programme provides for environmental awareness 
campaigns in schools and villages; for reforestation teams, 
teaching of nursery and forestry management skills; and tech-
nical manuals and training tools will be prepared and translat-
ed into Sereer, Wolof and Manding. The scope of the pro-
gramme goes beyond the mangrove forests: provision is also 
made for training in more profitable bee-keeping and oyster-
farming techniques, as well as the improvement of networks for 
marketing local produce. 
A wide-ranging programme indeed. Perhaps even a tad 
"ambitious", as was the view taken by several participants at the 
launch seminar in Dakar in November 2001. In any event, the 
promoters have faith in it, as well as the communities. However, 
as Bineta Basse, a resident of Mbam and vice-chairwoman of 
the community volunteers' association for the regeneration and 
conservation of the environment, points out: "We are expecting 
a lot from this project. We didn't wait for it before going into 
action ourselves. But now we can go no further without co-
ordination between the many partners who come to visit us 
here and, above all, without the real involvement of the com-
munities. Isn't that what ownership of development pro-
grammes by the people primarily concerned is all about?" ■ 
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increased support for artisanal fishing 
In Senegal, the fisheries sector is marked by the importance of artisanal or semi-industrial 
fishing. This sector accounts for almost 80 per cent of catches. Gradually, more and more fish 
is being caught for export, sometimes at the expense of domestic consumers. In Casamance, 
artisanal fishing is an important activity, all the more so as many farmers are turning to it as a 
way of escaping the insecurity of living off the land. While the ocean and the rivers are 
brimming with fish, catching them is very hard work. Improving working conditions, hygiene 
and the management of resources is not only vital for the sector but for the entire region. 
It ¡S early morning in Ziguinchor, capital of Lower 
Casamance, and the street leading to the pier is already busy 
with vehicles of all kinds and pedestrians. 1 hev are all headed in 
the same direction: the artisanal port, where the multicoloured 
pirogues are beginning to unload their bounty. 
"The huge volumes of fish that arrive in Ziguinchor are 
caught at sea. Fishermen can travel as far as Guinea Bissau or 
even Guinea Conakry, staying at sea for over a week," explains 
Isidor Biagui, head of the Regional Sea Fisheries Department. 
Smaller catches are unloaded at the pier while the bigger ones go 
straight to the port of trade. On the whole, the fish is sold right 
on the pier or sent to markets in Dakar and elsewhere. 
"Hygiene conditions have greatly improved since the river 
bank was rebuilt in 2001. Now the fish is placed on canvas 
sheets, awaiting wholesalers or local fishmongers. Before, it used 
to be tipped onto the ground, and the women worked in the 
mud. But fishing is still a difficult profession - the price of fuel, 
the demise of some species, the dangers of the sea, and hygiene 
standards that are not yet fully complied with", says Mr Biagui, 
pointing to a vague area just behind the pier where vultures feast 
on the waste. 
Getting the sector back on its feet 
Close on the heels of the Programme for Support of Artisanal 
fishing in Casamance (PROPAC) and the experience gained on 
the country's Grande Côte (the strip of coastline between Dakar 
and Saint Louis), a new Programme for Support of Artisanal 
Fishing (PAPA-SUD) was launched in 2000. PAPA-SUD is 
financed jointly by the F.U (64 per cent), the French Development 
Agency, and the government, to the tune of €8,63 million, and 
focuses on Senegal's south coast. The aim is to invest in infrastruc-
ture with a view to improving access to unloading areas, improving 
working conditions across the whole sector (catching the fish, pro-
cessing and distribution), strengthening quality and hygiene con-
trols on fresh and processed products, improving distribution and 
artisanal processing methods, and, finally, increasing safety at sea. 
"The purpose of PAPA-SUD is not to increase the size of catch-
es but to improve the management of resources and the prof-
itability of the work at different points in the chain," Isidor Biagui 
emphasises. In Ziguinchor, the effects of the programme will be to 
develop 60,000 square metres of river bank area, providing 
unloading sites and processing areas. I he pier is due to be com-
pletely connected to the electricity network and will house a com-
munity building, garages for the motors of the canoes, a ware-
house, sanitation blocks and premises tor the carpenters who build 
the boats. In the future, the site will also offer cold chain installa-
tions and an ice faeton'. "We will not limit ourselves to infra-
structure work," adds Mr Biagui. "We are also planning a major 
information campaign on safety at sea. The men don't like wear-
ing lifeiackets, but manv are lost at sea each year. Training is also 
important and will concentrate in particular on new techniques of 
processing and smoking the fish, for example. 
An interprofessional consortium of fishermen, wholesalers, 
processors and porters will manage the quay and collect income. 
The money made will be used to cover operating costs, develop-
ment work and the installation of new infrastructures. "PAPA-
SUD is getting the ball rolling for the users and beneficiaries to 
take over." sums up Mr Biagui. ■ 
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From top to bottom 
In 1996, Senegal stepped up its decentralisation programme. 
Rural communities, with their three levels of responsibility - region, commune, 
and rural community - have had their powers reinforced. They are now 
themselves responsible for determining their own local development policies. 
A difficult exercise, which is supported by PSIDEL (support programme for local 
development initiatives). This programme makes direct financial contributions 
to the budgets of rural communities to enable them to finance development 
activities and to help local representatives take ownership of planning, and thus 
supporting the decentralisation process. 
Little light filters through the shutters into the dark 
room where community representatives are holding a meet-
ing in Suel, Casamance, a stone's throw from the Gambian 
border. A special ceremony, at odds with the makeshift 
tables and chairs, is taking place with the utmost solemnity. 
Envelopes are carefully opened. It is the second stage of 
examination of the bids submitted in response to the rural 
community's invitation to tender. Under the supervision of 
a member of the ARD (regional development agency) and 
the tax collector of the department of Bignona, the repre-
sentatives of the Suel rural council study the bids. A few 
days earlier they had carried out a technical selection of 
potential partners. The stakes are high: it is time to select 
the contractor that will help the rural community draw up 
its local development plan and spending schedule. In short, 
the successful bidder will help identify priorities and how 
these should be financed. It is a complex planning exercise, 
which is allocated to the rural communities. 
Progressive decentralisation 
Like numerous African countries, Senegal inherited a 
strongly centralised state. Since independence, the country 
has put in place a decentralisation process, which is one of 
the most advanced in Africa. Since 1996, decentralisation 
has been regulated by a law on the transfer of power to the 
three levels of local responsibility: regions, towns and rural 
communities. Nine areas of competence have been trans-
ferred to these levels from the central to local level; 
environment, health, population and social activities, 
youth, sports and leisure, culture, education, the promo-
tion of national languages and vocational training, regional 
and town planning and housing. 
Like the PADELU (urban local development support) 
and the PAR programmes (regional support), PSIDEL 
bases itself on the structures of the State, aiming to 
strengthen them and enable them to implement the decen-
tralisation process. With €12 million in EDF funding 
(European Development Fund), PSIDEL directly supports 
the rural community budget by financing their planning, 
while contributing 80% of their investment needs. The 
Building of wells is the kind of infrastructure project that 
is likely to be financed 
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programme thus aims to fight poverty at local level by 
improving basic services and increasing access to commu-
nity services. PSIDEL is being implemented in an area 
where the majority of the rural communities do not have 
yet local development plans. 
However, according to Pierre Tendeng, manager of the 
regional agency in Ziguinchor, "the level of training in the 
local authorities is so poor that it is imperative that they 
receive guidance. That is part of our work with the PSIDEL 
programme. We try to help them make important, 
informed decisions but without taking over, for example as 
regards procedures to be followed for invitations to tender 
and the signing of contracts. We also want to ensure that 
local representatives fully understand the constraints of legal 
texts. We will not be here forever, and rural councillors will 
in the future have to manage on their own. The same goes 
for works. The rural communities have to be able to gauge 
the quality of the projects, so we provide them with techni-
cal advice. For example, we help them to assess the quality 
of works before paying. The PSIDEL is a groundbreaking 
project in all these aspects. After all, before it came along it 
was the sub-prefect who used to take care of everything". 
Once they have prepared their local development plan 
and finance plans, the communities can approach the 
PSIDEL. The programme provides for 80% of the annual 
investment plan, the rest being raised by the rural commu-
nity. However, the priorities identified (roads, bridges, 
clinics, etc.) are first submitted to a local monitoring com-
mittee which analyses their technical feasibility. This 
committee is composed of the presidents of the rural 
communities and the representatives of the administrative 
authorities concerned, the technical services and the devel-
opment partners. 
Safeguards 
Several safeguards have been put in place to prevent 
money being wasted. To qualify for funding, projects must 
fulfil a number of criteria: they must meet the real, identi-
fied needs of the popula-
tion; they must help fight 
poverty in a significant 
manner; they must relate to 
sectors such as health, edu-
cation, the environment, 
improving access to the 
regions, access to water and 
transport, building or re-
habilitation of infrastruc-
tures, or the campaign 
against desertification. 
Contracts for the work are 
awarded following a ten-
dering process. 'Although 
it's not a foolproof guarantee that the sub-contractor cho-
sen has not received favours from certain quarters, the fact 
that the representatives are present when the bids are 
opened and, above all, the fact that everyone knows the 
rules means the community itself has some degree of con-
trol," explains David Diatta, PSIDEL/ARD specialist. In 
addition, the money allocated by the PSIDEL to the rural 
communities is actually paid bv the Treasury. The State 
gives a guarantee and advances the funding for the opera-
tion. The EU does not reimburse the Treasury until after 
the checks and audits to verify the validity of the invest-
ment authorised. 
PSIDEL coordinators also stress the responsibility of the 
local representatives, encouraged, through the programme, 
to manage their resources in close cooperation with the 
people concerned. "In a certain manner', says Pierre 
Tendeng, "the whole population participates in the devel-
opment of the rural community. On the ground, the less 
the means available to the rural communities, the more 
they welcome the PSIDEL. A contribution fund and a 
decentralised appropriation fund were indeed installed but, 
as certain members of the Suel rural community point out, 
a gap in the law remains. The transfer of power has not yet 
been accompanied by an increase in the financial resources 
in line with the increase of the authorities' local responsi-
bilities". 
Decentralisation, by transferring power down to local 
communities, encourages them to take decisions in order 
to implement a development policy which is responsive to 
local needs. It also has the potential to consolidate the 
foundations of local democracy. Since 2001, PSIDEL has 
been implemented through tatgeted budgetary support in 
the departments of Podor, Kolda, Sedinoti, and Bignona. 
Fifty-nine rural communities, comprising 900,000 
people, currently benefit from the programme. In the 
future, it is expected that the experiment will be extended 
to cover the whole of the country, with assistance from 
other donors. ■ 
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The Regional Vocational Training Centre (CRFP) 
Ziguinchor's student-apprentices 
The informal sector - the mainstay in many developing countries - is the most 
important source of employment in Senegal. Most Senegalese are dependent on 
this parallel economy for their survival. In Casamance, disruption resulting from the 
conflict means that the sector is becoming increasingly crucial in terms of jobs, as 
people turn to the informal sector to fill the void left by companies that have fled 
the country's instability. The informal sector is also an essential ally in the 
reconstruction of the socio-economic fabric in the region. Indeed, there is a need 
for a credible alternative to "war trades" if there is to be a return to peace. In 
such a context, matching training to current and future employment is 
indispensible, and this is one of the objectives of the CRFP in Ziguinchor, capital 
of Lower Casamance. 
The time ÍS 5 p.m., and 16-year-old 
Abou is working away at a bed head-
board. His "workshop" is by the side of 
the road connecting the airport to central 
Ziguinchor, the capital of one of the two 
Casamance regions. His employer's work-
shop — banco walls, sheet-metal roof— sits 
a few metres back from the roadside. Two 
orders for beds have come in, the first 
some time ago. Tomorrow morning, 
however, Abou will not be at the work-
shop, but at the Regional Vocational 
Training Centre, where he attends block-
release courses. Set up in Ziguinchor's 
industrial area, this school was created in 
1991 using European Development Fund 
(EDF) financing. Its aim is to match the 
supply of and demand for work by offer-
ing a syllabus that promotes immediate 
integration into the productive sector. 
Initially, the school offered training in 
four areas: carpentry, car mechanics, 
bricklaying and metalwork. As time went 
on, the CRFP expanded, offering additional training 
courses in electricity and general mechanics. 
"In the beginning, the aim of the Centre was to develop 
the skills of young apprentices", explains Bacary Sané, the 
Centre's director. "We realised that an apprentice could 
spend between six and 15 years in a workshop with no 
opportunity to improve his skills or become self-employed. 
After having trained all the apprentices, we naturally went 
on to offer initial training to non-apprentices also". This 
development enabled many young people, who would not 
otherwise have had the opportunity to continue their gen-
eral education, to be accepted. What the Centre offers now 
goes beyond the conventional services provided by tradi-
tional educational establishments. Apart from the initial 
training and development of apprentices, the CRFP also 
offers modules that are open to established artisans, and 
tailor-made courses in response to the specific needs of cer-
tain companies. 
The informal 
sector, the 
mainstay in many 
developing 
countries, is the 
most important 
source of 
employment in 
Senegal 
School, work, sleep... 
Initial training is currently the 
CRFP's main activity. Based on a 
block-release arrangement, it com-
bines courses at the Centre and 
apprenticeships in a sponsor-work-
shop. "We refuse to shut our pupils 
up within four walls," Bacary Sané 
jokingly remarks. "Seriously, we 
think that block-release training 
offers several advantages. First, we have more sophisti-
cated equipment than the artisans, even if what we do 
have is obsolete in Western terms. Therefore young peo-
ple can learn new techniques and transfer them to the 
sponsor-workshop. At the same time, the pupils learn 
how bosses manage with the means they have available. 
Students are also able to take back to the workshop their 
knowledge about work organisation, schedules for 
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carrying out work, etc. So they are trained and also train 
others at the same time". 
Mamadou Kalifa Sonko, the Centre's work leader, adds: 
"Everything evolves very quickly in car mechanics and even 
in the building industry, so this transfer of knowledge is 
essential. Nowadays, it's all cut-price construction. For 
someone who has always built in the same way, it can be an 
advantage to learn that here we make stabilised bricks that 
need significantly less cement than traditional breeze-
blocks, although the bricks are just as robust". 
Leaning on a 20-ycar-old lathe, Abou nods in agree-
ment. Later, he admits to having a very busy schedule: 
"When I'm not at the Centre, I'm at the workshop -
Saturdays too, and sometimes Sundays as well. At our 
sponsor-workshops, we're apprentices and wc do every-
thing, sometimes things that have nothing to do with the 
job. That leaves only the nights to do homework. So, 
sometimes we skip class to go and play football ". In addi-
tion to the workshop and his training at the CRFP, Abou 
is also studying French and mathematics at the Alliance 
Française. A link has been created between the two estab-
lishments, benefiting a number of pupils. It is yet another 
opportunity for Abou, but an additional expense, too. He 
has to pay the Centre CFA 15,000 (about €22) in regis-
tration fees and the same sum to the Alliance Française. 
Nevertheless, he considers himself to be privileged: "I'm 
from Ziguinchor. Those who come here from the sur-
rounding villages first have to find a 
guardian in town for board and lodg-
ing. Mind you, some of them don't 
pay the CFA 15,000". In tact, the 
CRFP takes into account the situa-
tion of the most deprived students, 
such as those who arrive from the vil-
lages, displaced on account of the 
conflict. "One third of our students are social cases, and 
we cover all their expenses", explains Papa Oumar Sow, 
the C  entres administrator. 
Invention and innovation 
The Centre has a few teachers, a director, an adminis-
trator, a work leader and a secretary. The shortage of staff 
is all too obvious. "We have no supervisors, no teaching 
mediator, and as far as the teachers are concerned we have 
to fund half of them ourselves", the director explains. 
Funding for the Centre has progressively gone down, 
whereas demand has increased. "Fortunately, the State 
allows us to generate our own resources in order to pay 
staff, to buy equipment and to maintain machinery", Papa 
Oumar Sow adds. So, the school has to innovate, offering 
its services to companies, responding to open invitations to 
tender, selling what the students have produced, and also 
inventing; for instance, a tilting cart for making unloading 
easier, a nut crusher, a new type of oil press, stronger tables 
and benches for a school in the region, or even public 
waste bins, based on recycled material, for the local 
authorities. 
The CRFP docs not award diplomas, but gives pupils a 
course-completion certificate. The results speak for them-
selves, and levels of integration of pupils into the world of 
work are high: 99 per cent in construction, 99 per cent in 
carpentry, 77 per cent in car mechanics. Only electricity 
stands out, with its comparatively low 23 per cent, but this 
can be explained by the low level of demand. Outside the 
Centre, apprentices can be found in workshops in 
Ziguinchor and elsewhere, wherever they feel their dreams 
can be better fulfilled. The block-release training system is 
still an informal arrangement, and although the pupil — 
the link between school and workshop — is actually regis-
tered at the establishment, no contract binds him to his 
"employer-sponsor". 
Nevertheless, the CRFP is 
currently working on a 
framework and rules of 
conduct essential to plac-
ing its teaching on a more 
formal basis (defining 
objectives and the role of 
the partners, drafting of 
model conttacts, prepara-
tion for integration into 
the world of work, etc). 
Structuring of this type is 
increasingly essential given 
that the CRFP, despite the 
difficulties it encounters, 
is undoubtedly a lever 
for development in the 
region. ■ 
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Democracy under close surveillance 
Senegal is considered as West Africa's showcase, as far as democracy and 
participation are concerned. The country can pride itself on having instituted the 
subcontinent's first multiparty system and carrying out peaceful transfers of power. 
Its politics are not subject to major crises, and violations of human rights are rare. 
The southern Casamance region, however, has seen a fair share of abuses over the 
last 20 years, associated with the conflict between the Senegalese army and 
pro-independence rebels of the Movement of Democratic Forces (MFDC). 
The Senegalese human rights organisation RADDHO (African Meeting for the 
Defense of Human Rights) monitors a democracy in the process of consolidation, 
and campaigns to preserve the acquis and point the way towards the rule of law. 
In ¡tS mOSt recent report on the human rights sit-
uation in Senegal, Amnesty International is particularly 
critical of some cases of police violence committed with-
in the context of the conflict in Casamance, that are 
attributable not only to the rebels but also to the army 
and to uncontrolled or uncontrollable gangs. Amnesty 
also condemns the indiscriminate use of antipersonnel 
landmines by the belligerents and denounces the reluc-
tance to bring those responsible to justice that prevails 
in the combat zones. The organisation acknowledges, 
however, that the number of instances of torture, extra-
judicial executions and disappearances has substantially 
fallen. 
While not claiming credit for what are undoubtedly 
steps in the right direction, RADDHO, like other 
human rights organisations, has undoubtedly con-
tributed to the consolidation of democracy in Senegal. 
Nevertheless, as RADDHO's executive secretary Alioune 
Tine points out: "Democracy has yet to be fully accom-
plished, and there is still a lot to do in terms of justice, 
good governance and the creation of new radio and TV 
stations - there's only one TV station, and that belongs 
to the State!" 
On all fronts 
RADDHO practically owes its existence to an unfor-
tunate episode of history. In the early 1990s, African 
political refugees from Benin, Mali, Mauritania, 
Cameroon, Burundi, Rwanda, among others, launched a 
petition and sent it to the Mauritanian authorities. Its 
subject was the wave of bloody executions and instances 
of torture involving Negro Mauritanian citizens between 
1990 and 1992. The organisation which formed out of 
this action later turned its attention to respect for rights 
in Senegal, and more particularly to the Casamance con-
flict and its long list of atrocities. The NGOs partners 
include Amnesty International, the International 
Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH), Human 
Rights Watch, the World Organisation Against Torture -
SOS Torture, and the European Union. From 1998, 
RADDHO has run a secretariat responsible for monitor-
ing human rights, implementing the early-warning sys-
tems and overseeing legal matters. It conducts enquiries 
For the Senegalese, peaceful transfers of power 
are not new: Leopold Senghor, the country's first 
president, handed over power to his successor 
Abdou Diouf in 1980. In the presidential elections 
of March 2000, Diouf was defeated by opposition 
candidate Abdoulaye Wade, Senegal's current 
president 
into cases of torture, harassment, abduction, disappear-
ances and extrajudicial executions, and offers legal help 
to victims, calling upon the assistance of lawyers and 
doctors. RADDHO is also involved in transnational 
conflicts, and campaigns in favour of the International 
Criminal Court and for countries to sign up to the Mine 
Ban Treaty. 
"We did a lot of work on the Hissène Habré case, in 
collaboration with the FIDH, of which we are mem-
bers", points out Alioune Tine. This affair was a source 
of much talk and criticism in Dakar. In February 2000, 
a Senegalese judge found Hissène Habré, the former dic-
tator of Chad exiled in Dakar, guilty of complicity in 
crimes against humanity, and acts of torture and bar-
barism and placed him under house arrest. For the first 
time, a former head of state had been prosecuted by the 
legal system in the country where he had taken refuge. In 
March 2001, however, in an unexpected reversal, 
Senegal's Court of Appeal ruled that Hissène Habré 
could not be tried in Senegal for crimes committed in 
Chad. Nevertheless, his victims fight on and are now 
seeking to have Hissène Habré tried in a third country. 
"The government has promised to extradite him, but 
we're still waiting", says Mr Tine. 
With European Union funding, RADDHO has also set 
up some ten human rights monitoring bodies throughout 
Senegal. Responsible for gathering information on the 
human rights situation, these observatories also provide 
assistance to victims and draft monthly reports. 
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A change of government 
"In 1998, 2000 and 2001, we focused our attention on 
the elections", explains Mr Tine. "Our aim was to achieve 
a free, transparent vote, acceptable to all, so that any tran-
sition of power would pass off peacefully". To monitor the 
various elections, RADDHO trained more than 1,000 
observers and monitored preparations for the poll. 
"Drafting the lists, distributing voting cards and appoint-
ing the chairman of the National Election Monitoring 
Body had in the past been highly contentious issues. We 
also monitored the electoral campaign because the most 
recent presidential elections had been marked by a great 
deal of social unrest", he added. On polling days, 
RADDHO deployed its observers at polling stations: 
"During the presidential elections, we acted as mediator 
to persuade the two candidates — Abdou Diouf and 
Abdoulaye Wade — to accept the results of the ballot, 
which they finally did". 
Women, children and refugees 
In a period of armed conflict, women and children are 
usually the first to suffer. RADDHO initiated an enquiry 
into violence suffered by those most vulnerable in the 
Senegal/Mauritania conflict and in Casamance. In addi-
tion, a special commission has been set up to deal with 
women's rights issues. Apart from managing the various 
studies being conducted, this commission offers training 
courses and is active throughout Senegal in increasing 
women's involvement in decision-making bodies. Similar 
research, awareness-raisin" and information work is done 
on behalf of refugees and displaced persons, particularly 
those fleeing to the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau to escape 
the Casamance crisis. 
It is this latter conflict that is currently the most impor-
tant case for RADDHO's and its Casamance watchdogs. 
The NGO has decided to become parry to the peace nego-
tiations. On 22 July, not without some difficulty, it suc-
ceeded in reconciling the opposing points of view of the 
two principal leaders of the Movement of Democratic 
Forces in Casamance (see article on page 77). This 
undoubtedly led to the process being revised. "We try to 
mobilise everyone, and if possible in the same direction. We 
held talks with the tebel movement's leaders in order to per-
suade them to speak with one voice, and we explained to 
them that if they did not they would not have the ear of the 
government. Not only that, we went to see the government, 
which demonstrated its desire to find a rapid solution to the 
conflict. We advised them to give that desire concrete form bv 
immediately setting up a governmental negotiating group. It 
might have its shortcomings, but at least it is now in exis-
tence", comments Alioune Tine with some satisfaction. 
Over the last ten years, RADDHO has made itself indis-
pensable, cricicising some but not sparing others. To avoid 
any criticism from political circles, the NGO's charter 
excludes from its boatd of management any member of the 
government, political parties or trades unions. Its intransi-
gence has won it a fair number of critics and cuts it off from 
certain types of public funding. But this is undeniably a 
price worth paying if it is to maintain the credibility it has 
won for itself in Senegal and beyond. ■ 
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Xasamance: 
between war and peace 
Casamance is largely cut off from the rest of Senegal by The Gambia. For more than 
20 years a secessionist movement has asserted the area's historical independence. 
But successful negotiations between civil society and the administrative and military 
authorities have recently given hope to those who long for peace. 
Observers from RADDHO (the Senegalese human 
rights organisation) in Ziguinchor, the capital of Lower 
Casamance, are keeping a close eye on the conflict. The 
NGO's role is wide-ranging — from observer and negotiator 
to critic. RADDHO is also pressing for the return of dis-
placed nationals and members of the resistance, and the 
rehabilitation of war-torn areas. The dialogue which 
RADDHO has established with the administrative and mil-
itary authorities has led to an improvement in security for 
the population — a step on the long road to peace. 
During the 1970s, resentment against the government 
began to grow in Casamance, fuelled by increasing inter-
vention in the economic development of the area and the 
despoilment of vast areas of land. The Casamançais believed 
the State was more interested in the area's wealth than in its 
inhabitants. The majority of Casamançais are Muslim 
though the rebel movement is often linked to the Diola 
tribe, a predominantly Catholic group. But regardless of 
religion the majority of the population backed the denunci-
ation of the "northern domination" and "Senegalese neo-
colonialism". The situation was compounded by the region's 
isolation, cut off from the North by The Gambia. 
The situation came to a head in 1982. An impromptu 
demonstration was forcibly suppressed by the authorities in 
Ziguinchor. The Movement of Democratic Forces in 
Casamance (the MFDC) saw an opportunity to put them-
selves forward '. They took advantage of the crowds to dis-
tribute leaflets demanding independence. Following riots, 
people reassembled in the 'bois sacrés'
2 (the sacred woods) 
and resolved to launch an armed struggle to secure their 
independence. According to Abbé Augustin Diamacoune 
Senghor, the movement's leader, this was justified, as 
"legally, Casamance had never formed an integral part of the 
colony of Senegal" (this claim has subsequently been dis-
puted by a French expert
3). This struggle for independence 
has continued for the past 21 years, despite several bids for 
peace and a cease-fire in 2001. 
A census in 2000, conducted by the NGO Caritas, count-
ed more than 60,000 displaced or exiled people. The major-
ity were women and children from the Ziguinchor region, 
the principal scene of hostilities. Another outcome of the 
conflict has been that rice and groundnut production in 
Casamance have plummeted. Tourists are avoiding che area, 
with the exception of the secure beaches of Cap Skirring. 
Consequently unemployment has reached record levels. 
Farmers have abandoned their fields, which are strewn with 
landmines, children are deprived of schooling and migrants 
are marginalised. There have of course been the usual atroc-
ities that war brings in its wake: rape, torture and the loss of 
innocent lives. A few have profited from the conflict. It has 
proved a source of income for those in the arms, timber, car, 
cashew nut and Indian hemp (marijuana) trades. Alioune 
Tine, secretary-general of RADDHO asserts that "there are 
a number of more or less liberated areas in northern 
Casamance dedicated exclusively to the cultivation of 
Yamba [marijuana]. If lasting peace is to be achieved, this 
'mafia' has to be taken into account". According to some 
observers, the ramifications of this war economy even go as 
far as government. Moreover, the conflict has placed little 
financial burden on the state. The Senegalese army has 
enjoyed financial backing from the West — increasingly with 
Senegalese involvement in Africa's peacekeeping operations. 
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Forces against 
peace 
The spoils of illegal 
trade do not fully 
explain the parties' 
inability to find a 
peaceful solution to 
the conflict. But one complicating factor is that for the past ten 
years or so, the MFDC has been operating as two separate fac-
tions. Loyalty is divided between the Abbé Augustin 
Diamacoune Senghor, the honorary president, and Sidi Badji, 
interim secretary-general and founder of the Ättika armed 
wing. In geographical terms, this split has meant the creation 
of the 'Front Nord' (from the Gambia to the Casamance river), 
loyal to Sidi Badji, and the 'Front Sud' (from the river to 
Guinee Bissau), supporting Abbé Diamacoune. This polarisa-
tion dates back to the early 1990s, when Sidi Badji agreed to 
launch negotiations with the government against the express 
wishes of Abbé Diamacoune. 
Toda\' the two factions are keen to establish a common posi-
tion but observers would agree with Sidi Badji's spokesman 
when he says: "Neither the Abbé nor Sidi Badji have complete 
control over the resistance in the current climate". According to 
Adolphe Minkilane, member of the RADDHO programme in 
Ziguinchor: "Those brandishing the weapons are todays deci-
sion-makers and power within the Movement is split between 
numerous rebel leaders, all of whom command their own indi-
vidual strongholds". RADDHO's secretary-general Alioune 
Tine points out a further difficulty: "The President, Abdoulaye 
Wade, whose presidential campaign promised to deliver a solu-
tion to the problem within 100 davs, has also played on and 
intensified the lack of unity within the MFDC... by assigning 
different negotiators to the two wings and seeking to deal 
directly with the rebels. He was slow to grasp that 'divide and 
rule' left the government without a credible negotiator". 
Furthermore, until recently the two leaders, both getting on 
in years, were receiving official funding from the State. As 
Adolphe Minkilane points out, "the conflict is a political 
money spinner. On the one hand, political leaders use it to get 
themselves elected to power, whilst, down the line, each and 
every player claims an indispensable role in resolving the con-
flict to justify holding onto their posición of power." 
To make matters worse splinters groups have emerged, most 
notably the external wing abroad, the 'Cadre Casamançais' in 
Dakar and the 'Socio-cultures' with close links to Abbé 
Diamacoune. Furthermore, as Mr Tine notes, 'the State dele-
gation prepares a course of action, then hesitates and conse-
quently leaves itself open to manipulation. The negotiators do 
not always consult the appropriate sources and are often ill-
informed. To add to this, the world of the MFDC is an 
extremely complex one. Some are involved in valuable work, 
others less so. If we are honest, it is political incompetence that 
is holding up the peace process." 
Finally, the religious aspect of the conflict renders the defini-
tion of a peaceful solution even more difficult. The 'bois sacrés' 
are the exclusive religious and political domain of tribe elders, 
accessible only to initiated members. The secrecy surrounding 
the complex MFDC hierarchy indirectly reflects the tradition-
al governance of the villages from the forests by Diola elders. It 
was here that the vow was taken to free Casamance. In the eves 
of a great many members of the resistance, it would he tanta-
mount to betrayal to break this vow. 
Bertrand Diamacoune, brother of Abbé Diamacoune, 
reflects the view of many when he says, "the situation has gone 
on long enough. Everyone has had enough, members of the 
resistance and the Senegalese army included". Women, exas-
perated by the conflict and demoralised bv the huge loss of life 
when the Ziguinchor-Dakar ferry sank last year
4, have resort-
ed to mystical practices to exorcise the demons of war, seeking 
to undo the vows taken in the bois sacrés. As Fatou Cissé, head 
of a women's group in the region of Ziguinchor, explains: "It is 
their way of seeking a solution to the crisis and people listen to 
them. In any case, their involvement in the restoration of peace 
is imperative." 
Caught up in all of this, the politicians are appealing to 
NGOs to act as facilitators. RADDHO, for its part, has 
launched a new initiative entitled 'Peace Now', enlisting the 
help of all those keen to see an end to the deadlock. It is also 
urging rebel leaders to combine their ideas and speak with one 
voice in their negotiations with the government. So far, politi-
cians have failed to lay any foundations for sustainable devel-
opment in Casamance. Civil society may well represent a real-
istic alternative, capable of silencing arms and bringing sterile 
negotiations to life. ■ 
1. On 2d December 1982, the Movement of Democratic forces in Casamance 
(MFDC). at lilt- Instigation of Abbé Augustin Diamacoune Senghor. re-emerged, 
taking the name of the former regional party created in 19-17. 
2. A place of ceremony and initiatory rites. 
3. hi 1993 the two parlies consented to a French expert,Jacques ('harpy, 
conducting historical research to determine whether Casamance hail formed 
an integral part of Senegal in tile colonial past,'the French expert's report, 
published in November 1993. found Casamance lo be "Senegalese".These 
conclusions were disputed bv Abbe Diamacoune in a counter-report published 
in early 1995. 
4. 'the sinking in a storm of lhe Senegalese fern: the Joola, on 26 September last 
year, left 1,3-tO dead from lhe region of Ziguinchor alone, according to one 
claim. In early November, a government-appointed panel of enquiry had put 
(be death toll at an estimated 1.200 Willi just (> I survivors.'File ferry had a 
capacity of just 350 passengers plus about forty crew. profile 
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General Information 
Area: 
Population: 
Capital: 
Other main towns: 
Languages: 
Religions: 
196190 km
2
 
10589 571 
Dakar 
Thiès, Diourbel, Louga, Fatick, Kaolack, Saint-Louis, Tambacounda, Kolda and 
Ziguinchor 
French (official language). 
Other languages: Wolof, Pular, Serer, Jola, Malinke and Soninke 
Muslim (94%), Christian (5%), animisi and other traditional beliefs (1 %) 
Political structure 
Official name: 
President: 
New Constitution: 
Legal system: 
Legislative branch: 
Republic of Senegal 
Abdoulaye Wade. Succeeded Abdou Diouf in 2000. 
Adopted on 7 January 2001 
Based on French civil law system 
Unicameral National Assembly composed of 120 members elected for 5 years. 
Next elections: 2006 (legislative) and 2007 (presidential) 
Economy 
Currency: 
GDP per capita (PPP): 
GDP growth: 
Inflation: 
Unemployment: 
Main economic sectors: 
CFA Franc (1 euro = CFAF 655.957) 
US$1510 (2000) 
5.7% (2001) 
3.3% (2001) 
48% (2001) 
Trade, banking, transport, chemicals, fisheries, tourism 
Social Indicators 
Human development index rating: 0.431695 (154th out of 173) 
Gini index: 
Life expectancy at birth: 
Under-5 mortality rate: 
Adult literacy rate: 
Population with 
improved water sources: 
Population growth rate: 
41.3 
52.3 years 
139 per thousand (2000) 
37.3 
78% 
2.4% 
Sources: UNDP: Human Development Report 2002; CIA: The World Fact Book 
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Commerce, Propriété intellectuelle 
et Développement durable 
vus de l'Afrique 
(Trade, intellectual property and sustainable 
development as seen from Africa) 
This reference work gathers together number of analyses and opin-
ions on the thorny issue of intellectual property rights (IPR). This 
topic is central to the question of access to medicines, protection of 
traditional knowledge, patenting of living material and genetically 
modified organisms. The originality of 
this publication is that it gives a voice to 
Africa, a continent which is particularly 
concerned by the future of IPR - as 
regards food security, public health and 
education. 
The authors include officials, World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) negotiators, 
academics and representatives of civil 
society. The purpose of the work is not 
so mudi to briny a scientific comple-
ment to the controversial debate on IPR, 
but to create, in Africa, a critical mass of 
sufficiently informed actors to define 
and defend their own interests. 
Commerce, Propriété intellectuelle et Développement durable vus de l'Afrique 
Under the direction of Ricardo Meléndez Ortiz, Christophe Bellmann, Anne Chetaille, 
Taouflk Ben Abdallah, ICTSD, ENDA, SOLAGRAL, 2002 (In French only). 
Cuba 
and the European Union 
m^asnr-^msåm 
Commerce, 
Propriété Intellectuelle & 
Développement Durable 
Vus de l'Afrique 
Cuba and 
the European 
Union 
The year 2003 marks a decisive 
step in strengthening the 
relations between the European 
Union and Cuba. Cuba formally 
applied for accession to the 
ACP-EC Partnership Agreement 
(Cotonou Agreement) on 
8 January 2003. This brochure 
describes EU-Cuba relations, and 
covers political, commercial, and 
development cooperation, 
including humanitarian aid. 
Published by the Commission's Directorate-
General for Development. 
The brochure is available in English and 
Spanish at the following address: 
Directorate-General for Development 
Information and Communication Unit 
B-1049 Belgium 
Internet: 
http://europa.gu.lnt/comm/development 
e-mail: development@cec.eu.int 
Fax: +32.2.299.25.25 
FARMERS' 
INITIATIVES IN 
LAND HUSBANDRY 
Promising technologies for the 
drier areas of East Africa 
«ritti 
P. Lemcck. 
A. Lwakuba and 
C. Mburu 
Farmers' Initiatives in Land Husbandry; 
promising technologies for the drier areas of East Africa 
In the semi-arid areas of East Africa, there are farmers who are innovating in all sorts of ways, 
combining conservation with production. These farmers have proved to be excellent sources of 
learning, getting their message across to their fellow fanners better than outsiders can. The 
problems of land degradation and poverty in those areas are acute, and the wealth of human 
resourcefulness found there needs to be tapped into and actively supported. 
"Farmers' Initiatives in Land Husbandry" documents and describes a series of technologies 
which have been developed — or at least adapted to their own requirements - by farmers them-
selves in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Its primary aim is to document and analyse specific 
land husbandry initiatives on the basis of data collected, measurements taken, and estimates 
made. It's purpose is to help technicians and managers of projects, as well as literate farmers, 
to review a range of alternative practices for the drier areas in the region. 
Promoting Farmer Innovation is a programme in East Africa which seeks to stimulate farmer 
innovation. This book shows how the programme has enlisted the help of WOCAT (World 
Overview of Conservation Approaches and Technologies), to evaluate and document some of 
the most interesting innovative technologies that it has uncovered. 
"Farmers' Initiatives in Land Husbandry" does not dwell on methodology, but concentrates 
on documenting specific innovators and their initiatives. Above all it is impressive that local 
men and women using their own resources have devised the systems described in these pages. 
The technologies may not be technically perfect, but they work. 
The 18 technical initiatives described in the book have been chosen on the basis of their 
potential for improving conservation through production, and their potential (already being fulfilled in many cases) for rapid 
spread to other farmers. These span a broad range of interventions, from gully harnessing to organic matter management to 
local forest management practices. Some have been developed by men, some by women. 
It is not a technical cookbook recommending validated and well proven practices. However, enough technical information 
is given for the concepts to be understood, and in most cases for these technologies to be tried out and adapted to different 
environments, through a farmer/extension/researcher partnership. 
DetiiiL·: Farmers' Initiatives in Land Husbandry; Promising technologies for the drier areas of East Africa, written/edited by: Kithinji Mutunga 
and Will Critchley, Nairobi, published by: Regional Land Management Unit, RELMAJSwcdisb International Development Cooperation Agency 
(Sida), 2001. (RELMA Technical Report Series no. 27. Available at the following email addresses: RELMAJSida: relma@cgiar.org, WOCAT: 
wocaiC^eiuh.unihc.ch, CDCS/Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam: cdcs@vu.nl. For more information contact: CDCS/Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 
De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands, tel. (0)20-444 90 90, fax (0)20-444 90 95, email: vvam.tuyp@dienst.vu.nl 
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Published in partnership between: 
UNDP - Office to Combat Decertification and Drought (UNSOYESD&BDP) 
and SkJas, Regional Land Management Unit, 2001 Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Metherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
France 
Territorial collect ivi t i ί-s 
Mavorte 
St Pierre and Miquelon 
Overseas territories 
New Caledonia 
and dependencies 
French Polynesia 
French Southern and Antarctic 
territories 
Wallis and Futuna islands 
Netherlands 
Overseas amntrics 
Netherlands Antilles: 
Bonaire, Curaçao, St Martin, 
Saba, St Eustache 
Aruba 
Denmark 
Country having special 
relations with Denmark 
Greenland 
United Kingdom 
Overseas countries and territories 
Anguilla 
British Antarctic Territory 
British Indian Ocean Territory 
British Virgin Islands 
Cayman Islands 
Falkland Islands 
Southern Sandwich Islands 
and dependencies 
Montserrat 
Pitcairn Island 
St Helena and dependencies 
Turks and Caicos Islands 
Mar'.hull hlamia 
Angola 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Bahamas 
Barbados 
Belize 
Benin 
Botswana 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Cape Verde 
Central African Republic 
Chad 
Comoros 
Congo 
Cook Islands 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Cuba* 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
Djibouti 
Cuba was admitted as a new member of the ACP group i: 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic 
Equatorial Guinea 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Fiji 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Grenada 
Guinea 
Guinea Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Jamaica 
Kenya 
Kiribati 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
τ December 2000, but is no 
General Secretarial of lhe ACP Group of States: Avenue Georges He 
'Phis list does not prejudice the status of these countries and territories ι 
iri 451, 1200 Brussels. Belgium. Telephone: »32 2 743 0600 
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Malawi 
Mali 
Marshall islands 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Micronesia 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Nauru 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Nine 
Palau 
Papua New Guinea 
Rwanda 
St Kitts and Nevis 
St Lucia 
St Vincent and the G 
Samoa 
Sao Tome' and Principe 
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Senegal 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
Solomon Islands 
Somalia 
South Africa 
Sudan 
Suriname 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Tonga 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Tuvalu 
Uganda 
Vanuatu 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 